United States of America v. Ashantae Corruthers

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff–Appellee/
Cross-Appellant
v.
A SHANTAE C ORRUTHERS ,
Defendant–Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 22-20066-001 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED SEPTEMBER 18, 2025 — D ECIDED A PRIL 27, 2026
____________________
Before R IPPLE , LEE , and P RYOR , Circuit Judges.
P RYOR , Circuit Judge. On October 4, 2022, a federal grand
jury charged Ashantae Corruthers with conspiracy to illegally
purchase and transfer a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371
(Count I), and conspiracy to engage in misleading conduct, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(3), 1512(k), and 2 (Count II).
Corruthers later pled guilty to both charges and was

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2 Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672
sentenced to an above-guidelines sentence of 48 months’ im-
prisonment. It is this sentence that is at issue in this appeal.
We find no errors by the district court, so we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Corruthers grew up in Kankakee, Illinois in the 1990s,
where she became friends with Regina Lewis. In 2020, Cor-
ruthers was living in Indianapolis, Indiana and Lewis in Nor-
mal, Illinois. Lewis contacted Corruthers to request her assis-
tance in purchasing a firearm for her cousin, Darrion Lafa-
yette, in exchange for a couple hundred dollars. Corruthers
agreed.
In November 2020, Lafayette and Lewis traveled from Illi-
nois to Indiana to complete the straw purchase.1 After retriev-
ing Corruthers, the group traveled to Indy Trading Post/Full
Throttle Arms, located at 2851 Madison Avenue in Indianap-
olis, Indiana to complete the firearm purchase. While La-
feyette waited in the car, Corruthers and Lewis went inside
the store. Once inside, Lewis texted Lafayette to confirm
which firearm he wanted. Lafayette sent three text messages
in response: “Glock 48,” “Get some shells too,” and “Hallow-
tips [sic] if u can.”
Corruthers, following Lafayette’s directive, purchased 50
rounds of Sellier & Bellot nine-millimeter ammunition and a
Glock, Model 48, nine-millimeter, semiautomatic pistol, bear-
ing serial number ADTZ976. To complete the purchase,
1 For purposes of this appeal, the term “straw purchase” refers to a trans-
action where one person purchases a firearm for another person. See e.g.,
United States v. Inglese, 282 F.3d 528, 531–32 (7th Cir. 2002).

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Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672 3
Corruthers filled out a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (“ATF”) Form 4473, Firearms Transaction
Record. Corruthers certified that she was the actual buyer of
the firearm and that she was not purchasing the firearm on
behalf of another.
Completing the transaction, Corruthers and Lewis re-
turned to the car with Lafayette. Corruthers then gave the
firearm to Lewis, who then gave the gun to Lafayette.
Three months later, on February 21, 2021, the Champaign,
Illinois Police Department (CPD) responded to a call involv-
ing a domestic dispute and gunshots being fired. When CPD
officers arrived, it was reported that Lafayette shot a gun into
the air as two women were arguing about their relationship
with him. Lafayette then fled from the scene. CPD officers re-
covered one cartridge casing stamped with “9x19 S&B 20.”
On March 10, 2021, Lewis texted Lafayette asking for the
model of the gun purchased for him by her and Corruthers.
Lafayette responded and asked for Corruthers’ phone num-
ber. In that same text message, Lafayette warned Lewis not to
tell anyone that he had already shot the gun four times. In re-
sponse to Lewis calling Lafayette’s actions “dumb” because
Corruthers had not yet reported the gun as stolen, Lafayette
bragged about his plan to not get caught and “getting rid of
it,” if necessary.
Lewis texted Lafayette again on March 29, 2021, to ask for
the firearm’s serial number. Because he had scratched it off
the gun, Lewis indicated that he would get it from the gun’s
box. After exchanging a few additional text messages with
Lewis, Lafayette texted Corruthers asking her to purchase
him another firearm. Lafayette also gave Corruthers the serial

