DEVON NOBLES and ANQI LIU v. MARKWAYNE MULLIN , Secretary of Homeland Security

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1652
DEVON NOBLES and A NQI LIU,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
M ARKWAYNE M ULLIN , Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:24-cv-09473 — Manish S. Shah, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 29, 2026 — DECIDED J UNE 5, 2026
____________________
Before R IPPLE, LEE, and K OLAR , Circuit Judges.
K OLAR , Circuit Judge. American citizen Devon Nobles is
married to Anqi Liu, a Chinese citizen present in the United
States with H-1B status, allowing her to work in the country
for a limited time. Nobles twice filed Form I-130 petitions
seeking to classify Liu as his immediate relative under federal
immigration law, a prerequisite to Liu’s securing a green card
based on their spousal relationship. But the United States Cit-
izenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) rejected those

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2 No. 25-1652
petitions under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act of 2006. This rejection was premised on the government’s
determination that Nobles—who was previously convicted of
aggravated criminal sexual abuse involving a minor—failed
to show he “poses no risk to” Liu under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I). With the Adam Walsh Act, Congress
entrusted that no-risk determination to the Secretary of
Homeland Security’s “sole and unreviewable discretion.” Id.
Nobles and Liu sued, alleging 13 counts arising from the de-
nials. The district court dismissed all but one count for lack of
jurisdiction and dismissed the lone reviewable count for fail-
ure to state a claim. Because we agree that plaintiffs’ claims
either are not reviewable in this posture or fail on the merits,
we affirm.
I. Background
Before turning to the allegations and procedural back-
ground, we start with the applicable statutory framework.
A. Statutory Background
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides:
Except as provided in clause (viii), any citizen of
the United States claiming that an alien is enti-
tled … to an immediate relative status under
section 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) of this title may file a pe-
tition with the Attorney General for such classi-
fication.
8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i). The INA defines “immediate rela-
tives” to include “the children, spouses, and parents of a citi-
zen of the United States.” Id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).

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No. 25-1652 3
When a petition is filed, “the Attorney General shall, if he
determines that the facts stated in the petition are true and
that the alien in behalf of whom the petition is made is an im-
mediate relative … approve the petition.” Id. § 1154(b). Once
approved, the immediate-relative non-citizen may remain in
the United States notwithstanding other statutory limits. E.g.,
id. § 1151(b).
But with the Adam Walsh Act, Congress imposed an ad-
ditional restriction on that process. The Act added a provision
stating that section 1154(a)(1)(A)(i) (the relative-status-adjust-
ment provision):
(I) … shall not apply to a citizen of the United
States who has been convicted of a specified of-
fense against a minor, unless the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in the Secretary’s sole and un-
reviewable discretion, determines that the citizen
poses no risk to the alien with respect to whom
a petition described in clause (i) is filed.
(II) For purposes of subclause (I), the term
“specified offense against a minor” is defined as
in section 20911 of title 34.
Id. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii) (emphasis added). So, citizens con-
victed of an offense against a minor enumerated in 34 U.S.C.
§ 20911(7) may not sponsor their immediate relative’s immigra-
tion petition unless the Secretary of Homeland Security makes
the no-risk determination. Id. Congress has authorized USCIS
to make that determination on behalf of the Secretary. 6 U.S.C.
§ 271(b). Whether the Secretary (or USCIS acting on his be-
half) makes the no-risk determination in the convicted

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4 No. 25-1652
citizen’s favor is committed to “the Secretary’s sole and unre-
viewable discretion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I).
Another provision within the INA strips courts of jurisdic-
tion over suits challenging denials of discretionary immigra-
tion relief. See id. § 1252(a)(2)(B). It says, in relevant part:
[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review …
any other decision or action of … the Secretary
of Homeland Security the authority for which is
specified under this subchapter [1] to be in the
discretion of … the Secretary of Homeland Se-
curity[.]
Id. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). But Congress also preserved judicial re-
view in limited circumstances:
Nothing in subparagraph (B) … which limits or
eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as
precluding review of constitutional claims or
questions of law raised upon a petition for re-
view filed with an appropriate court of appeals
in accordance with this section.
Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Because section 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I)’s no-
risk determination is within “the Secretary’s sole and unre-
viewable discretion,” section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and (D) allow
1 “‘[T]his subchapter’ refers to Title 8, Chapter 12, Subchapter II, of the
United States Code, codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1381 and titled ‘Immigra-
tion.’” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 239 n.3 (2010). So, section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips courts of jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s “de-
cision or action” to make the discretionary no-risk determination within
section 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I).

