Don Lippert v. Latoya Hughes

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210
DON LIPPERT, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
LATOYA HUGHES, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:10-cv-4603 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 13, 2025 — DECIDED A PRIL 2, 2026
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, LEE, and M ALDONADO, Circuit
Judges.
LEE, Circuit Judge. A class of prisoners in the custody of the
Illinois Department of Corrections sued the department’s di-
rector, its director of health services, and the governor of Illi-
nois in their official capacities (collectively, “IDOC”) for
providing inadequate medical and dental care in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. The class was subsequently certified,
and the parties settled the case and agreed to the entry of a

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2 Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210
consent decree, which, among other things, required IDOC to
create an implementation plan to rectify the systemic deficien-
cies identified in the decree. After several years of protracted
litigation, the district court approved an implementation plan
that was incorporated into the consent decree.
As time went on, IDOC filed several motions under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(b) asking the district court to modify the consent
decree in various ways. In turn, Plaintiffs filed a motion to ex-
tend the consent decree beyond the original expiration date.
IDOC appealed the various rulings that went against it in two
separate appeals, and Plaintiffs cross-appealed (the cross-ap-
peal was subsequently dismissed). One notable issue IDOC
raises is whether the district court, having already approved
the implementation plan, must make certain findings re-
quired by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), before enforcing any of its provi-
sions. IDOC argues that this is the case, presumably believing
that the district court’s various orders leave this question in
doubt. But, as we read this record, the district court in fact
agreed with IDOC on this issue. Turning then to IDOC’s two
appeals, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to address cer-
tain issues raised in the first appeal and affirm the remainder.
I
The certified class consists of IDOC prisoners with serious
medical and dental needs. They sued IDOC, alleging that it
failed to provide necessary medical and dental care in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment. Eventually, the parties arrived
at a settlement and agreed to the entry of a consent decree; the
district court approved the consent decree in 2019 and
amended it in 2022.

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Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210 3
Its purpose, the consent decree states, is to ensure that
IDOC “implements sufficient measures … to provide ade-
quate medical and dental care to those incarcerated in the Il-
linois Department of Corrections with serious medical or den-
tal needs while ensuring the availability of necessary services,
supports and other resources to meet these needs.” As part of
the consent decree, the parties also stipulated that it “com-
plies in all respects with … 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a).”
To achieve its broad purpose, the consent decree laid out
a host of requirements and standards that IDOC had to meet
in providing health and dental services. Rather than mandat-
ing specific detailed actions, however, the consent decree im-
posed rather general benchmarks and goals such as: provid-
ing “access to an appropriate level of primary, secondary, and
tertiary care”; “implement[ing] changes in … [i]nitial intake
screening”; the “development and implementation … of a
comprehensive set of health care policies”; ensuring a certain
minimum qualification for physicians; providing “sufficient
private and confidential sick-call areas in all of its facilities”;
maintaining various medical records; providing sufficient
medical professionals to provide necessary services; and
providing “[r]outine and regular dental cleanings” to “all
prisoners at every IDOC facility.”
To put flesh on the bones, the consent decree required
IDOC, with the assistance of an “independent and impartial
Monitor,” to submit an implementation plan to accomplish
the decree’s mandates. The duties of the monitor included
“assisting the IDOC in assessing staffing needs and assisting
IDOC with the preparation of an initial staffing plan” as well
as “providing input on the Defendants’ Implementation
Plan.” The monitor also was tasked with “evaluat[ing]

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4 Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210
Defendants’ compliance with [the consent decree], including
identifying actual and potential areas of substantial compli-
ance, partial compliance and non-compliance and bringing
these areas to the Parties’ attention.”
The implementation plan was due within six months from
the monitor’s selection and subject to the monitor’s review.
Once finalized and approved, the implementation plan would
become part of the consent decree.
The monitor was selected in March 2019, and despite the
six-month deadline, IDOC did not submit the implementation
plan until December 2021. The monitor then reviewed the
plan, found that the plan failed to comply with the consent
decree in multiple ways, and made detailed recommenda-
tions as to each issue.
In response, IDOC argued that, in order for the district
court to rule in the monitor’s favor and adopt any particular
recommendation, § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the PLRA requires the
court to find that IDOC’s proposed approach violated federal
law and the monitor’s recommendation was the least intru-
sive means necessary to correct the violation.1 As the months
1Section 3626(a)(1)(A) provides in relevant part:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison condi-
tions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the viola-
tion of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The
court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the
court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further
than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is
the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).

