United States of America v. Ausencio Martinez

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-1890
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
A USENCIO M ARTINEZ ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 21-cr-20066-001 — Colin S. Bruce, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 3, 2025 — DECIDED J ULY 7, 2026
____________________
Before S CUDDER , K IRSCH , and PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
PRYOR , Circuit Judge. In the early morning hours of Octo-
ber 7, 2021, Illinois State Police Trooper Anthony Muzzillo re-
ceived a tip that a semitruck was hauling a large amount of
narcotics north on Interstate 57. Muzzillo, a K9 handler, en-
listed help from another K9 state trooper and they waited on
the side of the highway for the truck to pass. Upon spotting
the semitruck, Muzzillo pulled the vehicle over to conduct an
administrative inspection pursuant to Illinois’s commercial

-- 1 of 41 --

2 No. 24-1890
trucking regulatory scheme. As the stop unfolded, Muzzillo
eventually conducted a dog sniff, which resulted in a search
and discovery of narcotics. The driver of the semitruck,
Ausencio Martinez, was placed under arrest. After the district
court denied his motion to suppress, Martinez entered a con-
ditional plea to possessing with intent to distribute five kilo-
grams or more of cocaine. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).
On appeal, Martinez challenges the constitutionality of the
traffic stop, arguing it was a pretextual administrative inspec-
tion in violation of the Fourth Amendment. For the reasons
that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Early in the morning of October 7, 2021, Illinois State Po-
lice Trooper Anthony Muzzillo was called out to assist an-
other (unspecified) law enforcement agency about a semi-
truck transporting narcotics. Muzzillo, a K9 handler, was not
on routine patrol that night, so he enlisted support from
Trooper Krol, another K9 handler with the Illinois State Po-
lice.
Based on the law enforcement tip, the two K9 troopers
staked out a spot on Interstate 57 for at least thirty minutes
waiting for the semitruck. At 3:16 a.m., Muzzillo located Mar-
tinez’s semitruck driving north on the interstate in Kankakee
County, Illinois and pulled it over. Muzzillo testified that he
decided to stop this particular semitruck because it was “pos-
sibly carrying large-load narcotics.” The stated purpose of the
stop was to conduct a Level 3 administrative inspection,
which entailed checking Martinez’s driver’s license, the

-- 2 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 3
truck’s logbooks, insurance documents, and registration doc-
uments.
When approaching the truck, Muzzillo noticed an “over-
whelming odor of air freshener,” which he understood to be
commonly used to mask odor from narcotics. He asked Mar-
tinez to follow him to his squad car for questioning while he
reviewed Martinez’s documents. As they spoke in the squad
car, Muzzillo perceived Martinez as being “extremely nerv-
ous,” having “dry mouth,” and breathing “heav[ily].”
From the logbooks, Muzzillo learned that Martinez took a
300- to 400-mile detour from his delivery route. Martinez ex-
plained that his company had rerouted him but then decided
against the new route. Muzzillo also noticed that the semi-
truck’s bill of lading indicated the load Martinez was hauling
had been sealed previously, but that seal had since been re-
moved; this created the risk that the shipment’s receiver
would reject it. Finding these observations suspicious, Muz-
zillo conducted an exterior dog sniff of Martinez’s semitruck.
The K9 alerted Muzzillo to an area near the driver’s door.
Muzzillo then communicated the alert to a member of the
law enforcement agency that had provided the tip and who
was also present at the stop. In response, law enforcement re-
quested Muzzillo search Martinez’s semitruck based on the
K9 alert. During the search, Muzzillo discovered a duffel bag
filled with suspected narcotics. Muzzillo then handed the
criminal investigation off to the originating law enforcement
agency.
B. Procedural Background
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Martinez
with possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms or

