Anna’s Café Place LLC v. Village of Westchester

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued February 24, 2026
Decided May 22, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2019
ANNA’S CAFÉ PLACE LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
VILLAGE OF WESTCHESTER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 21-cv-3267
Martha M. Pacold,
Judge.
O R D E R
The Village of Westchester, Illinois, declined to grant a liquor license to Anna’s
Café Place LLC, for a business that Anna’s Café intended to purchase. Anna’s Café sued
the village and two of its former presidents, claiming that their inaction violated the
Café’s due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
district court dismissed its suit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We now affirm the district
court’s judgment.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-2019 Page 2
I. Background∗
Anna’s Café is located in Westchester, Illinois, and its general manager is Michael
Manzo. Manzo has taken part in local politics for over 25 years. According to Manzo,
members of local governments have singled him out for persecution in retaliation for
his political involvement.
In 2020, Anna’s Café was one of two businesses in Westchester to hold a Class I-1
liquor license. Class I-1 licenses are only granted to premises licensed to provide video
gaming. Once an I-1 license is granted, it is valid until December 31 of the year for
which it is issued. Thereafter, it must be renewed annually, or else it will expire and
then be rescinded. The only other business in Westchester that held an I-1 license was
Christopher’s Speakeasy LLC.
In late 2020, Christopher’s Speakeasy wanted to turn its management over to
Anna’s Café. Manzo and the proprietor of Christopher’s Speakeasy orally agreed that
Anna’s Café should either purchase Christopher’s Speakeasy or take over its operation
as new management. On behalf of Anna’s Café, Manzo contacted Westchester’s
Economic Development Director, Melissa Headley, about the potential transaction.
Headley told Manzo that instead of purchasing Christopher’s Speakeasy and renewing
its existing I-1 license, Anna’s Café should file a new I-1 license application for that
location. Anna’s Café did so in November of 2020, seeking an I-1 license for its
forthcoming “Anna’s Mannheim” location.
That application went nowhere. The existing license belonging to Christopher’s
Speakeasy expired at the end of December. The Westchester Board discussed Anna’s
Café’s application in January of 2021 but took no action. In February, Anna’s Café’s
attorney addressed the Board about its “delay and due process violation of not deciding
Plaintiff’s Anna’s Mannheim application.” In March, Westchester president Paul
Gattuso told Manzo that the Board had decided not to grant the application because
certain board members wanted to punish Manzo. In April, Headley told Manzo that
∗ At the motion to dismiss stage, the court takes all well-pleaded allegations as
true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Indep. Tr. Corp. v.
Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2012). We therefore recite here the
pertinent “factual allegations of the operative complaint without vouching for their
truth.” Nelson v. City of Chicago, 992 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2021).

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No. 25-2019 Page 3
Anna’s Café needed to modify its application to exclude gaming to avoid rejection. No
action has been taken on the application since then.
Anna’s Café filed this Section 1983 action against Westchester, Gattuso, and
Westchester’s subsequent president, Frank Perry, in June of 2021. The district court
dismissed its First Amended Complaint but allowed Anna’s Café to amend its
complaint again. Anna’s Café filed its Second Amended Complaint in November of
2024. The district court dismissed that complaint as well, this time with prejudice, for
failure to state a claim.
II. Discussion
A. As a threshold matter, the defendants argue that Anna’s Café lacked
standing to bring its claim. But that contention is meritless. According to the complaint,
Anna’s Café would have purchased Christopher’s Speakeasy and operated it for five
years now if not for the defendants’ delay in handling the license application. That is a
“classic pocketbook injury” that could, in theory, be redressed through this suit. Tyler v.
Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631, 636 (2023). Thus at the very least, Anna’s Café has
standing to seek monetary damages flowing from Westchester’s delay in processing its
liquor license application. Defendants’ arguments to the contrary—that Anna’s Café
lacked standing because its suit focuses on the denial of a liquor license to another
business—simply confuse standing with the merits. See, e.g., Booker-El v. Superintendent,
Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012) (argument that plaintiff lacked
standing because “he has no property interest” in the sought-after funds “conflates
standing with the merits of the case”).
B. Anna’s Café claims that the defendants’ handling of the liquor license
application violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “To state a
claim for a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a
cognizable property interest; (2) a deprivation of that property interest; and (3) a denial
of due process.” Manistee Apartments, LLC v. City of Chicago, 844 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir.
2016). We review the district court’s dismissal on this ground de novo. 145 Fisk, LLC v.
Nicklas, 986 F.3d 759, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2021).
The complaint in this case fails at the first step, because Anna’s Café has not
identified a cognizable property interest of which it was deprived. First, Anna’s Café
alleges that it had a property interest in its application for a license. A property right in
a public benefit like a liquor license only arises if a person has “a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it.” Bell v. City of Country Club Hills, 841 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 2016)

