Quentin L. Taylor v. Dennis Reagle

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 30, 2026*
Decided July 6, 2026
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2338
QUENTIN L. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DENNIS REAGLE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:22-cv-02169-SEB-KMB
Sarah Evans Barker,
Judge.
O R D E R
Quentin Taylor, an Indiana prisoner, sued mental health practitioners, the
private health-care contractor that employed them, and several prison officials, alleging
that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of his
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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rights under the Eighth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court entered
summary judgment for all defendants. We affirm.
We recount the facts in the light most favorable to Taylor and draw all
reasonable inferences in his favor. See Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir.
2025). During the events giving rise to this suit, Taylor was incarcerated at the
Pendleton Correctional Facility in the G-Cellhouse restrictive-housing unit. While there,
Taylor suffered from mental health issues including post-traumatic stress disorder,
depression, anxiety, and antisocial personality disorder.
Between January and late November 2022, Taylor was seen on an almost weekly
basis by mental health practitioners, including Aryana Moss, Jeremy LaReau, and
Dr. Akilah LaMar, all of whom were employed by Centurion Health of Indiana, LLC.
During these visits, Taylor mentioned feeling stress and fear because of his
environment, and he struggled to implement the coping mechanisms suggested to him.
Taylor’s mental health struggles reached a peak in May. Between May 7 and
May 10, he submitted three healthcare request forms all describing “crazy thoughts”
and suicidal ideations. On May 11, Taylor met with LaReau, but the session ended
abruptly when Taylor stated that he “want[ed] to die,” pulled out a bag of unidentified
pills that he had obtained from other inmates, and consumed them.
Officer Chris Campbell and Sergeant Jacob Williams were alerted to the pill
overdose and arrived to assist. Sergeant Williams called medical staff to report the
incident while Officer Campbell removed the cup Taylor had used to swallow the pills.
Medical staff instructed them to take Taylor to an urgent care shakedown booth (a cell
that is empty except for a mattress and toilet) that was video monitored by the medical
staff. Sergeant Williams and Officer Campbell checked on Taylor approximately twice
while he was in the booth. Taylor asserts that he notified Williams of intense chest and
abdominal pains, and Williams did nothing. Williams, on the other hand, asserts Taylor
showed no visible signs of immediate medical need but reported feeling “generally
unwell,” which Williams asserts that he relayed to medical staff, who directed him to
do nothing further. Taylor was in the shakedown booth for approximately two hours
before medical staff examined and treated him. Taylor asserts that he “was forced to
suffer and was in severe pain” during this two-hour interval.
For the week following that incident, Taylor was placed on suicide watch and
received daily visits from Dr. LaMar and other mental-health staff. During these

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meetings he made repeated complaints about the conditions in his cellhouse and, at one
point, claimed that he did not want to live in segregation for the next year and would
continue to engage in self-harm. Eventually, Taylor denied suicidal ideation and was
released from suicide watch.
Taylor continued to visit healthcare professionals over the next few months
about once per week. There was little improvement in Taylor’s reported condition
despite providers prescribing different medications (Remeron, Zoloft, and Prazosin),
adjusting dosages, and attempting to help Taylor develop coping mechanisms. On one
occasion, in September 2022, Taylor again reported having suicidal thoughts. In
response, Dr. LaMar ordered a safety evaluation, but during the evaluation, Taylor
denied having suicidal ideations. Then, for a period in November 2022, Taylor refused
his medications because he believed that prison staff were giving him the wrong pills.
Taylor reported this to Dr. LaMar, who relayed the complaints to the physician who
prescribed his medications.
Taylor then sued Centurion, Dr. LaMar, Moss, and LaReau, as well as Warden
Dennis Reagle, Sergeant Williams, and Officer Campbell, alleging that they violated his
rights under the Eighth Amendment by providing inadequate medical treatment. He
said that the prison staff and medical practitioners ignored his declining mental health
and that Centurion had a widespread practice of denying treatment to mentally ill
inmates. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). He also alleged that
Sergeant Williams and Officer Campbell were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs based on their purported failure to obtain medical treatment for him
after his attempted suicide in May 2022. He specifically pointed to the lack of a logbook
entry recording any attempt from the officers to contact medical staff while he was in
the shakedown booth.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. Centurion and the medical
providers argued that the care they had provided for Taylor was constitutionally
sufficient—he had regular and prompt access to treatment, and his care was routinely
adapted to better meet his needs. Warden Reagle, Sergeant Williams, and Officer
Campbell argued that they had no control over Taylor’s allegedly deficient treatment
and thus could not have been deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants, concluding that
no reasonable jury could find they were deliberately indifferent. The court concluded
that the record showed Dr. Lamar, Moss, and LaReau ensured that Taylor had extensive