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4 Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672
number from the first firearm she purchased for him, which
she later used to report the firearm stolen.
On April 26, 2021, Corruthers filed a false report with the
Indianapolis, Indiana Metropolitan Police Department alleg-
ing her firearm had been stolen.
A few weeks later, in the early morning hours of May 19,
2021, Lafayette was involved in a possible domestic disturb-
ance at an apartment complex in Champaign, Illinois. CPD
Officers Jeff Creel and Chris Oberheim were dispatched
around 3:24 a.m. to the scene. Upon arrival, the officers ob-
served Lafayette sitting in a parked vehicle with the door
open. As the officers approached him, Lafayette began firing
the Glock 48 that Corruthers had purchased for him, striking
Officer Creel and killing Officer Oberheim. Officer Creel man-
aged to return fire and kill Lafayette. Officer Creel was
wounded but survived.
About an hour later, between 4:38 a.m. and 5:02 a.m.,
Lewis called Corruthers approximately nine times. Around
5:23 a.m., Corruthers returned the call to Lewis and spoke
with her for about seven minutes. Both women spoke again
at approximately 8:15 a.m. for 28 minutes.
The Illinois State Police investigated the May 19, 2021, in-
cident as a “righteous” or “police-involved” shooting. Inves-
tigators recovered several items from the scene, including a
Glock, Model 48, nine-millimeter semiautomatic pistol, bear-
ing serial number ADTZ976, and multiple cartridge casings
with a “S&B 20 9x19” brand stamp.
ATF later traced the firearm back to Corruthers. On May
21, 2021, the ATF went to Corruthers’ home to speak with her
about the firearm. When ATF arrived, Corruthers was not

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Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672 5
home, but her brother was able to connect her with the agents.
On the call, Corruthers agreed to return to the apartment and
speak with ATF.
Before arriving at the apartment, Corruthers called Lewis
five times. Corruthers then returned home and provided sev-
eral false statements to the ATF, including that the Glock 48
firearm was purchased for personal protection; that the fire-
arm was stolen in March 2021; that she was unaware of why
her firearm was discovered at the scene of a police-involved
shooting in Champaign, Illinois; and that she did not know
Lafayette.
B. Procedural History
On October 4, 2022, a federal grand jury indicted Cor-
ruthers and Lewis, charging them with conspiracy to illegally
purchase and transfer a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371
(Count I), and conspiracy to engage in misleading conduct, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(3), 1512(k), and 2 (Count II).
On October 13, 2022, federal agents arrested Corruthers and
Lewis.
On May 16, 2023, Lewis pled guilty to the charges against
her in an agreement with the government. The district court
accepted Lewis’ guilty plea, adjudicated Lewis guilty of the
charges, and ordered her sentencing to occur on October 2,
2023. Roughly a month after Lewis’ plea, on June 22, 2023,
Corruthers pled “open” to conspiracy to illegally purchase
and transfer a firearm and conspiracy to engage in misleading
conduct. The district court accepted Corruthers’ guilty plea
on July 7, 2023.
Before sentencing, the United States Probation Office pre-
pared Presentence Investigation Reports (“PSR”) for Lewis

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6 Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672
and Corruthers. In the revised PSRs, the probation officer first
grouped the two counts of conviction pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 3D1.2(d). Next, the probation officer, in both revised PSR re-
ports, calculated a base offense level of 14 and added a two-
level enhancement for obstruction of justice resulting in an
adjusted offense level of 16. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2X1.1(a),
2K2.1(a)(6), and 3C1.1. With no criminal history points and a
three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Cor-
ruthers’ PSR calculated an advisory guideline range of 12 to
18 months’ imprisonment. Even though Lewis was subject to
the same charges and similar offense-level enhancements, her
PSR calculated an advisory range of 18 to 24 months’ impris-
onment because of Lewis’ criminal history. While the district
court attempted to coordinate both sentencings, scheduling
reasons not relevant to this appeal caused Lewis to be sen-
tenced first.2
1. Lewis’ Sentencing
On December 22, 2023, the district court held Lewis’ sen-
tencing hearing. During Lewis’ sentencing, the government
presented testimony from ATF Special Agent Cully
Schweska, who explained that the CPD had enlisted the Illi-
nois State Police (ISP) to investigate the May 19, 2021, shoot-
ing. Agent Schweska testified that the purpose of ISP’s “of-
ficer-involved shooting” investigation was to rule out possi-
ble police corruption in the wake of racial tension in the area.
The ISP investigators were also tasked with investigating
2 United States District Court Chief Judge for the Central District of Illi-
nois, Colin S. Bruce, originally presided over this case including the sen-
tencing of Lewis and Corruthers. This case was reassigned to Judge Mi-
chael M. Mihm on March 31, 2025.

