Soma Getty Priddle v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD

United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued May 11, 2026
Decided June 18, 2026
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1695
SOMA GETTY PRIDDLE,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
and ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD,
Respondents,
and
Petition for Review of an Order
of the Department of Labor.
No. 2023-0037
UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,
Intervening Respondent.
O R D E R
Soma Priddle worked for three decades as a pilot for United Airlines. In 2018 she
began training to fly the Boeing 777, a high-capacity, long-haul aircraft. But the training
regimen revealed numerous deficiencies in her fundamental piloting skills, so United
suspended the training and referred Priddle for an examination of her fitness for duty.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

-- 1 of 5 --

No. 25-1695 Page 2
Priddle filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(“OSHA”) accusing United of retaliating against her for reporting two maintenance-
related safety issues years earlier. OSHA dismissed the retaliation complaint as
unfounded, and both an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) and the Administrative
Review Board in the Department of Labor affirmed. Priddle then sought judicial review
of the Board’s adverse ruling, arguing that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024), entitles her to a jury trial. We have our doubts about
that argument, but we don’t need to reach it: Priddle’s petition for review is untimely,
and to the extent that an equitable exception is available and might excuse her untimely
filing, she hasn’t established a basis for it. We thus dismiss the petition for review.
Priddle’s career as a United Airlines pilot began in 1989. For three decades she
flew small and midsize aircraft, but in the summer of 2018, United offered her the
opportunity to become certified to fly the Boeing 777. During the training flights, the
line check airmen (i.e., skilled pilots) assigned to supervise Priddle noted serious
problems with her performance. For starters, Priddle was struggling to progress in her
training; a typical Boeing 777 training regimen involves six live or simulated flights, but
even after ten flights, she failed to complete the required training. Even more
worrisome, Priddle seemed to lack the skills necessary to safely pilot any flight: She was
unable to recall basic emergency procedures, her aggressive braking caused the plane’s
brakes to smoke, and she struggled with situational awareness and time management.
United thus suspended Priddle’s training, and because her performance suggested a
possible cognitive or psychiatric impairment, the airline referred her for an examination
of her fitness for duty. In the months that followed, Priddle objected to United’s chosen
psychiatrist and insisted that her preferred physician be permitted to perform the
examination. United refused, so rather than complete the examination, Priddle took
unpaid leave and eventually retired.
Priddle filed a complaint with OSHA under the whistleblower-protection
provision of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation and Investment Reform Act for the 21st
Century (“AIR 21 Act”), which prohibits air carriers from firing or taking other adverse
action against an employee who reports a “violation or alleged violation of any order,
regulation, or standard of the Federal Aviation Administration or any other provision
of Federal law relating to aviation safety.” 49 U.S.C. § 42121(a)(1). Priddle claimed that
United’s fitness-for-duty referral violated the AIR 21 Act’s prohibition on retaliation.
Years earlier she had reported two maintenance-related safety failures to United and
the FAA. Priddle maintained that she had satisfied all objective criteria in her