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No. 25-1652 5
legal or constitutional challenges to that determination to be
raised only in the courts of appeals pursuant to a petition for
review of a final order of removal.
B. Plaintiffs’ Allegations
Against that backdrop, we take all well-pled allegations in
the complaint as true and construe them in plaintiffs’ favor.
Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019).
Nobles and Liu are a married couple living in Lake
County, Illinois. Nobles is an American citizen. Liu—a citizen
of China—has H-1B status, allowing her to be lawfully pre-
sent and work in the United States for a limited time. In 2013,
Nobles was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse in-
volving a minor.2 Liu knew of Nobles’s conviction when the
couple married in 2015.
Nobles has filed two Form I-130 petitions with USCIS
seeking to designate Liu as his immediate relative so that she
can adjust her immigration status. USCIS denied Nobles’s
first petition in March 2019, citing deficiencies in the docu-
mentation supporting the petition. In April 2019, Nobles sub-
mitted a second petition along with an affidavit addressing
the deficiencies in the first petition. USCIS responded with a
notice of intent to deny, prompting Nobles to submit addi-
tional evidence, including a sex-offender risk assessment con-
cluding that Nobles posed no risk to Liu. USCIS denied the
second petition. According to the denial letter, USCIS deter-
mined that Nobles failed to demonstrate that he poses no risk
to Liu.
2 On appeal, plaintiffs do not dispute that Nobles’s crime of conviction
is a “specified offense against a minor” under 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7).

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6 No. 25-1652
C. Procedural History
In response, Nobles and Liu sued the Secretary of Home-
land Security, USCIS, and various USCIS personnel in federal
district court. Plaintiffs brought 13 counts under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA) challenging USCIS’s denial of
Nobles’s Form I-130: four challenging the agency’s exercise of
statutory authority (the “statutory claims”) and nine alleging
violations of the United States Constitution (the “constitu-
tional claims”). Defendants moved to dismiss all claims for
lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1).
The district court granted that motion as to three of the
four statutory claims and all nine of the constitutional claims.
It concluded that the Adam Walsh Act “gives the Secretary
total and unreviewable discretion to determine whether the
petitioner poses a risk to the beneficiary of the petition,” pre-
cluding judicial review of plaintiffs’ challenges in Counts I, II,
and III to the evidentiary standard and processes USCIS ap-
plies in making the no-risk determination. It dismissed sua
sponte the fourth statutory claim under Rule 12(b)(6), finding
it had jurisdiction over predicate legal questions but conclud-
ing that “the statutory language is unambiguous that the
Adam Walsh Act applies to adult beneficiaries,” which was
fatal to Count IV on the merits. And based on section
1252(a)(2)(D), the district court determined that “the [INA] re-
serves judicial review to petitions of review during removal
proceedings,” and otherwise strips the federal courts of juris-
diction to consider the constitutional claims in Counts V
through XIII outside of removal proceedings.
Plaintiffs timely appealed. We review pleadings-stage dis-
missals de novo. Dhakal v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir.

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No. 25-1652 7
2018) (Rule 12(b)(1)); Jakupovic v. Curran, 850 F.3d 898, 901 (7th
Cir. 2017) (Rule 12(b)(6)).
II. Discussion
With the Adam Walsh Act, Congress delegated to the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security the “sole and unreviewable dis-
cretion” to discern whether a citizen “convicted of a specified
offense against a minor … poses no risk” to his non-citizen
would-be beneficiary. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I). The
INA bars judicial review of “any other decision or action of …
the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is
specified … to be in the discretion of … the Secretary.” Id.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). And the APA prohibits review where “stat-
utes preclude judicial review” or “agency action is committed
to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)–(2). Our
power to review plaintiffs’ claims turns on whether plaintiffs
seek to challenge the Secretary’s unreviewable, discretionary
decision-making as exercised by USCIS. If so, we lack juris-
diction.
It is fundamental to our system that our power is limited
to “that power authorized by Constitution and statute” and
thus “is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). As a court
of limited (not general) jurisdiction, our “fair presumption is
… that a cause is without [our] jurisdiction, until the contrary
appears.” Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. 8, 10 (1799) (Ells-
worth, C.J.). “Observing the limits on judicial authority … is
required by a judge’s oath to follow the law.” Trump v. CASA,
Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 858 (2025).
Minding these principles, we conclude that we lack juris-
diction to review all but one of plaintiffs’ statutory and

