Willie Rogers v. Nicholas M. Byroad

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 5, 2026*
Decided May 5, 2026
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1155
WILLIE ROGERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NICHOLAS M. BYROAD, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:22-CV-356 DRL
Damon R. Leichty,
Judge.
O R D E R
Tiffanie Terry obtained a protective order against Willie Rogers following a
report of harassment. Two years later, Terry reported Rogers for violating the protective
order, and Officer Nicholas Byroad prepared an affidavit for probable cause against
Rogers for invasion of privacy and harassment. In the affidavit, Officer Byroad
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 25-1155 Page 2
incorrectly stated that the phone number used by Rogers to allegedly violate the
protective order was the same phone number he used during the original incident.
After Rogers was convicted of invasion of privacy, he sued the Town of Shipshewana,
Indiana; Officer Byroad; LaGrange County; and Shipshewana Town Marshal Tom M.
Fitch II, alleging violations of his constitutional rights and defamation. The district court
granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. FED. R. C IV. P. 56(a). We
affirm.
We recount the facts in the light most favorable to Rogers, the party opposing
summary judgment. See Sanders v. Moss, 153 F.4th 557, 561 (7th Cir. 2025). In 2019, Terry
reported to police that she had received unwanted phone calls and text messages from
Rogers. Officer Byroad investigated Terry’s complaint. Rogers was later charged with
misdemeanor harassment, to which he pleaded guilty. Terry obtained a protective order
that prohibited Rogers from harassing, contacting, or directly or indirectly
communicating with her.
Two years later, Terry reported that she received an Instagram message from an
unknown profile instructing her to call a phone number or come to an address, which
she knew was Rogers’s address. Officer Byroad investigated the report and confirmed
that the address and phone number provided in the Instagram message belonged to
Rogers.
Two months later, Rogers called Terry from the same phone number listed in the
Instagram message. Officer Byroad prepared an affidavit for probable cause against
Rogers. Officer Byroad averred that the phone number from which the call was placed
was the same phone number Rogers had used to call Terry in 2019. But this was
incorrect. Officer Byroad explained in a subsequent affidavit that he intended to say
Rogers’s address for this investigation matched his address from the 2019 incident;
Rogers disputes this explanation and states that Officer Byroad deliberately falsified
this information in the affidavit. Rogers was arrested and charged with invasion of
privacy and harassment, but the harassment charge was dismissed before trial. A jury
convicted Rogers of invasion of privacy. Rogers appealed, and the Indiana Court of
Appeals affirmed his conviction.
While his state-court appeal was pending, Rogers sued Officer Byroad, the
Town, the County, and Fitch, alleging several violations of his constitutional rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) all defendants deprived Rogers of his procedural due
process right to fairness in a criminal proceeding; (2) all defendants conspired to

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No. 25-1155 Page 3
intentionally bring about his wrongful arrest, prosecution, and confinement; (3) the
Town, County, and Fitch failed to supervise or train employees; (4) Officer Byroad’s
incorrect assertion in the probable cause affidavit constituted fabrication of evidence;
and (5) the deprivation of Rogers’s constitutional rights resulted from the Town’s and
County’s wrongful customs and practices. Rogers also levied a state-law defamation
claim (count 6) against Officer Byroad, the Town, and the County. The district court
granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, concluding that counts 1, 2,
and 4 were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); that Rogers failed to raise a
triable issue on counts 3 and 5 because he did not identify any policy, custom, or
practice that caused him harm; and that Rogers failed to comply with the notice
requirements of the Indiana Tort Claims Act for count 6.
Rogers appeals. He first contends that counts 1, 2, and 4 are not Heck-barred.
Heck bars a suit for damages under § 1983 if the basis for the suit would imply the
invalidity of a conviction or sentence. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. The district court correctly
concluded that any ruling concerning probable cause to arrest Rogers would necessarily
imply the invalidity of his conviction because the conviction was based on evidence and
testimony contained in the probable cause affidavit.† See Rollins v. Willett, 770 F.3d 575,
576 (7th Cir. 2014).
We also agree with the district court that Rogers did not present a triable issue on
counts 3 and 5. Section 1983 does not make municipalities vicariously liable for the torts
of their employees or agents, but a plaintiff can establish municipal liability under
§ 1983 when the “execution of a government’s policy or custom” caused a violation of
the plaintiff’s rights. Monell v. Dep’t of Socs. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–94 (1978). To prevail
on a § 1983 claim under Monell, a plaintiff must challenge conduct that is properly
attributable to the municipality itself by identifying one of three actions: “(1) an express
policy that causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice
that is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or practice; or (3) an
allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking
authority.” Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
Rogers presents none of these, arguing only that fabrication of evidence can be the basis
of a Monell violation. “But [Rogers] must demonstrate that there is a policy at issue
rather than a random event.” See Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., 604 F.3d 293, 303
† For count 2, even if the claim was not Heck-barred, it would still fail because a
conviction bars a suit for false arrest or malicious prosecution based on a claim that
there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484–85.

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No. 25-1155 Page 4
(7th Cir. 2010). Even if we accept Rogers’s contention that Officer Byroad intentionally
fabricated information in his affidavit, Rogers had not provided any evidence that the
municipal defendants maintained a policy or practice condoning fabrication of evidence
in police affidavits.
This resolves all of Rogers’s federal claims; only his state-law defamation claim
remains. But Rogers conceded during discovery that he never sent notice of his claim,
and failure to comply with the Indiana Tort Claims Act’s notice requirements compels
dismissal. See Ball v. City of Indianapolis, 760 F.3d 636, 644 (7th Cir. 2014). Although we
generally will remand to the district court with an instruction to relinquish jurisdiction
over state-law claims following the dismissal of all federal claims, we need not do so
where, as here, it is obvious that the state-law claims are futile. See Williams Elecs. Games,
Inc. v. Garrity, 479 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2007).
Rogers also contends that the court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to amend his complaint for a third time. But the time for amending his
complaint had long passed, and he did not establish good cause as to why he could not
have raised the proposed malicious prosecution claim in any of the previous three
complaints. See Arrigo v. Link, 836 F.3d 787, 797 (7th Cir. 2016). And because a conviction
bars a malicious prosecution claim under both Indiana and federal law, Ingram v.
Diamond Equip., Inc., 118 N.E.3d 1, 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018); Heck, 512 U.S. at 484–85,
amendment would be futile, Thomas v. Dart, 39 F.4th 835, 840 (7th Cir. 2022).
We have considered Rogers’s remaining arguments and none has merit.
AFFIRMED

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