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Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672 7
whether the firearm involved was a “drop gun.”3 Thus, ac-
cording to Agent Schweska, the motivation behind this inves-
tigation in part was to determine whether Officers Oberheim
and Creel’s actions were justified.
Based on the testimony and Lewis’ conduct, the govern-
ment argued that Lewis was an accessory after the fact to
Lafayette by obstructing ISP’s post-shooting investigation.
Thus, the government requested the district court calculate
Lewis’ sentence by cross-referencing a higher base offense
level under the obstruction of justice guideline. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2J1.2(c). The district court denied the government’s request,
finding that because Lafayette was already deceased on scene,
the only impact the ISP’s post-shooting investigation could
logically have was to determine whether Lafayette’s death re-
sulted from a “righteous shooting by an officer.” Finding no
murder investigation, the district court declined to apply the
§ 2J1.2(c) cross-reference to Lewis’ sentencing guideline cal-
culation. Instead, the court applied the offense level based on
the conviction for conspiracy to illegally purchase and trans-
fer a firearm. The district court sentenced Lewis to a term of
60 months’ imprisonment on Count I and 102 months’ impris-
onment on Count II, to be served concurrently.
2. Corruthers’ Sentencing
On July 19, 2024, the district court held a hearing to resolve
objections to Corruthers’ final PSR. The government argued
Corruthers’ proposed guidelines range was incorrect. Ac-
cording to the government, when the PSR grouped
3 The agent defined a “drop gun” as a firearm left behind at a crime scene
by a corrupt police officer “to cover their tracks if they did something
wrong.” (District Court Dkt. 89, at 16).

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8 Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672
Corruthers’ convictions, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c), the
base offense level applicable to the group was 30 and not 14
as outlined in the PSR. Similar to the argument presented at
Lewis’ sentencing, the government maintained that Cor-
ruthers’ conduct obstructed the ISP’s investigation into the
murder of Officer Oberheim fatally killed in the line of duty.
Instead of using the base offense level of 14 for conspiring to
illegally purchase and transfer a firearm under U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(7), the government argued for a base offense level
of 30 for obstructing a murder investigation, pursuant to the
§ 2J1.2(c) cross reference. Corruthers responded, arguing that
the § 2J1.2(c) cross reference did not apply because the district
court previously determined that ISP’s post-shooting investi-
gation was not a murder investigation. The district court over-
ruled the government’s objection “[f]or the same reasons ex-
pressed at … Lewis’ sentencing.”
The government also objected to the PSR’s three-level de-
crease for Corruthers accepting responsibility. The district
court agreed, finding Corruthers ineligible for the three-level
decrease contemplated in §§ 3E1.1(a), (b). Because Corruthers
does not challenge the district court’s denial of a reduction for
her acceptance of responsibility, we do not address that objec-
tion in resolving these appeals.
On August 12, 2024, the district court held a final sentenc-
ing hearing. The district court heard and received victim
statements from Officer Creel, Officer Oberheim’s family
members, and Corruthers’ mother. Corruthers also made a
statement in allocution. The district court adopted the PSR
and its findings, as modified. The court calculated Corruthers’
total offense level at 13 and her criminal history category as I,
resulting in a sentencing guidelines range of 21 to 27 months’

