United States of America v. Clifton Coleman

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2760
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
C LIFTON C OLEMAN ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:20-cr-00340 — Mary M. Rowland, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED O CTOBER 30, 2025 — DECIDED M AY 26, 2026
____________________
Before LEE, PRYOR , and K OLAR , Circuit Judges.
K OLAR , Circuit Judge. Between 2019 and 2020, Defendant
Clifton Coleman participated in a drug trafficking scheme
selling fentanyl-laced heroin in two Chicago drug markets.
His role in the scheme was twofold: he supplied the product
for the operation, and he provided an apartment for his col-
laborators to mix and package the product for sale.

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2 No. 23-2760
In connection with this scheme, Coleman pled guilty to
one count of violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, and was sen-
tenced to a 150-month term of imprisonment. In reaching this
sentence, the district court applied two sentencing enhance-
ments. First, the district court determined that Coleman was
a leader of the drug scheme, supporting a four-level enhance-
ment under United States Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”)
§ 3B1.1(a) (“the leadership enhancement”). Second, the court
concluded that Coleman had maintained an apartment on the
west side of Chicago (“the South Albany property”) for the
purpose of distributing drugs, supporting a two-level en-
hancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) (“the drug premises
enhancement”).
Coleman now appeals his sentence, asserting that the dis-
trict court applied the two sentencing enhancements in error.
On the leadership enhancement, he argues that the govern-
ment violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by sup-
pressing recordings of statements made by his co-defendants
that would have disproved his status as a leader in the drug
scheme. On the drug premises enhancement, he argues that
the district court’s finding was inconsistent with our recent
decisions in United States v. Ford, 22 F.4th 687 (7th Cir. 2022),
United States v. Montgomery, 114 F.4th 847 (7th Cir. 2024) (per
curiam), and United States v. Craft, 99 F.4th 407 (7th Cir. 2024).
We disagree on both fronts. The record shows that the
government provided Coleman with transcript summaries of
the co-defendants’ statements that provided the information
Coleman sought to undermine his leadership role. Thus,
Coleman cannot establish Brady’s materiality prong for the
purposes of the leadership enhancement. The drug premises
enhancement is more difficult: Coleman presents a close case

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No. 23-2760 3
following our opinions in Ford, Montgomery, and Craft. But the
combination of his ownership of the South Albany property,
his renting the property with knowledge it would be used as
a drug premises, and his level of control over the drug activi-
ties taking place there justify the enhancement. We affirm.
I. Background
A. The Offense
We present the facts as admitted in Coleman’s plea agree-
ment and unchallenged in the Presentence Report (“PSR”).
Coleman’s involvement in the drug trafficking organization
(“DTO”) at issue dates back to at least February 2019, the first
alleged date of his involvement in supplying products to two
open-air drug markets in Chicago. His primary role was to
provide heroin to lower-level “managers”: Coleman would
make weekly deliveries of heroin to three managers—Rodney
Rowsey, Bernard Rowsey, and Tarrence Watson—who
would then cut, mix, and package the drugs for distribution.
Coleman would make these deliveries to the South Albany
property, which he personally owned but rented to Watson
for roughly $1,000 per month, and where Watson and the
Rowseys would mix the product. Once packaged, the manag-
ers passed the product along to “distributors” to sell the prod-
uct at the drug markets, giving a cut to Coleman and the man-
agers. Between February 2019 and July 2020, Coleman sup-
plied, and the DTO sold, at least 25 kilograms of heroin and
40 grams of fentanyl.
In investigating Coleman’s involvement in the DTO, law
enforcement assembled a vast library of wiretapped conver-
sations between the various DTO members, including those
between Watson and the Rowseys. These conversations

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4 No. 23-2760
revealed that Coleman’s involvement was not limited to sup-
plying product: he also had a say in how the DTO sold the
product and managed personnel. For instance:
• In an October 8, 2019 text conversation, Wat-
son explained to the Rowseys that Coleman
had unilaterally decided to supply weaker
heroin to improve volume and sales.
• In an October 20, 2019 call, Watson relayed a
warning from Coleman to another DTO
member that if he took “[Coleman’s] money
again … you don’t work for him [any-
more].”
• In a November 3, 2019 call, Watson ex-
plained that Coleman had overruled his de-
cision to “fire” one of the DTO members.
• In a March 18, 2020 conversation, Watson
and Bernard Rowsey discussed cutting and
mixing the heroin according to what “[Cole-
man] want[s] … [to] do.”
The DTO came to an end in July 2020, when the govern-
ment charged Coleman, Watson, the Rowseys, and other DTO
members with a conspiracy “to knowingly and intentionally
possess with intent to distribute and distribute a controlled
substance” in violation of §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Coleman pled
guilty to the conspiracy charge in February 2023.
B. Sentencing
In the PSR, Probation recommended two offense-based
sentencing enhancements. First, it applied the four-level lead-
ership enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), relying on the
charging documents, Coleman’s plea declaration, and the