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No. 25-2019 Page 4
(quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). Anna’s Café would
thus need to show that Westchester’s discretion in granting the license was “clearly
limited such that [Anna’s Café] cannot be denied the interest unless specific conditions
are met.” Booker-El, 668 F.3d at 900 (quoting Brown v. City of Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720,
729 (7th Cir. 2006)). But Anna’s Café cannot make such a showing because Westchester
reserves discretion to grant new liquor licenses only “by action of the corporate
authorities of the Village of Westchester.” Westchester, Ill., Mun. Code § 5.36.130(a)
(2019). Under Westchester’s ordinances, therefore, a mere application for a liquor
license does not vest a property right in the applicant.
Indeed, Anna’s Café has not even shown that Westchester could have granted its
application. Westchester may only issue a liquor license to a person who “beneficially
own[s] the premises for which a license is sought” or has “a lease thereon for the full
period for which the license is to be issued.” Id. § 5.36.060(a)(14). In other words, an
applicant for a liquor license needs to show that it either owns or leases the real estate
where it will be serving liquor. Anna’s Café has not alleged that it did. In addition,
Westchester’s liquor commissioner may not grant a liquor license to a “person who is
not a beneficial owner of the business to be operated by the licensee.” Id. § 5.36.060(a)(16)
(emphasis added). Anna’s Café does not allege that it was a beneficial owner of
Christopher’s Speakeasy at the time it filed its application or at any time thereafter. As a
result, Anna’s Café has not shown that it had a property interest in its application for a
liquor license at Anna’s Mannheim. Just the opposite, its allegations indicate that it had
no valid claim to such a license.
Second, Anna’s Café alleges it had a property interest in Christopher’s
Speakeasy’s then-existing liquor license. An existing Illinois liquor license can indeed be
property for the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that property right can
extend to an application for renewal of an existing license in certain situations. See
Brunson v. Murray, 843 F.3d 698, 709–10 (7th Cir. 2016). Anna’s Café, however, has not
adequately alleged that it shared in Christopher’s Speakeasy’s property interest, either
by ownership, by transfer, or otherwise. Anna’s Café admits that it never purchased
Christopher’s Speakeasy. And Christopher’s Speakeasy could not have transferred
direct ownership of its I-1 license to Anna’s Café, because Westchester’s ordinances
prohibit such transfers. Westchester, Ill., Mun. Code § 5.36.150(a) (2019) (“A license …
shall not … be alienable or transferable, voluntarily or involuntarily….”). Anna’s Café
may have thought its liquor license application was effectively an application to renew
Christopher’s Speakeasy’s license, but only the licensee can renew a liquor license. Id.
§ 5.36.150(b).

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No. 25-2019 Page 5
Because Christopher’s Speakeasy never filed a renewal application, its license
expired on December 31, 2020. See id. § 5.36.070. That nonrenewal also meant that
Christopher’s Speakeasy’s liquor license was “rescinded,” and that Westchester
“automatically reduced” the total number of I-1 liquor licenses to just one—the one
owned by Anna’s Café itself, at its original location. Id. § 5.36.130(b). At no point during
the life of Christopher’s Speakeasy’s liquor license did Anna’s Café allegedly have a
property interest in it.
Finally, Anna’s Café attempts to rescue its due process theory by arguing that the
defendants are estopped from defending this case by “relying on the November 2020
filing for a new I-1 license by Anna’s, because that filing … was done at the express
direction of a Village official,” Headley. But Anna’s Café bears the burden to show a
protected property right; defendants need not show the absence of one. Anna’s Café has
failed to carry that burden. An estoppel argument like this one cannot create a property
right where none exists. The Café failed to state a claim for deprivation of due process,
and its suit was properly dismissed as to that theory of liability.
C. Anna’s Café also contends that the defendants’ handling of the liquor
license application violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Café alleges a “class-of-one equal protection” violation, which requires a showing
that (1) the plaintiff has “been intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated,” and (2) “there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Ind. Land
Tr. #3082 v. Hammond Redev. Comm’n, 107 F.4th 693, 697–98 (7th Cir. 2024); see also Village
of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (establishing this two-factor test). We
review dismissal on this ground de novo as well. 145 Fisk, 986 F.3d at 765–66.
We need only address the rational-basis factor today. To state a claim under a
class-of-one equal protection theory, the plaintiff must “negative any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis” for the defendant’s
conduct. Id. at 772 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001)).
If the court can identify a conceivable rational basis for the defendant’s actions, that is
enough; “it does not need to be the actual basis for defendant’s actions.” Chi. Studio
Rental, Inc. v. Ill. Dep't of Com., 940 F.3d 971, 980 (7th Cir. 2019).
The equal protection theory here fails because conceivable rational bases exist for
the decisions of Westchester and its former presidents. As the district court held, one
possible rational basis was that “at the time Anna’s Café applied for the I-1 license, all
such licenses permitted by the local ordinance were already assigned.” Another possible
basis could be that Anna’s Café never owned or leased the premises on which

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No. 25-2019 Page 6
Christopher’s Speakeasy was located, which is a prerequisite to obtaining a liquor
license. Westchester, Ill., Mun. Code § 5.36.060(a)(14) (2019). And as the district judge
observed, even if the defendants were wrong in their interpretation of these local
ordinances, “the uncertainty surrounding the application is at least a plausible rational
motive for the Village’s failure to act upon the application.”
Anna’s Café resists this conclusion, arguing that its allegations of personal
animus directed at Manzo should suffice to state a claim notwithstanding the rational-
basis requirement. But under long-established precedent, evidence of animus cannot
keep a class-of-one equal protection claim alive after a court identifies a rational basis.
Even if Westchester or its former presidents “had an ulterior motive, the finding of a
rational basis is ‘the end of the matter—animus or no.’” 145 Fisk, 986 F.3d at 773
(quoting Fares Pawn, LLC v. Ind. Dep’t of Fin. Insts., 755 F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 2014)). The
district court thus properly found the Café’s equal protection theory deficient as well.
The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.

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