-- 3 of 41 --

4 No. 24-1890
more of cocaine. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). Martinez
moved to suppress the evidence derived from the warrantless
search of his semitruck. Relevant here, he argued Muzzillo vi-
olated his Fourth Amendment rights by using the Illinois ad-
ministrative inspection statute as pretext to investigate al-
leged criminal activity and by unreasonably prolonging the
stop to conduct a dog sniff. In response to the suppression
motion, the government argued that Muzzillo’s subjective in-
tent was irrelevant to whether he lawfully stopped Martinez
for an administrative inspection. The government also con-
tended that Muzzillo had independent reasonable suspicion
to extend the stop for a dog sniff.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the sup-
pression motion. Muzzillo testified at the hearing. The court
also admitted multiple explanatory exhibits and a video of the
traffic stop.
Following the hearing and after reviewing the parties’
post-hearing briefing, the district court denied Martinez’s
suppression motion. It rejected Martinez’s contention that the
stop’s constitutionality turned on Muzzillo’s subjective in-
tent. The district court recognized that under City of Indianap-
olis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45–48 (2000), an administrative
stop could be challenged on the basis that the administrative
program itself was enacted with a pretextual programmatic
purpose of aiding criminal investigations. But, the court rea-
soned, Edmond and United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,
462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983), barred defendants from contest-
ing the constitutionality of that programmatic stop by chal-
lenging the subjective intent of the individual officer who con-
ducted the inspection. From this, the district court concluded
the stop was justified at its inception because there was no

-- 4 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 5
dispute that Illinois law authorized Muzzillo to conduct an
administrative inspection. The district court also rejected
Martinez’s argument that the dog sniff unreasonably pro-
longed the stop.
Martinez conditionally pled guilty to possessing with in-
tent to distribute cocaine, reserving his right to challenge the
denial of his suppression motion. The district court sentenced
Martinez to 120 months’ imprisonment. Martinez now ap-
peals.
II. A NALYSIS
Because a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress
involves mixed questions of fact and law, we review factual
determinations for clear error and conclusions of law de novo.
United States v. Avila, 106 F.4th 684, 692 (7th Cir. 2024).
On appeal, Martinez maintains his contention that the traf-
fic stop of his semitruck exceeded the constitutional bounds
of an administrative inspection because it was mere pretext to
conduct a criminal investigation, and thus the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress.1
A. Purpose for the Stop
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
1 Martinez also argues that even if the initial basis for the stop was lawful,
Muzzillo unreasonably prolonged the stop by conducting a dog sniff with-
out reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. But for the reasons ex-
plained below, we need not reach this argument.

-- 5 of 41 --

6 No. 24-1890
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. C ONST. amend. IV. A traffic stop is a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and is “thus subject to the
constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under
the circumstances.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810
(1996). The essential purpose of the “reasonableness” stand-
ard is “to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions” by law enforcement. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (citation omitted); see also
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
To be reasonable, a traffic stop must be “justified at its in-
ception.” United States v. Cole, 21 F.4th 421, 427 (7th Cir. 2021)
(en banc) (citation and quotation omitted); cf. New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (collecting cases “recogniz[ing]
the legality of searches and seizures based on suspicions that,
although ‘reasonable,’ do not rise to the level of probable
cause”). Typically, assessing reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment “is predominantly an objective inquiry.” Ash-
croft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 736 (2011) (quoting Edmond,
531 U.S. at 47). Under that usual assessment, where the objec-
tively viewed circumstances justify the initial stop based on
individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, the Su-
preme Court instructs that action is reasonable “whatever the
subjective intent” motivating the relevant officials. Id. (em-
phasis in original) (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 814).
In this case, however, the government does not seek to jus-
tify the initial stop of Martinez’s semitruck based on the ob-
servation of a traffic violation or probable cause of criminal