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Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210 5
passed, IDOC did not address the deficiencies identified by
the monitor, and, on June 22, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a motion
asking the court to find IDOC in contempt. The court granted
that motion on August 5, 2022.
Then, after the parties and the monitor narrowed their dis-
putes somewhat, they presented the remaining issues to the
court for resolution. In short, the monitor believed that many
of IDOC’s proposals were too vague and failed to identify
specific steps IDOC would take to satisfy the consent decree
requirements. IDOC disagreed and maintained its argument
that, before rejecting its proposal in favor of the monitor’s rec-
ommendations, the district court had to make the findings re-
quired by § 3626(a)(1)(A) for each issue.
The district court was clearly frustrated with IDOC’s re-
fusal to engage with the monitor’s recommendations, noting
that “[t]he disputes in the comment threads [of the proposed
implementation plan] were so numerous that defendants
were either unable or unwilling to provide substantial rebut-
tals including counterproposals to the Monitor’s proposed
changes.” This, in the court’s view, “basically left [it] to
choose between defendants’ version and the Monitor’s, with-
out much to provide grounds for the decision either way.”
Given the state of things, the district court concluded that
“the only fair and workable option at this point is to accept
the Monitor’s proposed edits to defendants’ draft [plan].”
And so, it adopted essentially all of the monitor’s recommen-
dations, observing:
Accepting the Monitor’s recommendations as prima
facie evidence of how to implement the reforms neces-
sary to achieve compliance with the consent decree

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6 Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210
seems like an appropriate starting point—and defend-
ants will not be heard to complain about any unfair-
ness they may purport to find in it, given that the Court
has held them in contempt for failing to meet their con-
tractual obligations with regard to the implementation
plan.
At the same time, recognizing its obligations under
§ 3626(a)(1)(A), the district court put the parties “on notice
that any attempt to enforce a provision of the implementation
plan, certainly to the extent it concerns a matter such as a par-
ticular staffing requirement, will likely require supporting ev-
idence on which the Court can base findings meeting the
PLRA’s narrowness-need-intrusiveness requirements.” The
court then ordered the parties to submit a revised final imple-
mentation plan consistent with its order.
IDOC complied, and, on August 1, 2023, the parties filed a
joint motion for entry of the implementation plan to become
part of the consent decree, which the court granted. The joint
motion did note, however, that the plan was being entered
over IDOC’s objection that the district court had failed to com-
ply with § 3626(a)(1)(A) with regard to certain specified plan
terms.
Shortly thereafter, IDOC filed several motions to modify
the consent decree under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). First, IDOC
asked the court to strike from the consent decree the prior
stipulation that the consent decree had complied “in all re-
spects with … § 3626(a)(1)(A).” The court denied the motion.
Second, IDOC filed a motion requesting that the court ex-
cise the implementation plan from the consent decree or, al-
ternatively, terminate the implementation plan altogether

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Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210 7
based on the court’s failure to make the necessary findings
under § 3626(a)(1)(A). The court reserved ruling on the former
and denied the latter without prejudice.
Meanwhile, as the consent decree’s expiration ap-
proached, Plaintiffs moved to extend the consent decree, con-
tending that IDOC had failed to substantially comply with its
obligations under it.2 The district court agreed, and, after
making numerous findings that IDOC had failed to live up to
its obligations under the consent decree, the court extended
the term to May 9, 2027. Each of these three rulings are the
subject of IDOC’s first appeal.
2 Section IX.B.5 of the amended consent decree states (emphasis
added):
This Decree and the Court’s jurisdiction over the Decree and un-
derlying case shall terminate five (5) years after the Effective Date,
with respect to any provisions of the Decree for which there is no
outstanding determination that Defendants are not in substantial
compliance. If the Court determines that Defendants are not in
substantial compliance with any provisions of the Decree at any
time during the five (5) year period of the Decree, the Court’s
jurisdiction with respect to such provisions shall continue for
the remainder of the five (5) year period or for a period to be de-
termined by the Court of not more than three (3) years from the
date of the Court’s finding the Defendants are not in substantial
compliance. If after eight (8) years, the Court determines that the
Defendants have failed to come into substantial compliance with
respect to one or all provisions of the Decree, the Court’s jurisdic-
tion with respect to such provisions shall continue for a period of
not more than two (2) additional years for that particular provi-
sion(s). In any event, this Decree shall terminate no later than ten
(10) years after its Effective Date.

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8 Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210
This left IDOC’s motion under Rule 60(b) to completely
excise the implementation plan from the consent decree. In
IDOC’s view, the implementation process had strayed far
afield of what the parties had envisioned when they agreed to
the consent decree. After reviewing the procedural history,
the district court agreed. For example, the court recognized
that the consent decree had anticipated a process where IDOC
would take the lead in creating the implementation plan
while the monitor played more of a supporting role. Instead,
the way things played out, the court adopted almost all of the
monitor’s recommendations (which were numerous) over
IDOC’s objections. Thus, the district court agreed with IDOC
that there was a significant change in circumstances that war-
ranted modification of some sort.
In the court’s view, however, IDOC’s request to remove
the implementation plan entirely from the consent decree far
exceeded what was needed. At the same time, the district
court acknowledged, it “cannot enforce the requirements of
the implementation plan against defendants without making
the requisite PLRA findings.” “To the extent that the consent
decree, as drafted, suggests otherwise,” the court concluded,
“a modification is appropriate.”
Unfortunately, Plaintiffs had not provided a counterpro-
posal, which left the court “to fashion an appropriate modifi-
cation on its own.” And, after weighing various factors, the
district court decided to amend § IV.C of the consent decree
to state:
The Implementation Plan, and all amendments or up-
dates thereto, shall become enforceable as part of this
Decree, provided that the Court makes any factual

