United States of America v. Joseph Van Sach

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 28, 2026
Decided April 28, 2026
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1839
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH VAN SACH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Western Division.
No. 3:19-CR-50029(1)
John Robert Blakey,*
Judge.
O R D E R
Joseph Van Sach, a federal prisoner, was convicted of assaulting a correctional
officer, violating 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)–(b). After a remand and resentencing, Van Sach filed
a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer argues that the appeal is frivolous and
moves to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We grant the
motion and dismiss the appeal.
* The Honorable John Robert Blakey, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, sitting by designation.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1839 Page 2
While in his cell at the correctional institution in Thomson, Illinois, Van Sach
refused an officer’s order to be handcuffed so that the door could be safely opened for
his cellmate to return. When Van Sach refused a second time, officers deployed pepper
spray into the cell and removed him. He received a medical assessment and was moved
to a temporary cell for observation. He was put into ambulatory (hand-and-ankle)
restraints, which required officers to enter the cell every two hours to check on him. On
one check, Van Sach freed one of his hands and punched an officer in the face, causing
swelling, pain, and bruising around the officer’s eye. Van Sach was charged with
assaulting a federal officer.
At trial, Van Sach represented himself and a jury found him guilty. He was
sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment. On direct appeal, we agreed with Van Sach that
U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4 (the provision for obstructing or impeding officers) and not § 2A2.2
(the provision for aggravated assault) should have been used to calculate his guidelines
base offense level, so we vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. United
States v. Van Sach, 104 F.4th 1003, 1006–07 (7th Cir. 2024).
A probation officer updated the presentence report. The officer applied
§ 2A2.4(a), which has a base offense level of 10, added three levels because the offense
involved physical contact, id. § 2A2.4(b)(1), and two more because the victim sustained
bodily injury, id. § 2A2.4(b)(2). This revised calculation, together with Van Sach’s
criminal history category III, yielded an advisory range of 24 to 30 months’
imprisonment.
The government objected to that calculation, arguing that Van Sach’s conduct
during litigation merited the two-level adjustment for obstructing justice. Id. § 3C1.1.
The court discussed its finding that Van Sach willfully committed perjury when he
intentionally gave false testimony about not receiving a Miranda warning. The court
determined that the adjustment applied, increased the offense level to 17, and
calculated an advisory range of 30 to 37 months.
Van Sach did not object to that calculation and asked the court for a within-
guidelines sentence. The government, emphasizing the seriousness of his offense and
his long history of violence, argued for 60 months. After balancing these factors, the
court sentenced Van Sach to 67 months’ incarceration—20 months lower than his first
sentence and 30 months over the properly calculated guidelines range. This appeal
followed.

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No. 25-1839 Page 3
Counsel’s Anders submission explains the nature of the case and addresses
potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because
counsel’s analysis appears sufficient, we limit our review to the subjects she examines
and those that Van Sach raises in his response under Circuit Rule 51(b). See United States
v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel begins by correctly observing that because this is an appeal from
resentencing, Van Sach has no basis to contest decisions that arose before his
resentencing, such as his conviction. See United States v. Barnes, 660 F.3d 1000, 1006–07
(7th Cir. 2011). The law-of-the-case doctrine precludes a party from raising new
arguments in a later appeal unless “justified by intervening authority, new and
previously undiscoverable evidence, or other changed circumstances.” United States v.
Sumner, 325 F.3d 884, 891 (7th Cir. 2003). On direct appeal Van Sach could have
challenged his conviction, or the rulings preceding it. See United States v. Whitlow,
740 F.3d 433, 438 (7th Cir. 2014). And no intervening authority, new evidence, or
changed circumstances allow him to raise any new challenges now. See Sumner,
325 F.3d at 891–92.
Van Sach replies with two arguments that would be more appropriately
addressed on collateral review. First, he wishes to challenge the effectiveness of his
stand-by trial counsel and appellate counsel because, he says, they gave him conflicting
advice on his right to challenge his conviction. Second, he maintains that he is innocent
of the offense. These challenges are best saved for collateral review, where an
evidentiary foundation can be fully developed. See United States v. Cates, 950 F.3d 453,
456–57 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003)).
Counsel next considers and rightly rejects any potential sentencing arguments.
She considers, first, whether the court rightly calculated a guidelines range of 30 to
37 months’ imprisonment. Because Van Sach did not object to that calculation, we
would review the court’s acceptance of it for plain error. See United States v. Thomas,
897 F.3d 807, 816 (7th Cir. 2018). And Van Sach cannot plausibly contend that plain
error occurred. The court calculated his total offense level of 17 by applying U.S.S.G.
§ 2A2.4, which has a base offense level of 10, then adding a three-level increase because
the offense included physical contact, see id. § 2A2.4(b)(1), and a two-level increase
because the victim sustained bodily injury, see id. § 2A2.4(b)(2). The court properly
applied the two-level increase for obstruction of justice, id. § 3C1.1, because it found that
Van Sach “willfully obstructed” the prosecution of his offense when he intentionally

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No. 25-1839 Page 4
gave materially false testimony. United States v. Law, 990 F.3d 1058, 1065–66 (7th Cir.
2021) (quoting § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(G)).
Van Sach replies that he seeks to challenge the increase for obstruction because
he was not charged with perjury. But no language in § 3C1.1 suggests that a formal
perjury charge is a prerequisite for application of the adjustment. The application notes
make clear that the adjustment covers the commission of perjury, which occurs when a
testifying witness gives false testimony about a material matter with willful intent to lie.
See Law, 990 F.3d at 1066 (citing § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(G)).
Counsel also correctly concludes that it would be frivolous to challenge the
substantive reasonableness of Van Sach’s sentence. An above-guidelines sentence is not
presumptively unreasonable so long as the court explains why the sentence is
appropriate on a reviewable record. United States v. Hendrix, 74 F.4th 859, 866–67
(7th Cir. 2023). In so doing, a court may rely exclusively on the factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), id. at 871, and here the court rooted Van Sach’s new sentence in the § 3553(a)
factors. The court amply justified Van Sach’s new sentence, explaining that the
Guidelines underrepresented his substantial and violent conduct while in custody, and
emphasizing the seriousness of the offense (characterizing the assault as premeditated),
the need to deter similar conduct in prison environments, and Van Sach’s failure to
accept responsibility for his actions (demonstrated by his obstructive conduct during
trial). Because the court “firmly grounded” Van Sach’s sentence in the § 3553(a) factors,
Hendrix, 74 F.4th at 872, Van Sach could not plausibly argue that the court abused its
discretion.
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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