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8 No. 25-1652
constitutional claims, and that the remaining claim fails as a
matter of law. We affirm.
A. Statutory Claims
We begin with plaintiffs’ statutory claims under the APA.
Whether we have jurisdiction under the Adam Walsh Act is a
matter of first impression in our Circuit. We first consider
Counts I, II, and III and the Adam Walsh Act’s plain text.
Then, we discuss out-of-circuit approaches. Ultimately, we
conclude that we lack jurisdiction over Counts I, II, and III,
and we affirm dismissal. We then assess Count IV. Finding
our jurisdiction over that claim secure, we affirm its dismissal
on the merits.
1. We Lack Jurisdiction to Review Counts I, II, and III.
In Counts I and II, plaintiffs argue on the merits that the
beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard that USCIS applies to
no-risk determinations under the Adam Walsh Act is ultra
vires and was illegally adopted without notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Plaintiffs point out that neither the Adam Walsh
Act nor the INA adopts this evidentiary standard. Moreover,
plaintiffs posit that USCIS adopted the beyond-any-reasona-
ble-doubt standard—what they call “a rule, policy, or inter-
pretation of general applicability”—unlawfully through
agency memoranda3 rather than through formal rulemaking
3 See USCIS Interoffice Memorandum, Guidance for Adjudication of
Family-Based Petitions and I-129F Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) under the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Feb. 8, 2007)
[https://perma.cc/X4PU-TWJ5] (“[A] petitioner who has been convicted of
a specified offense against a minor must submit evidence of rehabilitation
and any other relevant evidence that clearly demonstrates, beyond any

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No. 25-1652 9
processes. And they contend the standard improperly sup-
plants the preponderance-of-the-evidence assessment they
argue is required under agency precedent. See In re Chawathe,
25 I. & N. Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010) (“Except where a different
standard is specified by law, a petitioner or applicant in ad-
ministrative immigration proceedings must prove by a pre-
ponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for the benefit
sought.”).
In Count III, plaintiffs contend that USCIS’s denial of their
Form I-130 petition was arbitrary and capricious because
USCIS failed to consider the evidence that Nobles submitted
in support of the petition. According to plaintiffs, USCIS’s de-
nial provided no explanation supporting the conclusion that
Nobles failed to demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt he
poses no risk to Liu.
Plaintiffs concede that we lack jurisdiction to review
USCIS’s final no-risk determination but instead urge that
their statutory claims are reviewable under the APA4 insofar
as they challenge the legal standard and processes that USCIS
employed in rejecting Nobles’s Form I-130. But recall the
Adam Walsh Act’s plain text: a convicted citizen may not pe-
tition for immediate-relative status “unless the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in the Secretary’s sole and unreviewable
discretion, determines that the citizen poses no risk to the al-
ien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) (emphases added).
reasonable doubt, that he or she poses no risk to the safety and well-being
of his or her intended beneficiary(ies).”).
4 The APA itself is not an independent source of subject-matter juris-
diction. St. Vincent Med. Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 71 F.4th 1073, 1075
(7th Cir. 2023).

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10 No. 25-1652
“Determines” denotes more than the final decision on the pe-
tition. It includes the process of reaching that decision, too.
Here, we “begin (and find that we can end) our search for
Congress’s intent with the text and structure of” section
1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I). Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288
(2001). We presume that “the legislature says what it means
and means what it says.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA
Inc., 582 U.S. 79, 89 (2017) (cleaned up). To “determine”
means “to fix conclusively or authoritatively,” and “to find
out or come to a decision about by investigation, reasoning,
or calculation.” Determine, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dic-
tionary (11th ed. 2003). We conclude that “determines” within
the Adam Walsh Act captures both the process of reaching a
final decision and the final decision itself. See Bourdon v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 940 F.3d 537, 542 (11th Cir. 2019) (con-
cluding that “‘determine’ encompasses making a final deci-
sion—and the method for reaching that final decision (or, as
the dictionaries put it, the thought, consideration, research,
investigation, or calculation).”).
The text of the Adam Walsh Act supplies strong evidence
of Congress’s intent to broadly bar judicial review of the no-
risk determination. The statute dictates that the Secretary’s
“determin[ation]”—both the final decision on the petition and
process in reaching that decision—is committed to the “Sec-
retary’s sole and unreviewable discretion.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I). “Discretion” refers to “[i]ndividual
judgment” and “the power of free decision-making.” Discre-
tion, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (also defining “sole
discretion” as “[a]n individual’s power to make decisions