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Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672 9
imprisonment. Both the government and Corruthers’ counsel
agreed, while preserving their objections. The government re-
iterated its request that the § 2J1.2(c) cross reference be ap-
plied to Corruthers and that she be sentenced to a term of
102 months’ imprisonment, similar to Lewis.
The district court sentenced Corruthers to a term of
48 months’ imprisonment after considering the factors enu-
merated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court acknowl-
edged that Corruthers had no prior criminal history and was
not likely to repeat the offense. It differentiated Corruthers’
conduct from Lewis’ conduct in that Lewis acted as the “ful-
crum, the enabler, the quarterback” who set the underlying
offense in motion by persuading Corruthers to buy the fire-
arm for Lafayette. To justify its reason for deviating from the
recommended sentence under the guidelines, the district
court disagreed with U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1’s treatment of straw
purchasers and explained that “the guidelines as to straw
purchasers” failed to “take into account the consequences of
what could happen.” It further explained that the conse-
quences left unaccounted for by the guidelines included “vi-
olence being committed by others.” And after considering the
facts of this case, distinguishing Corruthers’ and Lewis’ cul-
pability, balancing the § 3553(a) factors, and considering the
parties’ arguments, the district court found the above-guide-
lines sentence to be appropriate.
Corruthers appeals, and the government brings a cross-
appeal.
II. A NALYSIS
Corruthers now appeals her sentence. In a cross-appeal,
the government appeals the district court’s refusal to apply

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10 Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672
the § 2J1.2(c)(1) cross-reference provision of the Sentencing
Guidelines when calculating Corruthers’ sentence. We ad-
dress each argument in turn.
A. Corruthers’ Appeal
Corruthers argues that her above-guidelines sentence is
substantively unreasonable. She contends that the district
court “failed to engage in a meaningful” review of the
§ 3553(a) factors and that the court’s policy disagreement with
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cannot reasonably support the upward vari-
ance.
When fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district
court “begins with a consideration of the [advisory] guide-
lines” as a rough approximation of the appropriate sentence
and then ends with a consideration of the factors outlined in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Warner, 792 F.3d 847, 855–
56 (7th Cir. 2015). Those factors include: (1) “the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteris-
tics of the defendant;” (2) the need for “a sentence that is suf-
ficient, but not greater than necessary to accomplish the basic
purposes of sentencing: just punishment, deterrence, incapac-
itation, and rehabilitation,” see Warner, 792 F.3d at 855 (cita-
tion modified); (3) “the kinds of sentences available;” (4) “the
kinds of sentence and the sentencing range” for that category
of offense; (5) “any pertinent policy statement;” (6) “the need
to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among [similarly
situated] defendants;” and (7) “the need to provide restitution
to any victims of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(7). It is
only after the district court weighs and balances these factors
that it can “make an individualized assessment based on the
facts presented.” Warner, 792 F.3d at 855 (quoting Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)).

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Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672 11
Our review is two-fold: we first “assess de novo whether
the court followed proper procedures,” id., and, if it did, we
review the substantive reasonableness of that sentence for
abuse of discretion, United States v. De Leon, 140 F.4th 920, 923
(7th Cir. 2025) (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 56).
Not contesting the procedural soundness of the district
court’s sentencing decision, Corruthers contends on appeal
that her sentence is substantively unreasonable. According to
Corruthers, the district court failed to conduct a “meaningful
review” of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and provide sup-
port for its decision to sentence her above the recommended
guidelines’ range. She maintains the sole basis for the above-
guidelines sentence given by the sentencing judge was the
court’s policy disagreement with U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 and this
alone was insufficient.4
“When reviewing above-guidelines sentences, we con-
sider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justifica-
tion is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of vari-
ance.” United States v. White, 126 F.4th 1315, 1323 (7th Cir.
2025) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. Wood, 31 F.4th 593, 600 (7th Cir. 2022). “As long as the
court gives an adequate justification for its departure, it may
impose a sentence above the guidelines range it deems too le-
nient.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
4 In a final argument in her brief, Corruthers seems to contend that the
district court’s statement of reasons contradicts the oral record. Finding
this argument perfunctory and undeveloped, we deem it waived and de-
cline to address it further. United States v. Avila, 106 F.4th 684, 696 n.4 (7th
Cir. 2024).

