Immanuel Baptist Church v. City of Chicago

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued February 20, 2026
Decided June 18, 2026
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1951
IMMANUEL BAPTIST CHURCH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:17-cv-00932
Mary M. Rowland,
Judge.
O R D E R
Immanuel Baptist Church (“IBC”) sued the City of Chicago, alleging that a City
ordinance imposed more demanding parking requirements on religious assembly uses
than on nonreligious assembly uses. After six years of litigation (including pandemic-
related delays), and the dismissal of three of IBC’s four theories of relief, the district
court found in favor of IBC at a bench trial. IBC sought more than $415,000 in damages,
but the district court found that it was entitled to recover only $14,590. IBC also sought
just shy of $680,000 in attorneys’ fees. The district court calculated a lodestar of $475,595
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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and then reduced that lodestar by 50% because of IBC’s limited success, resulting in an
award of $237,797.50.
IBC appeals, arguing that the district court misapplied the law and abused its
discretion in applying the 50% reduction. We affirm. The district court used the correct
legal framework, and it reasonably considered IBC’s overall success.
I
This litigation began in 2017, when IBC sued the City, seeking injunctive relief
and money damages. IBC alleged that the City’s off-street parking ordinance on its face
imposed more demanding parking requirements on religious assembly uses than on
nonreligious assembly uses (like libraries and theaters), in violation of the equal-terms
provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The substance of the
ordinance is not at issue in this appeal, but, in short, it required religious groups to have
one off-street parking spot for every eight seats in their worship space; other entities
had less demanding spot-to-seat ratio requirements, or no parking requirements at all.
The City moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The district
court construed the filing as a motion for summary judgment because the parties agreed
the case could be resolved on the undisputed facts in the complaint. IBC then cross-
moved for summary judgment. The court granted judgment to the City on IBC’s facial
challenge under the equal-terms provision of RLUIPA as well as the challenge under
the Equal Protection Clause. The court, however, gave IBC leave to amend to assert an
as-applied challenge under the equal-terms provision of RLUIPA.
In October 2017, IBC filed its first amended complaint, bringing an as-applied
challenge under the equal-terms provision of RLUIPA and identifying two libraries as
comparators to show that the City applied the parking requirement unequally. The City
moved to dismiss this complaint too, but the district court denied the motion.
In February 2019, IBC filed a second amended complaint, adding an allegation
that the City violated the substantial-burden provision of RLUIPA. IBC filed a third
amended complaint in August 2019, dropping its request for injunctive relief because
the City had since amended the ordinance and had reduced IBC’s parking requirement
to zero. The City moved to dismiss IBC’s new substantial-burden theory, but the district
court denied the motion.

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No. 25-1951 Page 3
To sum up, by this point in the litigation—July 2020—IBC had two live theories
of relief under RLUIPA: an as-applied challenge under the equal-terms provision, and a
challenge under the substantial-burden provision. And because the request for
injunctive relief had been mooted by the ordinance amendment, IBC was left solely
seeking damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees.
In May 2021, both parties again cross-moved for summary judgment. In March
2022, the district court denied IBC’s motion, granted the City’s motion as to the as-
applied equal-terms challenge, and denied the City’s motion as to the substantial-
burden challenge.
After a four-day bench trial in January 2023, the court ruled that the City had
violated the substantial-burden provision of RLUIPA. While IBC sought $415,509.37 in
damages, the court concluded that IBC had met its burden to recover only $14,590.1
IBC then petitioned for $679,910.25 in attorneys’ fees, which the district court
granted in part and denied in part. The court first calculated a lodestar of $475,595.
Then, the court reduced the lodestar by 50% to reflect IBC’s failure to prove most of its
theories and most of its requested damages. Based on these adjustments, the court
awarded IBC $237,797.50 in attorneys’ fees.
IBC moved for reconsideration, arguing that the court had committed a manifest
legal error in applying the 50% reduction. The district court denied the motion,
reiterating its view that IBC had limited success overall. IBC now appeals.
II
“We review a district court’s determination of attorneys’ fees under a highly
deferential abuse of discretion standard.” Vega v. Chi. Park Dist., 12 F.4th 696, 702 (7th
1 IBC had sought to recover for a litany of expenses, including increased rent and
mortgage payments, lost income, and miscellaneous fees. But apart from two requests—
$13,800 paid for a parking lot lease, and $790 paid for increased insurance premiums—
IBC failed to substantiate its requests or did not show them to be traceable to the City’s
conduct. See Assaf v. Trinity Med. Ctr., 821 F.3d 847, 848 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he party
seeking to recover damages . . . bears the burden of proving that [it] did, in fact, suffer
actual damages and must establish a reasonable basis for computation of those
damages”).