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No. 25-1652 11
without anyone else’s advice or consent”).5 And “unreviewa-
ble” means “[i]ncapable of being legally or judicially re-
viewed.” Unreviewable, Black’s Law Dictionary.
Putting the definitions to work, we conclude “the text of
the statute controls our decision.” Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A.
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994).
The Adam Walsh Act confers on the Secretary (acting through
his delegee USCIS) the sole power to determine whether the
citizen poses no risk to the non-citizen beneficiary without an-
yone else’s input and without being subject to judicial review.
Subjecting USCIS’s evidentiary standard to notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking, or making the agency’s fact-finding re-
viewable in court, would impermissibly introduce other par-
ties into the decision-making equation. That would conflict
with Congress’s clear grant of “sole and unreviewable discre-
tion” to the Secretary.
5 Reviewing the Adam Walsh Act, our Eighth Circuit colleagues ob-
served:
A grant of “sole” discretion is among the strongest known
to the law. It implies that the decisionmaker is simply not
bound by standards set by another authority. This type of
discretion necessarily includes authority to implement
practices or procedures for making decisions. … We be-
lieve it is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme, that
Congress has granted the Secretary sole authority to es-
tablish a framework for USCIS adjudicators to use in
making the no risk discretionary determination.
Bremer v. Johnson, 834 F.3d 925, 931 (8th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).

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12 No. 25-1652
“If the statutory language’s plain meaning is unambigu-
ous, our inquiry ends there.” United States v. Melvin, 948 F.3d
848, 852 (7th Cir. 2020). The Adam Walsh Act’s plain text is
crystal clear: we lack the power to review plaintiffs’ statutory
claims aimed at USCIS’s final no-risk determination and the
antecedent decision-making processes.
That conclusion—that we lack jurisdiction to review the
Secretary’s final decision and his method for reaching it—ac-
cords with the approach taken by six of our sister circuits. See
Bourdon, 940 F.3d at 542–45; Bakran v. Sec’y, DHS, 894 F.3d 557,
563–64 (3d Cir. 2018); Gebhardt v. Nielsen, 879 F.3d 980, 987 (9th
Cir. 2018); Privett v. Sec’y, DHS, 865 F.3d 375, 380–81 (6th Cir.
2017); Roland v. USCIS, 850 F.3d 625, 629–30 (4th Cir. 2017);
Bremer v. Johnson, 834 F.3d 925, 930–31 (8th Cir. 2016).
The D.C. Circuit stands alone in agreement with plaintiffs’
interpretation of the Adam Walsh Act. See Castaneira v. Noem,
138 F.4th 540 (D.C. Cir. 2025).6 Construing “determines” more
narrowly and citing the “strong presumption in favor of judi-
cial review of administrative action,” the Castaneira court held
that it had jurisdiction to consider whether Chawathe’s pre-
ponderance-of-the-evidence standard was binding on USCIS.
Id. at 549 (cleaned up). In doing so, it observed that “Congress
may shield from judicial review an agency’s ultimate deter-
mination without precluding courts from reviewing the ‘prac-
tice[s] or procedure[s] employed in making’ such individual
determinations.” Id. (citing McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr.,
Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 492 (1991)).
Plaintiffs ask us to follow Castaneira and McNary to con-
clude we have jurisdiction to reach their statutory claims. But
6 Castaneira was decided after the district court’s decision in this case.

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No. 25-1652 13
neither Castaneira nor McNary persuade us to adopt the D.C.
Circuit’s reading.
First, we have already held the APA’s presumption favor-
ing judicial review does not trump the INA’s jurisdiction-
stripping framework. As we observed in Britkovyy v. Mayor-
kas, the presumption that agency action is reviewable is far
from absolute. 60 F.4th 1024, 1027, 1030 (7th Cir. 2023). There,
we encountered a statute—8 U.S.C. § 1255—governing the
discretionary adjustment of status for arriving aliens. Id. at
1026. Regulations provide for USCIS’s exclusive jurisdiction
to adjust the status of arriving aliens. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R.
§§ 245.2(a)(1), 1245.2(a)(1)). We held that we lack jurisdiction
to review a plaintiff’s challenge to the denial of his adjust-
ment-of-status application. Id. at 1025. We observed that
“Congress has sharply limited judicial review in the immigra-
tion context, and ‘the APA’s general provision authorizing ju-
dicial review of final agency actions must yield to ... immigra-
tion-specific limitations.’” Id. at 1027 (quoting Dijamco v. Wolf,
962 F.3d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original)). We
held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precluded the appellant
from bringing an APA challenge to the denial of his applica-
tion outside the context of removal proceedings. Id. The same
reasoning applies here to USCIS’s denial of Nobles’s petition
under the Adam Walsh Act and section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
Second, we are not persuaded that we should read “deter-
mines” more narrowly. Following Castaneira, Plaintiffs cite to
McNary in support of their narrower reading of “deter-
mines”—that it only refers to USCIS’s ultimate decision deny-
ing the petition. But McNary is readily distinguishable and
does not alter our plain-text analysis.