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12 Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672
Under this deferential standard, we “do not apply a pre-
sumption of unreasonableness to a sentence outside the
Guidelines range,” United States v. Dickerson, 42 F.4th 799, 806
(7th Cir. 2022) (citation modified), nor do we ask “what sen-
tence we would impose,” De Leon, 140 F.4th at 923 (citation
modified). Instead, we’re asking a narrow question: “whether
the district judge imposed a sentence for logical reasons that
are consistent with the factors enumerated in § 3553(a).”
United States v. Taylor, 160 F.4th 874, 886 (7th Cir. 2025) (cita-
tions and internal quotation marks omitted). The cornerstone
of our review is whether “the sentencing judge gives an ade-
quate justification for the departure.” Wood, 31 F.4th at 600
(citation modified); United States v. McKinney, 543 F.3d 911,
913–14 (7th Cir. 2008) (“We are no longer in a world where
the district courts must justify each marginal month over the
Guidelines; our review for reasonableness goes forward with
a greater focus on the final sentence chosen and the quality of
the justification for it.”).
We conclude that the district court here did not abuse its
discretion. Before imposing Corruthers’ sentence, it consid-
ered each of the § 3553(a) factors and fashioned the above-
guidelines sentence to the facts of Corruthers’ case.
First, and when addressing the nature and circumstances
of the offense, the district court disagreed with the policy un-
derlying U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 because it did not “take into account
the consequences of what could happen” as a result of straw
purchases. One example of the potential consequences is that
straw purchases can lead to violence being committed by oth-
ers. The district court also explained that it was troubled with
the fact that this was not a “routine straw purchase.” The dis-
trict court provided the following explanation:

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Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672 13
In this case, I cannot ignore the manner in which
this gun was provided to a violent felon, and
Ms. Corruthers met Mr. Lafayette. I might not
feel the same way if Ms. Lewis, the codefendant,
had simply gone to Corruthers, got the gun,
taken the gun back to Lafayette, and given it to
him … . But in this case, Lafayette was someone
who she met. She encountered. I presume there
were discussions with Mr. Lafayette. They
didn’t just sit there silently together. It is not a
routine straw purchase type of case.
The district court here explained how the specific context of
the nature and circumstances of Corruthers’ conduct sup-
ported an above-guidelines sentence in connection with the
§ 3553(a) factors. See, e.g., United States v. Hatch, 909 F.3d 872,
875 (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (finding the district court’s ex-
planation was sufficient when, among other things, the nature
of the offense was regarded as “troubling”); Morgan, 987 F.3d
at 633; United States v. Stinefast, 724 F.3d 925, 932 (7th Cir.
2013) (“An above-guidelines sentence is more likely to be rea-
sonable if it is based on factors sufficiently particularized to
the individual circumstances of the case rather than factors
common to offenders with like crimes.” (citation and quota-
tions omitted)).
Second, the court observed that the society-at-large was
the victim of Corruthers’ straw purchase transaction, and that
an above-guidelines sentence would “protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant.” Here, as in United States v.
Hargis, we have found a district court’s explanation that
“harm to others,” among other reasons, is an adequate expla-
nation for an above-guidelines sentence for a defendant

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14 Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672
without a record of criminal history. 747 F.3d 917, 920–21 (7th
Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Bridgewater, 950 F.3d 928, 938
(7th Cir. 2020) (affirming above-guidelines sentence for a de-
fendant without criminal history when it was based on the
need to “deter future criminal conduct” and “protect the pub-
lic”); United States v. Kennedy-Robey, 963 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir.
2020) (affirming sentence when the district court found a need
to protect the public from the defendant’s nonviolent offense).
Third, the court considered a chart prepared by Cor-
ruthers’ counsel comparing sentences issued in straw pur-
chaser cases by district courts across the country. In consider-
ing these cases, the district court distinguished Corruthers’
case from another “officer-involved shooting” case captioned
United States v. Danzy, No. 1:21-cr-00491-1 (N.D. Ill.). In Danzy,
the defendant was sentenced to an above-guidelines sentence
of 30 months’ imprisonment after he purchased a firearm for
his abuser. According to the district court, Corruthers’ case
was “a little worse” than Danzy. In the district court’s view,
Corruthers’ case was not the typical straw buyer case, and it
warranted a sentence reflecting that.
Lastly, the district court incorporated the policy reasons
listed in United States v. Davis as further support for its devia-
tion from the guideline sentence. See 795 F. App’x 970, 973 (7th
Cir. 2019) (non-precedential). And the district court was free
to do so. United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (“[D]istrict judges are at liberty to reject any
Guideline on policy grounds—though they must act reasona-
bly when using that power.”). Indeed, district courts have the
discretion “to reject and vary categorically from … Guidelines
based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines.” Id.
(citing Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 266 (2009)). Given