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No. 25-1951 Page 4
Cir. 2021) (citing Paz v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 924 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2019)).
This is because “the district court is in the best position to make the ‘contextual and fact-
specific’ assessment of what fees are reasonable.” Montanez v. Simon, 755 F.3d 547, 553
(7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Sottoriva v. Claps, 617 F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir. 2010)). “[W]e find
an abuse of discretion only ‘where no reasonable person could take the view espoused
by the district court.’” Vega, 12 F.4th at 702 (quoting Cooney v. Casady, 735 F.3d 514, 518
(7th Cir. 2013)). This “highly deferential” standard of review drives our analysis here.
Id. Of course, “[t]o the extent the appeal challenges the district court’s application of the
‘correct legal framework,’ we review de novo.” Id. (quoting Nichols v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp.,
4 F.4th 437, 441 (7th Cir. 2021)).
IBC first argues that the district court did not properly adhere to the framework
for determining a reasonable fee award, as established in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424 (1983). Because all of IBC’s legal theories were related, IBC says, the district court
was not permitted under Hensley to reduce the lodestar at all. But that view finds no
support in Hensley.
Hensley permits a district court to “adjust the fee upward or downward” based
on various considerations, including “the important factor of the ‘results obtained.’” Id.
at 434. This is true regardless of the interrelatedness of the “contention[s] raised in the
lawsuit.” Id. at 435 (citation omitted); see also id. at 436 (permitting reduction “even
where the plaintiff’s claims were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith”);
Spegon v. Catholic Bishop, 175 F.3d 544, 557 (7th Cir. 1999) (instructing that Hensley
applies equally in cases “involving a single claim or related claims”).
Related claims or not, the key question for a court considering a downward
adjustment is whether “the plaintiff achieve[d] a level of success that makes the hours
reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award[.]” Hensley, 461 U.S. at
434. Put differently, the award should be “reasonable in relation to the results
obtained,” and a reduction “is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in
comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.” Id. at 440.
“To be sure, a plaintiff need not prevail on every claim or legal theory to receive
fully compensatory attorney’s fees.” Sottoriva, 617 F.3d at 976 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at
435). “Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a
fully compensatory fee,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, and they should not be “penalized just
because some [theories], or even all but one, are rejected,” Montanez, 755 F.3d at 556
(quoting Lenard v. Argento, 808 F.2d 1242, 1246 (7th Cir. 1987)).

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No. 25-1951 Page 5
Generally, then, “[a] plaintiff who achieves ‘excellent results’ should receive the
entire lodestar, but where ‘a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success,’ the
lodestar ‘may be an excessive amount.’” Montanez, 755 F.3d at 556 (quoting Hensley, 461
U.S. at 435–36). And when faced with a plaintiff who prevailed on only some of his
interrelated claims or theories, a district court “may attempt to identify specific hours
that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited
success.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37.
Here, although IBC won a sum that was surely meaningful for a small church, it
did not obtain “excellent results.” The district court considered that context and
concluded that IBC’s overall success, given the scope of the litigation, was not
commensurate with the full $475,595 lodestar. And, because it could not “identify
specific hours that should be eliminated,” it applied an across-the-board reduction “to
account for the limited success.” See id. at 436–37. All of these considerations were
consistent with the Hensley framework; we see no legal error.
IBC also argues that the reduction was unreasonable, reflecting an abuse of
discretion. We disagree. “There is no precise formula” for district courts to determine
an appropriate fee. Id. at 436. Some guideposts we have set are that courts cannot limit
the fee awards to “some multiple of the judgment,” Montanez, 755 F.3d at 557, and that
courts may not “claim count[]” to reduce the lodestar proportionally to the
successful/unsuccessful claims or theories, Sottoriva, 617 F.3d at 976. The district court’s
selection of a 50% reduction is neither a “multiple of the judgment,” Montanez, 755 F.3d
at 557, nor proportional to the successful theories (one out of four).
And—while definitely not determinative—where, as here, “damages are the
primary goal of a lawsuit, a comparison between the damages sought and those
awarded is highly relevant to the reasonableness of the fee petition.” Johnson v. Kakvand,
192 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); Anderson v. AB Painting &
Sandblasting, Inc., 578 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that “a fee request that dwarfs
the damages award might raise a red flag”). As the district court noted, because of its
failure to prove the bulk of requested damages, IBC walked away with less than 5% of
what it asked for. That disparity was a relevant and permissible consideration. See, e.g.,
Spegon, 175 F.3d at 558 (upholding 50% reduction where plaintiff received “significantly
less than the recovery he sought”); Montanez, 755 F.3d at 557 (upholding 50% reduction,
bringing the attorneys’ fee award to just over $100,000, where plaintiff received only
$2,000 in damages).

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The district court’s assessment was not an abuse of discretion and is thus entitled
to deference. All told, IBC did not “get all that [it] asked for” out of this litigation,
Montanez, 755 F.3d at 556, and therefore the $237,797.50 award was reasonable.
AFFIRMED

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