Vicki Stewart, in her individual capacity v. Jason Derbort

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued April 16, 2026
Decided July 6, 2026
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2651
VICKI STEWART, in her individual
capacity and as Administrator of the
ESTATE OF JAMI HAWKINS, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
JASON DERBORT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 2:24-cv-02186-CSB-EIL
Colin S. Bruce,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Plaintiff-appellants in this case are family members of the late Jami Hawkins.
They appeal the dismissal of their federal and state-law claims arising from alleged
wrongs surrounding Jami’s death. (We use some first names because several parties are
named Hawkins.) The district court entered final judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ action
without prejudice. We affirm dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs lack standing to
bring their federal claims, and the district court did not err by choosing not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-2651 Page 2
I.
Jami Hawkins died in August 2022 from a gunshot wound. Law enforcement
and municipal employees responding to the incident treated her death as a suicide. But
some family members believe Jami was murdered and that the investigation into her
death was intentionally flawed, tainting its conclusions and hindering the family’s abil-
ity to bring a wrongful death action. Jami died without a will. A probate court later de-
clared that Jami’s only heir was her son, Jarryd Hawkins.
In 2024, plaintiffs brought this civil action against several law enforcement offic-
ers, municipal workers, and three municipalities arising from the investigation into
Jami’s death. Plaintiffs alleged obstruction of justice under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and fail-
ure to intervene under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. They also alleged they had been deprived of ac-
cess to the courts under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, seeking relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, including conspiracy and municipal liability under Monell v. Department
of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Plaintiffs also invoked the fed-
eral court’s supplemental jurisdiction to assert several state-law claims.
After the suit was filed, Jami’s son Jarryd was terminated as a plaintiff in the ac-
tion at his own request, saying he had not agreed to participate in the lawsuit.1 In early
2025, before plaintiffs filed their operative second amended complaint, plaintiff Vicki
Stewart successfully filed a petition to reopen Jami’s estate in probate court and was re-
appointed administrator of Jami’s estate. After plaintiffs filed their second amended
complaint, defendants filed motions to dismiss.
The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss. The court first identi-
fied deprivation of access to the courts, specifically to bring a possible wrongful death
action, as the only alleged constitutional violation that might support plaintiffs’ federal
1 Jarryd’s motion requested that the court:
Remove my name, Jarryd Hawkins, from the list of plaintiffs and the case as a whole as I
did not agree to participate in this complaint. The main plaintiff, Vicki Stewart, and her
lawyer, Fabian J. Rosati, added my name to the complaint without my consent. I contacted
Rosati’s office before the complaint was filed and requested that my name be removed.
The complaint was still filed with my name listed. I do not want my name listed in the
parties of the complaint or in the counts of the complaint.
Dkt. 8 at 1. The court granted that motion and terminated Jarryd as a plaintiff. Then the remaining plain-
tiffs filed an amended complaint that asserted no claims on his behalf.