-- 6 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 7
activity. Instead, the government argues Muzzillo’s actions
were justified by Illinois’s commercial trucking regulatory
scheme, which permits warrantless administrative inspec-
tions by troopers for purposes of determining a truck’s com-
pliance with these regulations.
A warrantless administrative inspection does not per se vi-
olate the Fourth Amendment.2 City of Los Angeles v. Patel,
576 U.S. 409, 419–20 (2015). The Supreme Court has explained
that “in ‘closely regulated’ industries—namely, those which
have long been subject to close supervision and inspection—
the privacy interests of business owners may be so attenuated,
and the government’s interest in regulating the particular in-
dustry so strong, that a warrantless inspection of the commer-
cial premises might be reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.” Lesser v. Espy, 34 F.3d 1301, 1305 (7th
Cir. 1994) (discussing Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
313–14 (1978)). In these industries, an individual’s “reasona-
ble expectations of privacy are diminished because an indi-
vidual who ‘embarks upon such a business … has voluntarily
chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental
regulation.’” Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S.
2 The history of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement does, how-
ever, provide insight into why the Framers looked skeptically upon war-
rantless searches and seizures. Indeed, “[i]t is familiar history that indis-
criminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general
warrants’ were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adop-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583
(1980). “The Fourth Amendment’s commands grew in large measure out
of the colonists’ experience with the writs of assistance that granted
sweeping power to customs officials and other agents of the King to search
at large for smuggled goods.” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311
(1978) (citation modified).

-- 7 of 41 --

8 No. 24-1890
Dep’t of Transp., 840 F.3d 879, 893 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mar-
shall, 436 U.S. at 313).
Thus, “unlike searches of private homes, which generally
must be conducted pursuant to a warrant in order to be rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment, legislative schemes
authorizing warrantless administrative searches of commer-
cial property do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.” Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981) (citing
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), and Colonnade Ca-
tering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970)). These regula-
tory schemes can be permissible under the Fourth Amend-
ment when the government’s regulation of that industry is
“pervasive.” New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700–02 (1987).
We have held that the commercial trucking industry is a per-
vasively regulated industry. Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers
Ass’n, 840 F.3d at 893.
The Fourth Amendment, though, still imposes constraints
on warrantless inspections in pervasively regulated indus-
tries, see Burger, 482 U.S. at 699–703, so these inspections
“must still be reasonable,” Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers
Ass’n, 840 F.3d at 893 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S.
398, 403 (2006)). Importantly, an administrative inspection
must not be used as pretext for gathering evidence of criminal
activity. Whren, 517 U.S. at 811 (citing Burger, 482 U.S. at 716–
17 n.27). An administrative inspection, unlike penal laws,
serves a primary purpose distinguishable from a govern-
ment’s general interest in crime control. See Patel, 576 U.S. at
420. Thus, in the context of warrantless administrative inspec-
tions, an officer’s subjective intent may factor into whether the
inspection was pretextual. Indeed, an officer’s “actual moti-
vations” for conducting the inspection can invalidate the of-

-- 8 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 9
ficer’s otherwise objectively justifiable behavior. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. at 736 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,
122 (2001)).
Put differently, the administrative inspection context is
one of two limited exceptions where the Supreme Court has
recognized that officers’ “actual motivations” do matter. Id.
(quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 122).3
That recognition takes root in decades of Supreme Court
precedent. In Whren, for example, the Court explained that it
has “never held, outside the context of inventory search or admin-
istrative inspection … , that an officer’s motive invalidates ob-
jectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment.”4
517 U.S. at 812 (emphasis added). The administrative inspec-
tion case on which the Court relied for this proposition was
3 The other exception recognized by the Supreme Court is the “special
needs” doctrine. “A judicial warrant and probable cause are not needed
where [a] search or seizure is justified by special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, such as the need to deter drug use in public
schools, or the need to ensure that railroad employees engaged in train
operations are not under the influence of drugs or alcohol; and where the
search or seizure is in execution of an administrative warrant authorizing,
for example, an inspection of fire-damaged premises to determine the
cause, or an inspection of residential premises to ensure compliance with
a housing code.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 736 (citation modified).
4 “An inventory search is the search of property lawfully seized and de-
tained, in order to ensure that it is harmless, to secure valuable items (such
as might be kept in a towed car), and to protect against false claims of loss
or damage.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 811 n.1 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976)). In the inventory search context, courts assess
whether officers followed “standardized procedures” and whether they
“acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation.” Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987).

