Abraham Grindling v. Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued April 14, 2026
Decided June 29, 2026
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2367
ABRAHAM GRINDLING,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LTD.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:23-cv-05030
Sara L. Ellis,
Judge.
O R D E R
Plaintiff Abraham Grindling is a former pilot for defendant Cathay Pacific Air-
ways Ltd. He sued Cathay in the Northern District of Illinois for terminating his em-
ployment after he refused to take a Covid-19 vaccine. Grindling contends that Cathay
should have granted him a medical exemption based on his history of anaphylaxis from
bee stings and that Cathay’s actions violated its collective bargaining agreement with
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 25-2367 Page 2
his union. He raises claims against Cathay under the Americans with Disabilities Act
and the Railway Labor Act.1
The district court granted Cathay’s motion to dismiss. The court concluded that
the ADA claims failed because Grindling did not allege sufficiently that he has a “disa-
bility” or is regarded as disabled within the meaning of the ADA and that his RLA
claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Grindling appeals.
Grindling’s appellate brief wholly fails to engage with the district court’s reasons
for its decision. The argument section comprises fewer than four full pages. Outside of
reciting federal pleading standards, the argument cites only one case and no statutory
provisions. (Grindling did not file a reply brief.) On the ADA claims, he merely pro-
vides additional details about his history of anaphylaxis. He does not explain how that
history makes him disabled or regarded as disabled. On the RLA claims, he does not
address the district court’s well-supported conclusion that the time he spent exhausting
administrative remedies on his ADA claims did not toll the statute of limitations for the
RLA claims because there is no requirement to exhaust any administrative remedies on
those claims.
We dismiss this appeal without addressing the merits of these issues. An appel-
lant’s brief—whether he appears pro se or, as here, through counsel—must contain the
“appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and
parts of the record on which the appellant relies.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).2 Yet out-
side his discussion of the pleading standard, Grindling cites only “one irrelevant case”
and “offers no articulable basis for disturbing the district court’s judgment.” Anderson v.
Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001) (dismissing appeal for insufficient brief-
ing); see also, e.g., Henneberg v. Dewitt, No. 22-1152, 2023 WL 2823066 (7th Cir. Apr. 7,
2023) (same).
DISMISSED
1 Grindling’s suit against the union remains pending in another district. See Grindling v. United
States Aircrew Officers Association, No. 23-cv-02613 (D.D.C.).
2 The attorney who signed and filed this brief on behalf of Grindling was later disbarred for ap-
parently unrelated conduct. In re Christopher R. Burns, Esq., No. LD-2025-0008 (N.H. May 13, 2026).

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