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14 No. 25-1652
In McNary (which long predated the Adam Walsh Act),
the Supreme Court construed a different jurisdiction-strip-
ping provision that read: “There shall be no administrative or
judicial review of a determination respecting an application for
adjustment of status under this section except in accordance
with this subsection.” 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(1) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court held that “the reference to ‘a determina-
tion’ describes a single act rather than a group of decisions or
a practice or procedure employed in making decisions.”
McNary, 498 U.S. at 492.
McNary’s statutory interpretation analysis is of limited
utility here. For one, other provisions within that statute for-
tified that “single act” understanding of “determination” in
context. See id. (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(3)(A) and noting
it provides for “‘judicial review of such a denial’—again refer-
ring to a single act”). We have no such indication in the Adam
Walsh Act. For another, the noun “determination” does not
appear in the Adam Walsh Act. The Act uses the verb “deter-
mines” which, as explained above, connotes more than just
the ultimate decision itself. We must also take care not to
place too much weight on the meaning of standalone terms.
“The definition of words in isolation … is not necessarily con-
trolling in statutory construction.” Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006). Instead, we consider the interplay of
the words used in context. Id. Congress has provided that the
Secretary’s exercise of discretion to “determine[]” under the
Adam Walsh Act is itself “sole and unreviewable.” Bourdon,
940 F.3d at 542 n.2. By contrast, the statute in McNary did not
include such a clear statement granting wide-ranging discre-
tion to the Executive.

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No. 25-1652 15
Further, Congress’s use of “sole and unreviewable” in the
Adam Walsh Act—strong modifiers absent from the statute
at issue in McNary—evinces its intent to enact a sweeping ju-
risdictional bar. The statute in McNary stripped jurisdiction to
a lesser degree by otherwise prescribing specific procedures
for judicial and administrative review of a “determination.”
See 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(2)–(3); McNary, 498 U.S. at 491 n.12. We
must “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word” of
section 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii). See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,
174 (2001) (citation omitted). Nothing in the Adam Walsh Act
cabins the exercise of the Secretary’s “sole and unreviewable
discretion” to the single act of denying or approving a Form
I-130. McNary does not disturb our conclusion that Congress
intended to render unreviewable USCIS’s exercise of discre-
tion in determining whether Nobles posed no risk to Liu.
Counts I, II, and III each challenge USCIS’s evidentiary
standard and purported failure to consider Nobles’s submis-
sions supporting his Form I-130. Those challenges target
USCIS’s processes for determining whether Nobles poses risk
to Liu. Because we conclude, like all but one of our sister cir-
cuits, that USCIS’s methods of adjudicating Nobles’s petition
“are just as unreviewable as the Secretary’s ultimate decisions
themselves,” Gebhardt, 879 F.3d at 987, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of Counts I, II, and III.
2. We Dismiss Count IV on the Merits.
With Count IV, plaintiffs allege that USCIS exceeded its
authority by making the no-risk determination with respect
to Liu, an adult (rather than a minor) beneficiary. Defendants
moved to dismiss Count IV for lack of jurisdiction, but the
district court dismissed it on the merits sua sponte. We affirm.

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16 No. 25-1652
As the district court correctly held, we have jurisdiction to
resolve “predicate legal questions,” including whether sec-
tion 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii) applies to Nobles’s Form I-130 submis-
sion. See Bremer, 834 F.3d at 929; Privett, 865 F.3d at 380. Plain-
tiffs argue that section 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)’s discretionary no-
risk determination only applies where the beneficiary is a mi-
nor and thus does not apply because Liu is an adult.
We take as true plaintiffs’ factual allegations, but plain-
tiffs’ “legal conclusions”—such as their assertion that the Act
only applies to minor beneficiaries—“are not entitled to this
presumption of truth.” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d
611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011). Still, we construe factual allegations
in light of the governing sources of law giving rise to a claim.
Where, as here, “the allegations in a complaint, however true,
could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” the claim must
be dismissed. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558
(2007).
Plaintiffs’ position is without textual support. The Adam
Walsh Act prohibits Nobles from petitioning for immediate-
relative status absent a determination that he “poses no risk
to the alien with respect to whom a petition described in clause (i) is
filed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) (emphasis added). Here,
that alien is Liu, an adult. And clause (i) refers to petitions
classifying a family member as an “immediate relative,” id.
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(i), a term defined by statute to include “chil-
dren, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United
States, except that, in the case of parents, such citizens shall
be at least 21 years of age,” id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). So, the statu-
tory text contemplates both minor and adult beneficiaries.
Plaintiffs argue that “contextual clues” support their atex-
tual reading. They argue that the Adam Walsh Act targets