-- 9 of 41 --

10 No. 24-1890
New York v. Burger. There, the Supreme Court developed a test
to assess the “reasonableness” of warrantless administrative
inspection schemes, and in that case, upheld an administra-
tive scheme in New York regulating automobile junkyards.5
Burger, 482 U.S. at 708.
In doing so, the Court also evaluated pretext on two levels.
Id. at 716–17 n.27. First, it concluded “the New York Legisla-
ture had proper regulatory purposes for enacting the admin-
istrative scheme and was not using it as a ‘pretext’ to enable
law enforcement authorities to gather evidence of penal law
violations.” Id. At the second level, the Court evaluated
whether the officers’ administrative inspection was “truly”
made pursuant to the administrative scheme. The Supreme
Court noted there was “no reason to believe that the instant
inspection was actually a ‘pretext’ for obtaining evidence of
respondent’s violation of the penal laws. It is undisputed that
the inspection was made solely pursuant to the administra-
tive scheme.” Id.
The throughline of these cases is the Supreme Court’s con-
cern that administrative inspections will be used as a pretext
to investigate criminal activity. Given that concern, it makes
sense that courts can interrogate an individual officer’s pur-
pose for undertaking a warrantless administrative inspection.
See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 736–37.
5 Burger’s three-part test assesses: (1) whether a substantial government
interest informs the regulatory scheme; (2) whether warrantless inspec-
tions are necessary to further the regulatory scheme; and (3) whether the
scheme affords a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.
Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03.

-- 10 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 11
That conclusion finds further support in many of our sister
circuits’ decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Orozco, 858 F.3d
1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding, in a case posing nearly
identical factual circumstances, that “it does not matter that
the Nevada administrative scheme was valid on its face,
where the objective evidence … establishes beyond doubt that
this stop was a pretext for a stop to investigate information of
suspected criminal activity short of that necessary to give rise
to reasonable suspicion”); Bruce v. Beary, 498 F.3d 1232, 1239,
1242–43 & n.19 (11th Cir. 2007) (observing Burger “rejected the
idea that an administrative inspection may be used to gather
evidence as part of what is, in reality, a criminal investiga-
tion,” and noting officer’s testimony about his intent could be
“evidence of illegal pretext” (citing Burger, 482 U.S. at 691, 716
n.27)); United States v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 740, 742 (10th Cir.
1993) (an administrative inspection is a sham where it is “a
pretext solely to gather evidence of criminal activity”);
cf. United States v. Johnson, 889 F.3d 1120, 1135–36 (9th Cir.
2018) (Paez, J., concurring) (collecting cases from six circuits
showing “a police officer’s subjective motive is relevant” in
assessing an inventory search’s constitutionality).
In short, when assessing the second level of the Burger pre-
text inquiry, if there’s sufficient evidence that an officer’s pur-
pose for undertaking the administrative inspection is not to
“further the regulatory scheme,” but pretext for the sole pur-
pose of investigating criminal activity, then the administra-
tive inspection exception to the warrant requirement would
not apply. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702, 716–17 n.27 (citation modi-
fied).

-- 11 of 41 --

12 No. 24-1890
The government resists this conclusion, arguing that two
Supreme Court cases foreclose an officer-level pretext in-
quiry.
The first is City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, where the
Supreme Court held that the Indianapolis narcotics
checkpoint program allowing police to stop cars without
some measure of individualized suspicion violated the
Fourth Amendment. 531 U.S. at 34, 48. Looking to the
programmatic purpose, the Court concluded the primary
purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint program was to
uncover evidence of ordinary criminal activity without any
indicia of individualized wrongdoing, which contravened the
protections of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 40–42.
Distinguishing the unconstitutional narcotic-checkpoint
program from the traffic stop in Whren, the Court explained
that “an individual officer’s subjective intentions are
irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment validity of a traffic stop
that is justified objectively by probable cause to believe that a
traffic violation has occurred.” Id. at 45 (citing Whren, 517 U.S.
at 813). Turning back to the facts of the narcotics-checkpoint
program, the Court then warned that inquiries into the
purpose of these checkpoints should “be conducted only at
the programmatic level and is not an invitation to probe the
minds of individual officers acting at the scene.” Id. at 48
(citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 813).
Then in Brigham City v. Stuart, the second case offered by
the government, the Supreme Court built upon Edmond’s
warning and held that an officer’s subjective intent is irrele-
vant to determining whether the warrant requirement’s exi-
gency exception applies. 547 U.S. at 404–05. In doing so, the
Court drew a contrast with the programmatic inquiry ap-