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No. 23-2760 5
government’s version of the events. In applying this enhance-
ment, Probation also relied on a statement from the FBI case
agent relaying that Coleman’s co-defendants had, in post-ar-
rest interviews, identified him as the leader of the DTO. Pro-
bation also recommended the two-level drug premises en-
hancement, concluding that Coleman had “owned the [South
Albany] property in Chicago where he met with others to cut
and package narcotics, and this was not the defendant’s pri-
mary residence.” Applying both enhancements increased
Coleman’s recommended offense level from 31 to 37. In addi-
tion, the leadership enhancement rendered him ineligible for
“safety-valve” relief from the statutory minimum and a fur-
ther two-level reduction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. §§
2D1.1(b)(18), 5C1.2. With both enhancements applied, Proba-
tion’s recommended guideline range was 210 to 262 months.
Coleman objected to both enhancements. Regarding the
leadership enhancement, Coleman presented summaries of
the co-defendants’ post-arrest interviews—in the form of FBI
“302” forms provided by the government—which contra-
dicted the FBI case agent’s statement that all of his co-defend-
ants had identified him as the DTO’s leader. Indeed, the FBI
302s revealed that some co-defendants had denied Coleman’s
leadership status or made no statement regarding his role in
the DTO. While observing that it was “somewhat unusual”
that the government had not provided actual recordings of
the post-arrest interviews in addition to FBI 302s, Coleman’s
counsel did not request access to these recordings or argue
that they had been suppressed.
As to the drug premises enhancement, Coleman conceded
that he owned the property and had rented it to Watson. But
he asserted that Watson maintained total control of the

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6 No. 23-2760
property, and that his infrequent visits to the South Albany
property were to—as a landlord—perform maintenance or
deal with his other tenant. He denied ever participating in the
mixing or packaging of drugs at the property.
The district court adopted Probation’s recommendation
and applied both enhancements, acknowledging both as close
questions. As to the leadership enhancement—though the
government conceded that the FBI’s summary of the co-de-
fendants’ statements was inaccurate—the court relied on the
wiretapped statements from Watson and the Rowseys, show-
ing that they “felt … they were working for [Coleman].” On
the drug premises enhancement, the court concluded that
given Coleman’s possessory interest in the South Albany
property and surveillance on at least four occasions showing
him visiting the South Albany property, the government had
met its burden of proving that Coleman had maintained the
property for manufacturing or distributing drugs. The court
adopted the PSR’s calculation of the offense level at 37, and
sentenced Coleman to 150 months (below the guideline
range).
II. Discussion
Coleman claims two errors on appeal: that the govern-
ment suppressed favorable recordings of his co-defendants’
statements which could have undermined the leadership en-
hancement, in violation of Brady; and that the district court
misapplied the drug premises enhancement on the merits. We
apply distinct standards of review to each claim.
Because Coleman did not raise his Brady claim before the
district court, we review this claim only for plain error. United
States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 746 (7th Cir. 2015). This means

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No. 23-2760 7
that, for Coleman to prevail, “the alleged Brady violation must
be an obvious error that affected [his] substantial rights.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
Coleman preserved his objection to the drug premises en-
hancement by pressing the argument before the district court.
Therefore, we apply our usual standard of review for appli-
cations of the sentencing guidelines to this argument, review-
ing legal questions de novo and findings of fact for clear error.
Montgomery, 114 F.4th at 850.
A. Brady Challenge
To establish a Brady violation, Coleman must meet three
elements: “(1) the [Government] suppressed evidence, (2) the
evidence was favorable to the defense, and (3) the evidence
was material to an issue at [sentencing].” Shields, 789 F.3d at
746. He claims now that the government suppressed record-
ings of his co-defendants’ post-arrest statements, which he
could have used to combat the leadership enhancement. But
given the information contained in the FBI 302s, and Cole-
man’s use of that information at sentencing, he cannot
demonstrate that the absence of the recordings themselves
was material under Brady.
Here, the government provided FBI 302s that summarized
each of the co-defendants’ statements. As Coleman’s argu-
ments below demonstrate, the summaries fully communi-
cated that not all the co-defendants painted Coleman as the
leader of the DTO, allowing Coleman to counter the FBI’s
statement to Probation.
We assume without deciding that the recordings them-
selves, which the government did not volunteer, were “sup-
pressed.” Suppressed evidence is material when “there is a