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No. 25-1652 17
child predators by defining “specified offense[s] against a mi-
nor” to account for “all offenses by child predators.” 34 U.S.C.
§ 20911(7). They point out that the full name of the enact-
ment—the “Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006”—emphasizes the protection of children. Elsewhere, the
Adam Walsh Act uses “sex offender” as an umbrella term to
refer to those who offend against either adults or children, see
34 U.S.C. § 20911(1), (5), permitting the inference that clause
(viii) was intended to limit the no-risk determination to minor
beneficiaries only.
But none of these other features of the Adam Walsh Act
can supplant section 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I)’s plain text, which
does not specify that “the alien with respect to whom a peti-
tion described in clause (i) is filed” must be a minor. “As [the
Supreme Court] has repeatedly stated, the text of a law con-
trols over purported legislative intentions unmoored from
any statutory text; the Court may not replace the actual text
with speculation as to Congress’ intent.” Corner Post, Inc. v.
Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 815 (2024)
(cleaned up).
In effect, plaintiffs seek to re-write section
1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) to require the Secretary to “determine[]
that the citizen poses no risk to the [minor] alien with respect
to whom a petition described in clause (i) is filed.” But that is
not the statute Congress enacted. By its plain terms, section
1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) unambiguously applies to beneficiaries
of any age. Where age affects a beneficiary’s eligibility, as for
under-21 parents, Congress has so specified. See id.
§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
Finally, it was not error for the district court to reach this
issue sua sponte. Doing so is generally disfavored, but does not

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18 No. 25-1652
warrant reversal where, as here, we agree with the district
court that plaintiffs’ claim is plainly foreclosed as a matter of
law. See Zellner v. Herrick, 639 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2011);
Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003).
Because the statute’s plain language forecloses plaintiffs’
theory that it does not apply to Liu, Count IV fails to state a
claim for which relief can be granted. We affirm dismissal.
B. Constitutional Claims
Next, plaintiffs identify nine purported constitutional de-
ficiencies with USCIS’s no-risk determination and denial of
Nobles’s Form I-130.7 The district court dismissed these
claims for lack of jurisdiction, and we affirm.
We have yet to address whether constitutional claims are
reviewable under the Adam Walsh Act. The Act imposes no
express limit on “the Secretary’s sole and unreviewable dis-
cretion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I). And the INA’s juris-
diction-stripping statute sweeps in claims based on “nonstat-
utory” authority:
7 Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the Adam Walsh Act and USCIS’s
no-risk determination: (1) violate plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment liberty and
property interests in marriage, family, and a fair adjudication of their pe-
tition; (2) impinge plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights to marriage;
(3) invade the province of the states to recognize marital relationships un-
der the Tenth Amendment; (4) offend due process and non-delegation
principles by imposing a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard; (5) fail
to define “no risk” and are thus void for vagueness and lack of notice; (6)
amount to an unconstitutional bill of attainder; (7) violate the constitu-
tional protection against double jeopardy; (8) violate equal protection
principles, as Nobles and Liu are in an interracial marriage; and (9)
amount to other unspecified civil rights violations arising from USCIS’s
purported bias against interracial marriages.

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No. 25-1652 19
Notwithstanding any other provision of law
(statutory or nonstatutory) … no court shall have
jurisdiction to review … any other decision or
action of … the Secretary of Homeland Security
the authority for which is specified under this
subchapter to be in the discretion of … the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security[.]
Id. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
As the federal government points out, “nonstatutory” fed-
eral law includes constitutional provisions. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (“[I]n declaring what shall be
the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first
mentioned[.]”). Section 1252(a)(2)(D) preserves judicial re-
view of legal and constitutional claims, but only in a petition
for review of a final removal order filed in the court of ap-
peals. Taken together, these provisions preclude review of
claims outside that context.
Our sister circuits have split over whether constitutional
claims are reviewable notwithstanding the Adam Walsh Act
and section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The Fourth and Sixth Circuits
have concluded they lack jurisdiction over such constitutional
claims because section 1252 permits review of them only in a
petition for review of a final order of removal. Roland, 850 F.3d
at 629; Privett, 865 F.3d at 381–82. On the other hand, the
Eighth Circuit has held courts may review “colorable” consti-
tutional claims—those with “some possible validity”—de-
spite section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Bremer, 834 F.3d at 932. The
Third Circuit has addressed such claims on the merits without
specifying a threshold for jurisdiction. Bakran, 894 F.3d at 564.
And the Ninth Circuit has “assume[d], without deciding, that