-- 12 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 13
proved by Edmond, explaining that this inquiry also “has
nothing to do with discerning what is in the mind of the indi-
vidual officer conducting the search.” Id. at 405 (citing Ed-
mond, 531 U.S. at 44).
In light of Edmond and Brigham City, the government, in
essence, argues that where the Supreme Court has permitted
“purpose” inquiries, that permission is limited to the “pro-
grammatic” level and not the subjective intent of the officers.
Relying on these two cases and extrapolating to the adminis-
trative inspection context, the government contends Muz-
zillo’s “subjective” motivation for conducting the administra-
tive inspection is irrelevant. But that contention is misplaced.
Edmond and Brigham City did not involve special-needs or ad-
ministrative inspections, both of which are “limited excep-
tions” to the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness
inquiry. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 736 (citation modified).
Edmond was, at bottom, a checkpoint case divorced from
policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway
safety. The Court found the narcotics-checkpoint program
violated the Fourth Amendment. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48.
Much of the Court’s reasoning contrasted Indianapolis’s
drug-interdiction checkpoint with other fixed highway
checkpoints with limited officer discretion previously
approved by the Court. Id. at 40–44; see United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561–64 (1976) (checkpoint to
intercept undocumented immigrants); Mich. Dep’t of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450–55 (1990) (checkpoint to combat
drunk driving); see also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (suggesting that
the “[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type
stops” to check motorists’ driver’s licenses and vehicle
registrations may be permissible). The Court in Edmond

-- 13 of 41 --

14 No. 24-1890
clarified that its holding did “nothing to alter the
constitutional status of the sobriety and border checkpoints
that [it] approved in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte, or the type of
traffic checkpoint that [it] suggested would be lawful in
Prouse.” 531 U.S. at 47.
Beyond that, the Court in Edmond went to great lengths to
emphasize the limited reach of its reasoning:
Our holding also does not affect the validity of
border searches or searches at places like air-
ports and government buildings, where the
need for such measures to ensure public safety
can be particularly acute. Nor does our opinion
speak to other intrusions aimed primarily at pur-
poses beyond the general interest in crime control.
Our holding also does not impair the ability of
police officers to act appropriately upon infor-
mation that they properly learn during a check-
point stop justified by a lawful primary pur-
pose, even where such action may result in the
arrest of a motorist for an offense unrelated to
that purpose. Finally, we caution that the pur-
pose inquiry in this context is to be conducted
only at the programmatic level and is not an in-
vitation to probe the minds of individual offic-
ers acting at the scene.
Id. at 47–48 (emphasis added).
As this shows, by its own terms Edmond was not a doctri-
nal sea change. Indeed, because that case didn’t “speak to
other intrusions aimed primarily at purposes beyond the gen-
eral interest in crime control,” id. at 48, it disclaimed any in-