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8 No. 23-2760
‘reasonable probability’ that the result would have been dif-
ferent had the suppressed evidence been put before the
[finder of fact].” Goudy v. Cummings, 922 F.3d 834, 842 (7th Cir.
2019) (quotation omitted). Coleman argues that the record-
ings would have provided “direct quotes” and “surrounding
context” missing in the written FBI 302s. But the 302s already
contained the key information Coleman needed: that not all
the co-defendants had implicated Coleman as the leader of
the DTO, allowing him to undermine the FBI’s contrary state-
ment to Probation. Coleman does not claim that the summar-
ies themselves were inaccurate or incomplete.
At most, added context would have helped him further
discredit the FBI’s statement. But the district court did not rely
on that statement in reaching its conclusion that Coleman was
a leader. Instead, the court cited the mountain of separate
wiretapping evidence showing that various DTO members
did view Coleman as their leader and deferred to him on cru-
cial operational decisions. While Coleman notes that the dis-
trict court found the question of Coleman’s leadership to be a
“very, very, very close case,” that was after discounting the
statement Coleman sought to impeach—further evidence un-
dermining that statement would not have moved the needle.
Because the district court determined that other evidence sup-
ported Coleman’s leadership status within the organization,
and “[p]articularly given the fact that our review is only for
plain error, we are confident that the alleged Brady violation
does not support reversal here.” United States v. Daniel, 576
F.3d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 2009).
B. Drug Premises Enhancement
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) provides for a two-step offense-
level enhancement “[i]f the defendant maintained a premises

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No. 23-2760 9
for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled
substance.” We have divided this enhancement into three el-
ements: it applies “if the defendant (1) maintained (2) a prem-
ises (3) for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing
drugs.” Montgomery, 114 F.4th at 850 (cleaned up).
Only the first and third elements are at issue here, as Cole-
man does not dispute that the apartment would constitute “a
premises (i.e., a building, room, or enclosure)” for purposes of
the enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. 17. The “maintained”
element is met where a defendant “owns or rents … premises,
or exercises control over them, and for a sustained period of
time, uses those premises to manufacture, store, or sell drugs,
or directs others to those premises to obtain drugs.” Ford, 22
F.4th at 694 (quoting United States v. Acosta, 534 F.3d 574, 591
(7th Cir. 2008)). The “purpose” element is met where distri-
bution of a controlled substance is “one of the defendant’s pri-
mary or principal uses for the premises, rather than one of the
defendant’s incidental or collateral uses for the premises.”
Montgomery, 114 F.4th at 851 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt.
17).
In concluding that Coleman maintained the South Albany
property for the purpose of distributing a controlled sub-
stance, the district court explicitly mentioned two factors:
Coleman’s undisputed possessory interest in the property,
and four documented instances of Coleman meeting with
DTO managers at the property for the purpose of delivering
drugs. Coleman argues on appeal that his possessory interest
and infrequent visits to the property, alone, do not meet the
“maintained” and “purpose” elements of the enhancement.

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10 No. 23-2760
1. “Maintained” Element
In arguing that the district court improperly applied the
“maintained” element of the drug premises enhancement,
Coleman relies on our opinion in United States v. Ford. In Ford,
the defendant had used a rear bedroom in a house rented by
another person to store and sell drugs. 22 F.4th at 690–91. Dur-
ing sentencing, Ford argued that because he lacked a posses-
sory interest in the bedroom and home, he did not “maintain”
the premises within the meaning of the enhancement. Id. at
694. We held that because Ford was the “main user and occu-
pant” of the rear bedroom, he did “maintain[]” the bedroom
as a drug premises but cautioned that such facts “f[ell] close
to the limits” of the enhancement. Id. at 694–95. Coleman ar-
gues that because Watson was the “main user and occupant”
of the South Albany apartment, Coleman did not “maintain”
the property under Ford.
As a preliminary matter, Coleman’s reliance on Ford does
not logically follow: our holding that the drug premises en-
hancement applied to Ford as a “main user and occupant”
does not necessarily mean that the enhancement only applies
to a “main user and occupant.” Rather, we noted in Ford that
a defendant “maintains” a premises “even if he does not ex-
ercise control to the exclusion of all others.” Id. at 694 (citing
United States v. Sanchez, 810 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 2016)). And
in Montgomery, we noted that “although [the defendant] did
not lease the [premises] himself,” his ability to “access it
whenever he liked” weighed in favor of a finding that he had
“maintained” it for purposes of the enhancement. 114 F.4th at
850. Contrary to Coleman’s suggestion, Ford did not create a
new “main user and occupant” requirement; it merely ap-
plied our holistic approach by examining “factors …