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Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672 15
the court’s explanation that Corruthers was not a routine
straw purchaser and the consequence of her action, we con-
clude the district court’s decision to reject U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1
was reasonable and therefore not an abuse of discretion.
After considering the § 3553(a) factors, explaining its pol-
icy disagreement with § 2K2.1, and distinguishing Cor-
ruthers’ case from the typical straw purchase and other straw
purchase cases, the district court determined that an above-
guidelines sentence was warranted. For this reason, we can-
not say, as Corruthers now argues, that the district court
failed to “meaningful[ly]” consider the guidelines. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hendrix, 74 F.4th 859, 868 (7th Cir. 2023) (find-
ing that mere “disagreement as to how a court weighs the
§ 3553(a) factors” is insufficient). Nor is the above-guidelines
sentence so far outside magnitude of the variance that we
have found unreasonable or require further explanation. Com-
pare United States v. Wade, 890 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2018),
with United States v. Bradley, 675 F.3d 1021, 1026 (7th Cir. 2012)
(per curiam). We will not substitute our judgment for the dis-
trict court below.
Accordingly, and finding no error in Corruthers’ above-
guidelines sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment, we affirm.
B. The Government’s Cross-Appeal
The government argues, in its cross-appeal, that the dis-
trict court erred when it calculated Corruthers’ Sentencing
Guideline range. We disagree.
A district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines
is reviewed de novo and its factual findings for clear error.
United States v. Law, 990 F.3d 1058, 1065 (7th Cir. 2021). “The
clearly erroneous standard is deferential, and we will not

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16 Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672
disturb the district court’s findings unless, after examining
the evidence and the reasonable inferences, ‘we are left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.’” Taylor, 160 F.4th at 880 (quoting United States v. Ford,
22 F.4th 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2022)).
In calculating the appropriate guideline, the district court
is guided by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, which instructs a sentencing
court to start with “the offense guideline section from Chapter
Two (Offense Conduct),” then calculate “the base offense
level” for each offense conviction using “any appropriate spe-
cific offense characteristics, cross references, and special in-
structions,” then apply appropriate adjustments from Chap-
ter 3, Parts A–C. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(a)(1)–(3). Where, as here,
“there are multiple counts of conviction,” the sentencing
court then groups closely related offenses together and calcu-
lates the base offense level for the grouped counts by using
the count with the highest offense level. U.S.S.G.
§§ 1B1.1(a)(4), 3D1.2(c), 3D1.3(a). While this framework is
“advisory and cannot mandate a strict decision-making se-
quence,” a district court’s “adherence to § 1B1.1 facilitates
consistency in sentencing and permits appellate courts to fol-
low the [district] court’s reasoning in imposing a particular
sentence.” Taylor, 160 F.4th at 881 (quoting United States v.
Pankow, 884 F.3d 785, 793–94 (7th Cir. 2018)).
Turning back to Corruthers, recall she pled guilty to con-
spiring to illegally purchase and transfer a firearm, in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count I) and conspiring to engage in
misleading conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3),
1512(k), 2 (Count II). When calculating her guideline range,
the district court first grouped Corruthers’ multiple counts of
conviction to determine her base offense level. Next, the

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Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672 17
district court determined that Count One rendered the high-
est offense level and applied it for purposes of calculating
Corruthers’ total offense level.
The government disagreed with this calculation. Instead,
it maintained that Count Two rendered the highest offense
level and it maintains this argument in the cross-appeal. Ac-
cording to the government, the district court erred by failing
to calculate Corruthers’ sentence by cross-referencing the
higher base offense under the obstruction of justice Guide-
lines. See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(c).
Generally, the sentencing guideline applicable to a viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 1512, conspiring to engage in misleading
conduct, is § 2J1.2, which provides for varying base offense
levels depending on the offense and offender characteristics.
See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(a), (b). Additionally, § 2J1.2(c) applies a
cross reference to § 2X3.1 “[i]f the offense involved obstruct-
ing the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense …
[and] the resulting offense level is greater than [the base of-
fense level [under § 2J1.2(a),(b)].” Id. If applicable, the sentenc-
ing judge then turns to § 2X3.1 (Accessory After the Fact) to
calculate the defendant’s base offense level. See U.S.S.G.
§§ 2J1.2(c)(1), 2X3.1.
According to the government, Corruthers obstructed ISP’s
post-shooting investigation of Officer Oberheim’s murder, a
first-degree crime, and Lafayette’s murder, a second-degree
crime, which triggers U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(c). For support, the gov-
ernment points to the ATF agent’s remarks at Lewis’ sentenc-
ing when he testified that ISP was investigating two homi-
cides on May 19, 2021. The government also cited several out-