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Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210 9
findings that may be required by the PLRA prior to en-
forcement of its terms.
This, the court reasoned, struck the proper balance be-
tween providing IDOC the requisite flexibility to implement
reforms and allowing Plaintiffs to demonstrate that a particu-
lar reform is necessary, narrowly drawn, and the least intru-
sive means to correct the harm. IDOC’s second appeal chal-
lenges this ruling.
II
Turning to first principles, we must confirm our own juris-
diction. Federal appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to
reviewing “final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. Section 1292(a)(1), however, grants us jurisdiction to
review a district court’s interlocutory order “granting, contin-
uing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refus-
ing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court.”
“[W]e approach the § 1292(a)(1) exception ‘somewhat gin-
gerly lest a floodgate be opened’ that would deluge the appel-
late courts with piecemeal litigation.” Albert v. Trans Union
Corp., 346 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Gardner v.
Westinghouse Broad. Co., 437 U.S. 478, 481–82 (1978)). Thus, this
circuit “has repeatedly held that it will look beyond labels
such as ‘clarification’ or ‘modification’ to consider the actual
effect of the order.” Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 178 F.3d 951,
956–57 (7th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
Under our caselaw, § 1292(a)(1) imposes two require-
ments. Id. at 957. First, an interlocutory order qualifies as “a
modification (however labeled)” “only when a court substan-
tially alters the pre-existing legal relationship of the parties.”

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10 Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210
Id. (citation omitted). Second, “it must be apparent or obvious
that [the] order has such an effect before § 1292(a)(1) jurisdic-
tion will be proper.” Id. (citation omitted).
We lack jurisdiction to review two of the three rulings that
form the grounds for IDOC’s first appeal. IDOC’s appeal of
the district court’s denial of its request to strike the stipulation
from the decree does not satisfy § 1292(a)(1) because, alt-
hough the stipulation was a term in the consent decree, it was
not itself an injunction. See, e.g., Bogard v. Wright, 159 F.3d
1060, 1063 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding a lack of jurisdiction over
the grant of extending a monitor because the “appointment of
the monitor was not itself an injunction, although it was a pro-
vision in an equitable decree.”). Moreover, given that the par-
ties assented to the stipulation as part of the consent decree, it
is not “apparent or obvious” that the order denying IDOC’s
request to strike the stipulation substantially altered “the pre-
existing legal relationship of the parties.” See Gautreaux, 178
F.3d at 957.
We also lack jurisdiction over IDOC’s appeal of the district
court’s order extending the term of the consent decree. In
granting the extension, the court merely applied § IX.B.5 of
the consent decree that not only granted the court with the
authority to extend the consent decree but laid out the precise
terms and limitations for doing so. And, because the parties
agreed to this section when the consent decree was entered, it
is not apparent that the extension substantially altered the
parties’ pre-existing legal relationship. See, e.g., Bogard, 159
F.3d at 1063.
As for the remaining issues on appeal, our jurisdiction is
sound. IDOC appeals the district court’s denial of its motion
to modify the consent decree by terminating the

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Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210 11
implementation plan and the court’s denial of its motion to
excise the plan from the decree. Both requests, if granted,
would have substantially altered the pre-existing relationship
between the parties; therefore, § 1292(a)(1) is satisfied. See
Jones-El v. Berge, 374 F.3d 541, 544 (7th Cir. 2004).
Because IDOC’s objection to both orders is premised on a
common theme—the district court’s failure to make the req-
uisite findings under § 3626(a)(1)—we will consider the two
in tandem.
III
We review the denial of relief from judgment under Rule
60(b) for abuse of discretion. Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. of
Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 263 (1978). Likewise, “[w]e evaluate both the
district court’s grant of injunctive relief and the scope of that
relief for abuse of discretion.” Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 554
(7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). But we adopt the court’s
factual findings unless clearly erroneous. See Shakman v. Clerk
of Cook Cnty., 994 F.3d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 2021). “A finding is
clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been commit-
ted.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)
(citation modified).
The Supreme Court has set forth a two-part test to deter-
mine whether modification of a consent decree is warranted
under Rule 60(b). Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S.
367 (1992). First, the movant “bears the burden of establishing
that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision
of the decree.” Id. at 383. The movant may meet its threshold
burden by showing “a significant change either in factual