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No. 23-2760 11
[including] whether the defendant held a possessory interest
in (e.g., owned or rented) the premises and … the extent to
which the defendant controlled access to, or activities at, the
premises.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. 17.
Applying these factors here, the record supports distin-
guishing Ford and finding that Coleman “maintained” the
South Albany property within the meaning of the enhance-
ment. First, it is undisputed that Coleman had a possessory
interest in the property as the owner and landlord—a factor
relevant to the “maintained” element that was conspicuously
missing in Ford. See 22 F.4th at 694; Acosta, 534 F.3d at 591.
And the district court found that Coleman was more than a
passive landlord: he was a leader of the DTO that directed and
controlled the operations at the South Albany property. In
other words, Coleman exerted a level of control over the
South Albany property that was not present in Ford.
To be sure, neither Coleman’s possessory interest in the
premises nor his direction of the activities there would, alone,
suffice to meet the “maintained” element in this case. We do
not hold that a landlord, by virtue of his possessory interest
alone, “maintains” a premises for drug activities; nor do we
collapse the drug premises and leadership enhancements by
suggesting that direction alone is sufficient. But the combina-
tion of Coleman’s possessory interest in and his control and
direction of the illicit activities at the South Albany property
that satisfies us the “maintained” element is met in this case.
2. “Purpose” Element
Alternatively, Coleman argues that the district court’s
finding that he visited the South Albany property only four
times over the course of the DTO was not sufficient to

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12 No. 23-2760
establish the “primary purpose” of the premises under Mont-
gomery and Craft.
Coleman properly observes that we have limited the scope
of the drug premises enhancement—particularly through the
“purpose” element—in our recent decisions. In Montgomery,
the defendant used his sister’s storage unit for storing drugs,
cash, and paraphernalia. 114 F.4th at 849. But the government
presented only three occasions of the defendant accessing the
unit in a month-long period, despite facility records showing
that the unit was accessed multiple times a day during that
same period. Id. at 851. Without any explanation as to who
else may have accessed the unit—or to what purpose—we
held that the three documented uses of the unit, alone, did not
establish that the “primary purpose” of the storage unit was
drug distribution or storage. Id. Similarly, in Craft, we held
that “several occasions” of the defendant transferring drugs
to his partner in his home did not establish that the “primary
purpose” of his residence was distributing drugs, where the
defendant “most often transferred the drugs … at a local gas
station” and “went out of his way to deliver the drugs …
away from his house.” 99 F.4th at 411–12.
But, again, there are key features to this case that distin-
guish it from Montgomery and Craft. Most glaring, it is undis-
puted that the South Albany property was primarily used as
a drug premises, and that Coleman was aware of this use. In
Montgomery, it was crucial that we lacked evidence to com-
pare the defendant’s illicit uses against potentially innocent
uses of the unit—the record lacked even a denominator. See
114 F.4th at 851. But here, there is no mystery about what the
South Albany property was used for: it was a nerve center for
delivering, cutting, mixing, and packaging the DTO’s

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No. 23-2760 13
product. And unlike in Craft, there is no contrary evidence
that Coleman “went out of his way” to divert operations from
the South Albany property. Cf. 99 F.4th at 411–12. Rather, the
record supports the district court’s conclusion that Coleman
facilitated the property’s crucial role in the DTO.
Furthermore, Coleman’s participation in and direction of
the illicit activities at the South Albany property well exceeds
the conduct in Montgomery and Craft. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt.
17 (instructing courts to consider “the extent to which the de-
fendant controlled access to, or activities at, the premises” (em-
phasis added)). While the district court noted four specific in-
stances of Coleman visiting the property and participating in
drug-related activities, that reasoning must be read in concert
with the court’s broader finding that Coleman directed and
controlled the DTO’s operations. That is to say, even if the fre-
quency of Coleman’s personal visits to the property is in the
same ballpark as the frequency of illicit conduct in Montgom-
ery and Craft, Coleman (as supplier and leader) necessarily
had a part in the undisputed illicit conduct that occurred
throughout the DTO’s operation at the South Albany prop-
erty. This is not a case, like Montgomery, where the three iso-
lated visits to the storage unit were the only evidence of the
premises’ “purpose.” Coleman’s continued direction of illicit
conduct at the South Albany property, with no countervailing
evidence of innocent use, makes the unit’s primary purpose
plain. See United States v. Evans, 826 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.
2016) (upholding the enhancement where defendant lacked
possessory interest in apartment but instructed its occupant
on storing and distributing drugs there while he was not pre-
sent).

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14 No. 23-2760
As with the “maintained” element, it is the combination of
factors that meet the “purpose” element. Coleman’s
knowledge of the continuous and illicit use of the premises,
and measure of control and personal participation in this il-
licit use, together justify application of the drug premises en-
hancement in this case.
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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