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20 No. 25-1652
the Adam Walsh Act permits [the court of appeals] to review
colorable constitutional claims.” Gebhardt, 879 F.3d at 988.
In addressing this issue in the first instance, we are guided
by the “well-established principle” that with constitutional
challenges, “we will not read a statutory scheme to take the
extraordinary step of foreclosing jurisdiction unless Con-
gress’ intent to do so is manifested by clear and convincing
evidence.” Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977) (cleaned
up). Here, applying sections 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and (a)(2)(D), we
hold that we lack jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ constitutional
claims in this posture because Congress has channeled their
claims into removal proceedings. Given the enactment history
of section 1252(a)(2)(D), we are confident that is what Con-
gress effectuated.
Before the INA was amended to include section
1252(a)(2)(D), the Supreme Court allowed a habeas action to
proceed notwithstanding section 1252(a)(2)(A)’s jurisdic-
tional bar. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 310–13 (2001). There, a
foreign national with a criminal conviction facing removal
raised a legal challenge in a habeas petition despite section
1252’s prohibition on such petitions for judicial review. Id. at
293. The Court observed that to “entirely preclude review of
a pure question of law by any court would give rise to sub-
stantial constitutional questions,” so constitutional avoidance
counseled in favor of finding jurisdiction over the habeas ac-
tion. Id. at 300, 314.
In response to St. Cyr, Congress amended the INA to allow
“constitutional claims or questions of law” to be raised in a
petition for review in the courts of appeals. See REAL ID Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106, 119 Stat. 231, 310 (codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)). Since its enactment, the Supreme

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No. 25-1652 21
Court has recognized that section 1252(a)(2)(D) adequately
addresses the concern raised in St. Cyr about jurisdiction
stripping constitutional claims entirely. See Wilkinson v. Gar-
land, 601 U.S. 209, 218 n.3 (2024) (“Congress enacted
§ 1252(a)(2)(D) to ensure the constitutionality of its jurisdic-
tion-stripping provisions.”); Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 339
(2022) (“While Congress could have responded to St. Cyr by
lifting § 1252’s prohibitions on judicial review altogether, it
instead excised only the legal and constitutional questions
that implicated our concern.”). That concern is not unique to
the immigration context, as the Supreme Court has also
avoided construing statutes to effectuate wholesale jurisdic-
tion-stripping of constitutional claims related to federal bene-
fits. Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Fam. Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681
n.12 (1986) (collecting authorities and noting “the serious con-
stitutional question that would arise” if plaintiffs were denied
any forum to bring constitutional claims).
We do not write on a blank slate when considering the ex-
tent to which Congress may channel or bar constitutional
claims. See Holy Virgin Prot. Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox
Church Outside Russ. v. Chertoff, 499 F.3d 658, 663 (7th Cir.
2007). In Holy Virgin, we first considered claim channeling—
allowing claims to be raised only in certain proceedings in a
particular forum—in holding that constitutional claims tar-
geting immigration officials’ discretionary acts are subject to
section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s jurisdictional bar. See id. at 662–63.
There, Homeland Security officials revoked a visa that ini-
tially permitted a non-citizen religious sister to work in the
United States. Id. at 659. We lacked jurisdiction to review the
sister’s and her Church’s constitutional challenges to the dis-
cretionary revocation under section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Id. at
662. We observed that the sister “may well be placed in

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22 No. 25-1652
removal proceedings, at the conclusion of which she may con-
ceivably seek review in this court” and “would be entitled to
raise any constitutional claims she has in her petition for re-
view.” Id. (discussing section 1252(a)(2)(D)).
But we did not end our analysis with claim channeling.
The Church had potential constitutional claims that were not
subject to channeling since it would never be subject to re-
moval proceedings. It was in this context that we confronted
the question of “whether the existence of either party’s con-
stitutional claims” made the agency’s decision reviewable. Id.
We took care to reserve the possibility that we could exercise
jurisdiction over “egregious” constitutional violations—such
as “the potential case where the Secretary decides to revoke
all visas held by members of one religious group or of one
particular ethnicity”—notwithstanding section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Id. at 663.
Against that backdrop, we consider whether plaintiffs’
constitutional claims are in fact channeled to a petition for re-
view of a final removal order and whether they are nonethe-
less reviewable under Holy Virgin. Both Nobles and Liu seek
to vindicate their individual constitutional rights allegedly vi-
olated by USCIS’s denial of Nobles’s Form I-130. Liu is law-
fully present in the country with H-1B status notwithstanding
USCIS’s denial of the petition. Liu is neither subject to a notice
to appear, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1), nor currently in removal pro-
ceedings, id. § 1229a. And because “the decision when to ini-
tiate removal proceedings is committed to the discretion of
immigration authorities,” Liu is powerless to initiate the pro-
ceedings in which she could raise her claims. See Juarez v.
Holder, 599 F.3d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Reno v. Ameri-
can-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999));