-- 2 of 5 --

No. 25-1695 Page 3
Boeing 777 training and that United’s referral for a cognitive examination was
unjustified and retaliatory.
OSHA disagreed and dismissed the retaliation complaint for lack of evidentiary
support. Priddle objected, but an ALJ in the Department of Labor concluded that her
complaint was both time-barred and meritless. The Administrative Review Board
affirmed, explaining that Priddle filed her OSHA complaint at least two weeks after the
AIR 21 Act’s 90-day filing deadline had expired. Id. § 42121(b)(1). The Board issued its
final order on February 21, 2025.
Priddle, who is a lawyer as well as a pilot, petitioned for judicial review of the
Board’s order. Key here, our clerk of court received Priddle’s petition on April 23, or
61 days after the Board issued its order. That’s one day too late: the AIR 21 Act provides
that an airline employee’s petition for review must be filed “not later than 60 days after
the date” of the agency’s “final order.” Id. § 42121(b)(4). To be timely, Priddle’s petition
for review must have been filed no later than 60 days after February 21—that is,
April 22. Because the clerk’s office received the petition a day later (on April 23), the
agency urges us to dismiss it as untimely.
Priddle acknowledges that the clerk’s office didn’t receive her petition until
April 23; she argues in her reply brief that we should treat her petition as timely. She
attached a declaration asserting that she visited the Seventh Circuit clerk’s office on
April 14 (about a week before the due date) and planned to file her petition in person.
She asserts that the clerk’s office wouldn’t accept her filing and instead told her that
because she is a lawyer, she must file her petition electronically or by mail. See FED. R.
A PP. P. 25(a)(2)(A)(i) (“For a paper not filed electronically, filing may be accomplished
by mail addressed to the clerk … .”); 7TH C IR . R. 25 (“All documents must be filed and
served electronically” unless “submitted by unrepresented litigants who are not
themselves lawyers.” (emphasis added)). She further claims that because of “[p]revious
commitments,” she was unable to mail her petition for review until April 17, when she
sent it via certified mail from the post office in Winnetka, Illinois—about 25 miles north
of Chicago—so she had “every confidence” that it would arrive at the clerk’s office on
time.
It did not. And the consequences of the delayed mailing are clear: A “filing is not
timely unless the clerk receives the papers within the time fixed for filing.” FED. R. A PP.
P. 25(a)(2)(A)(i); see id. R. 20 (clarifying that Rule 25 “appl[ies] to the review or
enforcement of an agency order”). Applying that straightforward rule here, Priddle’s
petition for review is untimely.

-- 3 of 5 --

No. 25-1695 Page 4
Priddle resists this conclusion on several fronts. First, she argues that the 60-day
filing deadline in the AIR 21 Act is not jurisdictional. That’s an open question. Cf. Bowles
v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (“[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil
case is a jurisdictional requirement.”). But see Riley v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 2190, 2203 (2025)
(holding that the analogous 30-day filing rule in the Immigration and Nationality Act is
not jurisdictional). But this case doesn’t require us to decide whether the filing deadline
affects our jurisdiction. Even if it’s not jurisdictional, Priddle has not established a basis
for any recognized equitable exception to timely filing.
“Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing
two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418
(2005). Priddle learned on April 14 that she needed to file her petition either
electronically or by mail. On April 17—three days later and five days before the
statutory deadline—she mailed her petition for review. Even if that counts as
reasonable diligence in this situation, no “extraordinary circumstance” beyond
Priddle’s control prevented her from timely filing her petition.
Next, Priddle points to Rule 25(a)(4), which forbids the clerk to “refuse to accept
for filing any paper presented for that purpose solely because it is not presented in
proper form.” But the problem with Priddle’s attempt to file in person wasn’t one of
form; it was one of method. No rule requires the clerk to accept any paper for filing
regardless of the method by which a litigant tries to file it.
Priddle asserts that she “acted in good faith” and tried to file her petition for
review on time. Maybe so, but “good faith” is not a basis for excusing untimely filings—
at least not without more. See Marquez v. Mineta, 424 F.3d 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2005) (listing
“good faith” as one of many factors relevant to establishing “good cause or excusable
neglect” (quotation omitted)). Regardless, Rule 26(b)(2) prohibits us from extending the
time to file a petition for review of an agency order “unless specifically authorized by
law.” Priddle has identified no law that “specifically authorize[s]” us to excuse her
untimely filing.
Finally, Priddle contends that the agency waived its untimeliness argument by
omitting the issue from its motions seeking extensions of time to file its brief and the
certified list of documents in the administrative record. Relatedly, she insists that we
excused her untimely petition by accepting her opening brief. These arguments are
nonstarters: The agency raised its untimeliness argument at the first available

-- 4 of 5 --

No. 25-1695 Page 5
opportunity, and we did not excuse Priddle’s untimely petition by accepting her
opening brief for filing.
Accordingly, regardless of the jurisdictional status of the AIR 21 Act’s filing
deadline, we must dismiss Priddle’s petition for review as untimely. The agency has
properly invoked the time-bar, and to the extent that equitable tolling is available,
Priddle doesn’t qualify.
PETITION DISMISSED

-- 5 of 5 --