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No. 25-2651 Page 3
claims. Based on limits in the Illinois wrongful death statute, the court determined that
the only plaintiff with standing to bring these claims was Stewart in her capacity as ad-
ministrator of Jami’s estate. The district court found she could recover nominal or puni-
tive damages from a Section 1983 claim stemming from that violation of her constitu-
tional rights.
Reaching the merits only as to Stewart’s claims, the court then dismissed the Sec-
tion 1985(2) and Section 1986 claims for failure to allege discriminatory animus on the
part of any defendant. The court dismissed the remaining federal claims, which alleged
interference with plaintiffs’ access to courts and municipal liability under Monell, for
resting on a predicate wrongful death claim that the court viewed as “entirely hypothet-
ical.” The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-
law claims.
As to the plaintiffs who lacked standing, the district court in its order dismissed
the case without prejudice, but also without leave to amend. The court wrote in its or-
der that Vicki Stewart’s claims as estate administrator, which the court addressed on
their merits, were dismissed with prejudice and that the case was “terminated.” Con-
trary to the order, however, the court entered a separate final judgment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 58 dismissing the entire action without prejudice. Plaintiffs
have appealed.2
II.
We first address the discrepancy between the district court’s order and judg-
ment, which poses an issue for our jurisdiction over this appeal. Our jurisdiction as an
appellate court is limited to appeals from “final decisions” made by federal district
courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “Normally, a dismissal without prejudice is not a final order for
purposes of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678,
680 (7th Cir. 2006).
One wrinkle in the finality rule allows us to exercise appellate jurisdiction when
the district court’s dismissal without prejudice is “conclusive in practical effect.” Ameri-
can States Insurance Co. v. Capital Associates of Jackson County, Inc., 392 F.3d 939, 941 (7th
2 After oral argument in this case, plaintiffs moved to supplement the record under Federal Rule of Appel-
late Procedure 10(e)(2)(C) with an email exchange they claim clarifies a factual dispute. That email ex-
change does not appear to be part of the district court record, as required to supplement the record under
Rule 10(e). In any event, the tendered emails are not material to our decision. See United States v. Hillsberg,
812 F.2d 328, 336–37 (7th Cir. 1987). Plaintiffs’ motion is denied.

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No. 25-2651 Page 4
Cir. 2004); Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (exercising § 1291 jurisdic-
tion despite district court’s dismissal without prejudice, in part because “multiple indi-
cia [showed] that the district court was finished with the case”). We also explained in
Hernandez: “The true test for determining finality under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ‘is not the ade-
quacy of the judgment[,] but whether the district court has finished with the case.’” 814
F.3d at 841, quoting Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Moore, 446 F.3d 725, 726 (7th Cir.
2006) (alteration in original).
This finality issue was not brought to light in plaintiffs’ appendix or brief, but it
should have been. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 30(a)(1) and Seventh Circuit
Rule 30(a) require the appellant to file an appendix that includes the judgment in ques-
tion. Plaintiffs submitted their opening brief with an appendix containing only the dis-
trict court’s order, but not its final judgment dismissing the action without prejudice.
No other supplemental appendix was filed by either side. Plaintiffs nevertheless certi-
fied compliance with our appendix rules. Defendant-appellees were also silent on this
problem.
As we have previously cautioned, this omission alone can doom a party’s appeal.
See United States v. Boliaux, 915 F.3d 493, 497 (7th Cir. 2019) (collecting cases where false
certification of compliance with Circuit Rule 30 led to summary affirmance or dismissal
of appeal); Braam v. Carr, 37 F.4th 1269, 1276 (7th Cir. 2022) (same). We reiterate the
importance of these rules today. The required appendix should contain the most
fundamental documents showing our appellate jurisdiction. Given the district court’s
conclusion to its order, however, “This case is terminated,” we are satisfied here that the
district court thought it was finished with this case, so we have jurisdiction over the
appeal. See Munson Transportation, Inc. v. Hajjar, 148 F.3d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1998)
(exercising § 1291 jurisdiction where district court entered judgment on all claims and
said “[t]his case is terminated”); Moore, 446 F.3d at 726 (finality determination hinges on
“whether the district court has finished with the case”).
III.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff-appellants run into a separate jurisdictional obstacle
that they cannot surmount. They all lack Article III standing. See Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975) (standing is jurisdictional).
We begin by examining what exactly plaintiffs allege in their federal claims. The
Section 1983 claims against both individual and governmental defendants allege that
defendants violated plaintiffs’ constitutional right to access the courts to pursue a