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18 Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672
of-circuit cases,5 many of which involved defendants who
were alleged to have committed an underlying offense that
triggered § 2J1.2(c) or who knew their living co-conspirator
committed an underlying offense that triggered § 2J1.2(c) at
the time of the defendant’s obstruction.
Looking to the base offense level for murder, as the gov-
ernment argues, Count Two’s base offense level would have
totaled 37 (six levels lower than the base offense level for first
degree murder) or 32 (six levels lower than the base offense
level for second degree murder) pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1-2. Section § 2X3.1 has an upper limit, which
the government finds to be applicable, that would have fur-
ther reduced her base offense level to 30. By the government’s
calculation, a base offense level of 30 for Count Two rendered
the highest offense level of Corruthers’ convictions and
would have made rendered a recommended guidelines range
of 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment. We disagree.
The district court did not err in declining to apply the
§ 2J1.2(c) cross reference. Recall at Lewis’ sentencing, the dis-
trict court disagreed with the government’s argument that ISP
5 See, e.g., United States v. Flemmi, 402 F.3d 79, 83, 96–97 (1st Cir. 2005) (de-
fendant “had reason to know that the grand jury was investigating a mur-
der” but perjured himself to “impede [that] investigation of his brother
and other members of the Bulger/Flemmi group”); United States v. Con-
nolly, 341 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2003) (defendant persuaded witness to
falsely “testify that another FBI agent—and not [defendant]—had alerted
him … to the pending indictment”). And the government’s citation to
United States v. Arias does not help its position because the Ninth Circuit
agreed “that when there is more than one possible underlying offense, it
is up to the sentencing court to determine with respect to which crimes
being prosecuted the obstructive conduct occurred.” 253 F.3d 453, 460 (9th
Cir. 2001).

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Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672 19
and ATF were conducting a murder investigation following
the deaths of Lafayette and Officer Oberheim. Instead, the dis-
trict court determined, based on the evidentiary record and
witness testimony, that the focus of ISP’s post-shooting inves-
tigation was ruling out police corruption in the death of Lafa-
yette. Without facts to support an underlying murder investi-
gation, the district court reasoned, the government’s theory
collapsed, and the court declined to apply the obstruction of
justice cross-reference provision. We agree.
The district court did not clearly err in finding the
§ 2J1.2(c) cross reference was unwarranted for purposes of
calculating Corruthers’ sentence. The government resists this
conclusion by arguing Corruthers’ conduct obstructed the un-
derlying murder investigations of Officer Oberheim and Lafa-
yette. Taking the government’s position at face value, it seems
to suggest that any “investigation” is the prerequisite to
§ 2J1.2(c)’s application, no matter the investigation’s scope.
We disagree with that position.
Here, the district court made factual findings regarding
the “underlying nature” and scope of ATF and ISP’s post-
shooting investigation. The sentencing judge concluded that
the scope was not a murder investigation because the civilian-
shooter did not survive. For the district court that meant the
only logical explanation to describe the investigation’s scope
was, as the agent testified at sentencing, to determine whether
Lafayette’s officer-involved killing was justified. Without an
evidentiary foundation to support the government’s argu-
ment that ISP was conducting a murder investigation when
communicating with Corruthers, the district court did not
clearly err in declining to increase Corruthers’ sentencing
range by applying the § 2J1.2(c)’s cross reference.

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20 Nos. 24-2489 & 24-2672
Accordingly, we deny the relief requested by the government
in its cross-appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Corruthers’ sentence is AFFIRMED.

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