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access to individualized therapy and treatment sessions, and that Taylor’s healthcare
requests were timely addressed. And because the level of care was not constitutionally
deficient, neither Warden Reagle nor Centurion could be held liable for condoning
violations that did not occur. On his claims against Sergeant Williams and Officer
Campbell, the court rejected Taylor’s argument that the lack of a logbook entry meant
that Sergeant Williams never contacted medical staff. The court concluded that the
officials correctly deferred to the decisions of medical professionals when they moved
Taylor to the shakedown cell and monitored him.
Taylor appeals, raising only two arguments. First, he argues that a material fact
dispute remains regarding whether Sergeant Williams contacted medical staff while
Taylor was in the shakedown booth after his May suicide attempt. Taylor asserts that
the district court impermissibly credited Sergeant Williams’s sworn statement that he
relayed, by phone, Taylor’s complaints to medical staff while Taylor was in the
shakedown booth. Taylor argues that this is contradicted by his own sworn statements
and the lack of an entry in the logbook, which Taylor says officers must use to record all
events that take place in the unit.
But neither Taylor’s statements nor the lack of entry in the logbook create a
genuine dispute of fact. Although Taylor alleged in his verified complaint that officers
“ignored” his requests for help, he later admitted in his deposition that he was “not
sure if anyone contacted medical or not.” Because Taylor lacked personal knowledge of
whether officers called medical, he cannot genuinely dispute Sergeant Williams’s sworn
testimony that he called medical staff and relayed Taylor’s concerns. See Payne v. Pauley,
337 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2003) (speculation is insufficient to survive summary
judgment). Moreover, as the district court recognized, Taylor provided no evidence that
Sergeant Williams was required to record his every action in the logbook. Thus, the
absence of a logbook entry about Sergeant Williams’s call does not, without more, allow
for the reasonable inference that the call did not happen. Estate of Biegert ex rel. Biegert v.
Molitor, 968 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2020) (drawing inferences in favor of nonmoving
party does not extend to drawing inferences that are supported by only speculation or
conjecture). And, Sergeant Williams and Officer Campbell were entitled to rely on the
medical staff’s judgment that Taylor did not require treatment at that time and could
remain in the shakedown booth. See Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1049–50 (7th Cir.
2019); Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527–28 (7th Cir. 2008).
Next, Taylor argues that Dr. LaMar’s treatment was constitutionally inadequate.
But we agree with the district court that no reasonable jury could conclude that

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Dr. LaMar’s treatment constituted a significant departure from professional standards.
See Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014). We look at “the totality of an
inmate’s medical care when considering whether that care evidences deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016)
(en banc). After Taylor’s suicide attempt, Dr. LaMar regularly evaluated Taylor while
he was on suicide watch and ensured that medical health staff visited him daily.
Months later, when Taylor again reported that he was suicidal, Dr. LaMar ordered a
safety evaluation to ensure that Taylor was not a danger to himself. Taylor insists that
Dr. LaMar should have done more to treat his persistent mental health struggles. But
prisoners are “not entitled to demand specific care,” Walker v. Wexford Health Sources,
Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted), and the Eighth Amendment
does not guarantee success in treatment, Rodgers v. Rankin, 99 F.4th 415, 419 (7th Cir.
2024) (“Prison officials do not violate the Constitution every time they fail to heal a
prisoner’s injury or cure an illness.”).
Taylor does not address on appeal whether the district court erred in its
determination that Reagle, Moss, LaReau, and Centurion, were entitled to summary
judgment. Therefore, any argument along those lines is waived. Shipley v. Chi. Bd. of
Election Comm'rs, 947 F.3d 1056, 1062–63 (7th Cir. 2020).
AFFIRMED

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