-- 14 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 15
tention to modify the Court’s previous administrative inspec-
tion jurisprudence. And its admonition to conduct purpose
inquiries at only the programmatic level was cabined to in-
quiries “in this context”—i.e., in the context of assessing
whether a vehicle checkpoint program’s drug trafficking pur-
pose is distinguishable from general crime control. See id.
Brigham City is even further afield from the administrative
inspection context than criminal-checkpoint programs. In
Brigham City, the Court was addressing the constitutional lim-
its of the “exigent circumstances” warrant exception to the
Fourth Amendment. In that case, the Supreme Court did not
discuss or modify the “intent” inquiry of administrative in-
spections. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. As the Court explains,
in the context of exigent circumstances, the touchstone of the
warrant exception to the Fourth Amendment is whether “the
needs of law enforcement [are] so compelling that the war-
rantless search is objectively reasonable.” Id. (citation omit-
ted). The Court also went on to explain that when the nature
of the “exigent circumstances” is challenged, the inquiry is
objective and “has nothing to do with discerning what is in
the mind of the individual officer conducting the search.” Id.
at 405 (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48). Brigham City doesn’t add
anything new to the “pretext” detour of challenges to an ad-
ministrative inspection.
So, when put in proper context, Edmond and Brigham City
do not prohibit individual officer-level pretext inquiries in the
limited area of administrative inspections. Without more spe-
cific guidance from the Supreme Court, it seems unlikely to
us that those cases upended the Court’s prior precedent per-
mitting those inquiries. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811–12; Burger,
482 U.S. at 702, 716–17 n.27.

-- 15 of 41 --

16 No. 24-1890
Further support for that conclusion can be found in the
Supreme Court’s decisions after Edmond and Brigham City.
These decisions continue to demonstrate the enduring vitality
of officer-level pretext inquiries in “limited” circumstances.
For example, the Court in al-Kidd reiterated that the adminis-
trative inspection context is an area where officers’ “actual
motivations” do matter. 563 U.S. at 736 (citation modified).
And the Court has pressed that same point in subsequent
cases. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 464 (2011) (“Indeed, we
have never held, outside limited contexts such as an ‘inven-
tory search or administrative inspection … , that an officer’s
motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the
Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, and
then citing Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 405)); Fernandez v. Califor-
nia, 571 U.S. 292, 302 (2014) (quoting this passage from King).
Put simply, we are not persuaded that Edmond or Brigham
City—cases outside the administrative inspection context—
modified the framework for assessing administrative inspec-
tions in the way the government contends.
The government also relies on United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez, a case decided before Burger, for the proposition that
an administrative inspection is not rendered unconstitutional
simply because it is accompanied by some suspicion of
wrongdoing. See Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584 n.3. But
such reliance fails to account for crucial differences in the
scheme at issue in Villamonte-Marquez and the unique inter-
ests at stake in the maritime context.
In Villamonte-Marquez, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a federal statute permitting Customs of-
ficers to board seafaring vessels located in waters with ready
access to the open seas and review those vessels’ documenta-

-- 16 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 17
tion without a warrant or suspicion of wrongdoing. Id. at 580–
81. In answering this question, like its later analysis in Ed-
mond, the Court assessed the “reasonableness” of the govern-
ment’s intrusion by balancing the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against the legitimate interests of the
government. Id. at 588. Thus, to evaluate the statute’s consti-
tutionality, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Cus-
toms officers needed articulable suspicion to seize the vessel
that is comparable to the suspicion required to stop automo-
biles on the public highways near the border. Id. Relying on
factual differences between those two contexts, the Supreme
Court concluded the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness in-
quiry demanded a different result.
The Supreme Court started by evaluating the govern-
ment’s interest in random maritime documentation checks.
Id. at 589–91. The Court first observed the impracticality of
establishing fixed checkpoints at various ports, explaining
vessels coming from the open sea could evade those check-
points and thereby reduce the government’s ability to ensure
compliance with its documentation laws. Id. at 589–90. Next,
the Supreme Court highlighted the difficulty of determining
a vessel’s documentation compliance by merely examining its
outward markings. Id. at 590. Then, the Supreme Court noted
the panoply of complex statutes and regulations governing
maritime documentation that served both public and govern-
mental interests in numerous ways. Id. at 590–93. Some of
these interests could be described as administrative, such as
supporting the regulation of trades like “fishing, salvaging,
towing, and dredging.” Id. at 591. But these documentation
laws also served other law enforcement purposes, like pre-
venting the entry of “controlled substances, illegal aliens, pro-
hibited medicines, adulterated foods, dangerous chemicals,