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12 Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210
conditions or in law.” Id. at 384. Second, if the movant satisfies
this initial burden, “the court should consider whether the
proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed cir-
cumstance.” Id. at 383.
Faithfully applying Rufo, the district court first found that
IDOC had shown a significant factual change in circum-
stances. Although the consent decree had designated IDOC as
the primary drafter of the implementation plan (with the
monitor providing assistance), the implementation plan
adopted by the court was based predominantly on the moni-
tor’s opinion and recommendations. As the court put it, “alt-
hough the parties intended for the implementation plan to be
‘create[d]’ by defendants,” after IDOC failed to address the
monitor’s concerns, “the plan was essentially rewritten by the
Monitor and approved by the Court in its revised form.” On
this record, we cannot say that the district court’s finding of
changed circumstances was clearly erroneous.
Moving to the next step, the district court held that com-
plete removal of the implementation plan from the consent
decree (as IDOC had requested) was excessive and not suita-
bly tailored to the change in circumstances. Plaintiffs now
contend that IDOC waived any objection to maintaining the
plan by joining the motion to enter it. But this is the first time
that Plaintiffs have offered this argument, thereby forfeiting it
on appeal. See DM Trans, LLC v. Scott, 38 F.4th 608, 619 (7th
Cir. 2022) (issues and arguments raised for the first time on

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Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210 13
appeal are forfeited). And, in any event, IDOC preserved its
objection in the joint motion as noted above.3
Turning to the merits, the district court recognized that the
current situation was due, in large part, to “defendants’ flout-
ing—for years—their obligation under the consent decree …
to the point that the Court was forced to find them in con-
tempt.” It had accepted the monitor’s recommendations (at
last, on a preliminary basis) given “defendants’ refusal to
make a serious attempt at an implementation plan.” And the
court was clearly concerned that excising the implemention
plan in toto would leave the consent decree rudderless.
That said, the district court correctly acknowledged that
“[d]efendants’ history of noncompliance does not blunt the
requirements of the PLRA.” Therefore, it fashioned a middle
ground by amending § IV.C of the consent decree in the man-
ner described, in essence requiring Plaintiffs to establish the
§ 3626(a)(1)(A) factors—that any prospective relief be “nar-
rowly drawn, extend[] no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right, and [] the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right”—be-
fore enforcing any term in the implementation plan. This, the
court reasoned, would respect IDOC’s need for flexibility to
“adopt and implement policies that balance prison resources,
3 Even if Plaintiffs’ argument were not forfeited, their reliance on As-
sociation of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 99
F.3d 261 (7th Cir. 1996), is misplaced. In contrast to IDOC’s explicit preser-
vation of its objection to the court’s adopting portions of the implementa-
tion plan in violation of § 3626(a)(1)(A), ACORN involved a standard re-
fusal to acknowledge wrongdoing in a consent decree, which we held was
insufficient to preserve the right to appeal the decree as a whole. See id. at
262.

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14 Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210
safety concerns, and inmate health,” Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th
703, 713 (7th Cir. 2022), while preserving Plaintiffs’ ability to
demonstrate a reform’s indispensability.
Despite the amendment’s language, IDOC insists that the
district court erred by failing to make the § 3626(a)(1)(A) find-
ings when denying its Rule 60(b) motions. But IDOC con-
ceded at oral argument that, given the § IV.C amendment, the
implementation plan imposes no binding obligations upon it.
And Plaintiffs agreed, admitting that they are not entitled to
enforce any part of the plan unless § IV.C is satisfied.
This rather peculiar posture stands in stark contrast to the
cases upon which IDOC relies. See Doe v. Cook County, 798
F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir. 2015) (overturning a district court’s de-
termination that the requisite PLRA findings were unneces-
sary); Rasho, 22 F.4th at 712 (vacating a permanent injunction
for exceeding the least-intrusiveness requirement of the
PLRA); Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)
(same). During oral argument, IDOC clarified that all it was
really seeking is a clear statement that the implementation
plan is not enforceable unless and until the district court
makes the findings that § 3626(a)(1)(A) requires. As we see it,
the district court’s modification does just that.
* * *
We DISMISS for lack of jurisdiction IDOC’s appeal of the
district court’s order denying the motion to strike the stipula-
tion from the consent decree and the order granting Plaintiffs’
motion to extend the consent decree. We AFFIRM the district
court’s order denying in part and granting in part IDOC’s mo-
tion to excise the plan from the consent decree or, in the alter-
native, to modify the consent decree. Because we affirm the

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Nos. 24-1998 & 24-2210 15
district court’s modification of the consent decree, we also
AFFIRM the district court’s order denying IDOC’s motion to
terminate the implementation plan. We REMAND for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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