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wrongful death claim. Plaintiffs’ Section 1985(2) and Section 1986 claims allege a con-
spiracy among those same defendants to obstruct justice in the state court by denying
plaintiffs “their constitutional right and the equal protection of the laws.” The Sec-
tion 1985(2) and 1986 claims carry the additional requirement of showing class-based
discriminatory animus, Nowicki v. Ullsvik, 69 F.3d 1320, 1325 (7th Cir. 1995), but they
fundamentally turn on the same alleged wrong as the Section 1983 claims—that defend-
ants deprived plaintiffs of the ability to pursue legal relief for Jami’s death. As a result,
the district court correctly determined, the applicable violation underlying all plaintiffs’
claims is an alleged deprivation of plaintiffs’ access to the courts to pursue a wrongful
death action.
The district court dismissed the claims of most plaintiffs on the ground that they
failed to allege an injury-in-fact. That ruling was correct. The court also determined,
however, that Vicki Stewart, in her capacity as Jami’s estate administrator, satisfied
standing requirements. That determination hinged on the district court’s view that
Stewart, unlike the other plaintiffs, could win nominal or punitive damages from a Sec-
tion 1983 claim premised on deprivation of her right to bring a wrongful death claim as
administrator of Jami’s estate. This injury, the district court said, gave Stewart standing.
As the district court correctly noted, a party may recover nominal or punitive
damages from a Section 1983 claim, in some circumstances even when the party suffers
no monetary injury from the underlying violation. E.g., Six Star Holdings, LLC v. City of
Milwaukee, 821 F.3d 795, 805 (7th Cir. 2016). But, for a denial-of-access claim, that party
must nonetheless have standing to bring the underlying claim to which she allegedly
was denied access. Absent such standing, she has suffered no constitutional violation of
her right to access the courts. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414–15 (2002)
(right of access to courts is “ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff
cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court”). Illinois’s wrongful death stat-
ute, which governs plaintiffs’ underlying wrongful death claim, forecloses such stand-
ing, even for plaintiff Stewart acting as Jami’s estate administrator.
Under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 180/1 et seq., any
wrongful death action must be brought by the decedent’s personal representative, but
“the amount recovered in every such action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the sur-
viving spouse and next of kin of such deceased person.” 740 ILCS 180/2(a). “The per-
sonal representative is merely a nominal party to this action, effectively filing suit as a
statutory trustee on behalf of the surviving spouse and next of kin, who are the true
parties in interest.” Glenn v. Johnson, 198 Ill. 2d 575, 583, 764 N.E.2d 47, 52 (2002). The

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statute specifies that all damages awarded, including punitive damages, go to the sur-
viving spouse and next of kin of the decedent. 740 ILCS 180/2(a). The representative of
the decedent’s estate may recover damages only “[w]here the deceased person left no
surviving spouse or next of kin entitled to recovery.” 740 ILCS 180/2(c). Further, puni-
tive damages are not available in a wrongful death action against local governments or
employees of a local government acting in their official capacity. 740 ILCS 180/2(a).
Jami left no surviving spouse. As her sole heir, her son Jarryd is the only person
who could possibly benefit from a hypothetical wrongful death claim. See Morris v. Wil-
liam L. Dawson Nursing Center, Inc., 187 Ill. 2d 494, 497, 719 N.E.2d 715, 717 (1999)
(phrase “next of kin” within context of Illinois wrongful death statute is defined by laws
of intestacy); 755 ILCS 5/2-1(b) (“If there is no surviving spouse but a descendant of the
decedent: the entire estate to the decedent’s descendants per stirpes.”). And as noted,
Jarryd has removed his name from the complaint and disclaimed any interest in this
suit.
Accordingly, even in her capacity as estate administrator, Vicki has no standing
to pursue independently a wrongful death claim. Under the logic of Christopher v. Har-
bury, her lack of standing to bring the underlying claim also forecloses her ability to
bring a Section 1983 denial-of-access claim premised on that wrongful death claim. See
536 U.S. at 415–16. None of the remaining plaintiffs could bring or benefit from a hypo-
thetical wrongful death action either. 740 ILCS 180/2(a) (permitting only decedent’s per-
sonal representative to bring wrongful death action). Nor do any plaintiffs identify any
other legal claim that defendants’ alleged conduct prevented them from pursuing. Ab-
sent this showing, plaintiffs lack standing to bring any of their federal claims. Finally,
having dismissed all federal-law claims, the district court did not abuse its discretion
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the re-
maining state-law claims. See Davis v. Cook County, 534 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2008).
AFFIRMED

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