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No. 25-1652 23
8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a) (listing the federal officials who may initi-
ate removal proceedings). But like the Holy Virgin plaintiff
who “m[ight] well be placed in removal proceedings,” the
government could initiate a future removal proceeding
against Liu. 499 F.3d at 662. As the government acknowl-
edged at argument, Liu could raise her constitutional chal-
lenges to the no-risk determination under section
1252(a)(2)(D) in those proceedings. Because her claims are
channeled to removal proceedings, we lack jurisdiction to re-
view them.
By contrast, Nobles will never be able to raise his claims in
removal proceedings because he is an American citizen not
subject to removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (“An immigra-
tion judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding the inad-
missibility or deportability of an alien” (emphasis added), de-
fined by section 1101(a)(3) as “any person not a citizen or na-
tional of the United States”). So, like the Church in Holy Vir-
gin, Nobles’s constitutional claims are not channeled any-
where—they are simply barred.
But in affirming the district court today, we do no more
than follow Holy Virgin and again “save for another day” dif-
ficult questions surrounding the extent to which Congress can
categorically bar review of even the most serious constitu-
tional claims. In this case, we need not confront those ques-
tions. It is enough for us to conclude that none of Nobles’s
claims amount to egregious—or, for that matter, colorable, see
Bremer, 834 F.3d at 932—constitutional violations, precluding
our jurisdiction.
To the extent that Nobles attempts to assert claims based
on his own constitutional rights, he has missed the mark.
First, although he invokes a constitutional right to reside in

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24 No. 25-1652
the United States with his non-citizen spouse, the Supreme
Court has squarely rejected the notion that the Constitution
protects such a right, which is distinct from the right to
marry.8 Dep’t of State v. Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899, 916 (2024)
(“While Congress may show special solicitude to noncitizen
spouses, such solicitude is a matter of legislative grace rather
than fundamental right.” (cleaned up)). Instead, the Constitu-
tion entrusts to Congress plenary power to regulate immigra-
tion. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) (“[O]ver no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete
than it is over” immigration).
As for Nobles’s equal protection claims, plaintiffs plead no
specific facts suggesting that USCIS exceeded the bounds of
its lawful discretion. They instead hypothesize in conclusory
fashion that USCIS’s determination may have been driven by
animus against interracial marriage. Such “naked asser-
tion[s]” without “further factual enhancement” are insuffi-
cient to state a claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
Plaintiffs’ bill-of-attainder theory fares no better. We have
soundly rejected similar theories, reasoning that immigration
statutes that regulate eligibility for immigration benefits are
not “legislative act[s] that inflict[] punishment without a
8 Nobles’s conviction erects a barrier to plaintiffs’ securing an immi-
gration benefit that is not even directly tied to marriage. See Bakran, 894
F.3d at 565 (“[T]he availability of this immigration benefit is not exclu-
sively contingent on marriage because parents and children may seek the
benefit.”). USCIS’s denial is tied to his prior sex conviction, which permis-
sibly carries collateral consequences. Id. at 565–66 (collecting cases and
statutes showing the government may impose restrictions on convicted
felons’ ability to exercise rights and access government benefits).

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No. 25-1652 25
judicial trial.” See Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655, 662–63 (7th
Cir. 1986). The same reasoning controls here.
As with the statutory claims, under the Adam Walsh Act,
Congress lawfully delegated authority to the Secretary, en-
trusting the no-risk determination to the Secretary’s discre-
tion (acting through USCIS). It channeled plaintiffs’ constitu-
tional claims, requiring them to be “raised upon a petition for
review filed with an appropriate court of appeals.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D). Because we encounter plaintiffs’ constitu-
tional claims outside of that procedure, and they do not raise
any alleged constitutional violations we may otherwise re-
view, we lack jurisdiction.
III. Conclusion
We AFFIRM dismissal of Counts I through III and V
through XIII for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and Count
IV for failure to state a claim.

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