-- 17 of 41 --

18 No. 24-1890
prohibited agricultural products, diseased or prohibited ani-
mals, and illegal weapons and explosives.” Id. In other words,
these documentation laws furthered both administrative and
criminal enforcement interests in the maritime context. Id.
Recognizing the government’s “substantial” interests in
random maritime documentation checks, the Supreme Court
next examined this intrusion on an individual’s Fourth
Amendment interest. Id. at 592–93. In assessing their reason-
ableness, the Court observed these checks involved “only a
brief detention where officials come on board, visit public ar-
eas of the vessel, and inspect documents,” resulting in a “lim-
ited” interruption. Id. at 592. The Court concluded this consti-
tuted only a modest intrusion. Id.
Balancing this modest intrusion against the government’s
“substantial” interests, the Supreme Court upheld the statute
as constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 593.
From that, the Supreme Court concluded the Customs offi-
cials’ suspicionless stopping and boarding of the vessel pur-
suant to this federal statute was “reasonable” and not a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
It’s against this backdrop that the Supreme Court consid-
ered the defendants’ alternative argument in Villamonte-
Marquez: the presence of state police and knowledge of a tip
that a vessel in the shipping channel was carrying drugs un-
dermined the Customs officers’ legal justification for board-
ing the vessel. Id. at 584 n.3. The Supreme Court rejected that
argument, reasoning there’s “little logic in sanctioning such
examinations of ordinary, unsuspect vessels but forbidding
them in the case of suspected smugglers.” Id. (citation and
quotation omitted). We have previously echoed similar rea-

-- 18 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 19
soning. See United States v. Nechy, 827 F.2d 1161, 1166–67 (7th
Cir. 1987).
This is the portion of Villamonte-Marquez on which the
government in this case relies. Such reliance, however, fails to
account for the Supreme Court’s finding in Villamonte-
Marquez that the maritime documentation law at issue there
provided the legal justification for the Customs officials’ war-
rantless boarding of the vessel. And that justification, the
Court explained, found support both in civil and criminal law
enforcement purposes. See Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at
591.
Here, the government failed to present evidence that the
Illinois administrative inspection program at issue serves to
support the state’s criminal investigatory interest. Indeed,
there is no record support that this scheme was intended to
support anything other than administrative, non-criminal in-
terests. In this way, Villamonte-Marquez can be distinguished
on the same basis as Edmond and Brigham City—the principles
from those cases cannot be wrenched out of context and ap-
plied to regulatory schemes justified by different Fourth
Amendment interests and furthering only non-criminal regu-
latory purposes. Rather, when the regulatory scheme at issue
furthers only an administrative purpose, not a criminal inves-
tigatory one, an administrative inspection undertaken solely
to investigate criminal activity does not further that regula-
tory scheme. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811–12 (“[T]he exemption
from the need for probable cause (and warrant), which is ac-
corded to searches made for the purpose of inventory or ad-
ministrative regulation, is not accorded to searches that are
not made for those purposes.”).

-- 19 of 41 --

20 No. 24-1890
An allegation that an officer abused such a scheme in this
manner is, by another name, attacking that administrative in-
spection as pretextual. And given the risk of allowing admin-
istrative inspections to become a pretext for crime control, it
makes sense why Martinez has asked us to focus on that ques-
tion here. Burger, 482 U.S. at 716–17 n.27 (assessing whether
“the instant inspection was actually a ‘pretext’ for obtaining
evidence of respondent’s violation of the penal laws”); see also
United States v. Knight, 306 F.3d 534, 537 (8th Cir. 2002) (recog-
nizing the danger of allowing administrative inspections to
become “pretexts for ‘crime control’” (quoting Edmond,
531 U.S. at 40)); Bruce, 498 F.3d at 1241 (“We share our sister
circuits’ concern that the administrative search exception not
be allowed to swallow whole the Fourth Amendment.” (cita-
tion omitted)); United States v. Johnson, 408 F.3d 1313, 1321
(10th Cir. 2005) (noting Burger “did not endorse a scheme that
would allow a warrantless search based on recently discov-
ered evidence that criminal activity had occurred” (citation
omitted)).
We do not mean to say that pretext is irrelevant when an
administrative scheme serves multiple goals. See Burger,
482 U.S. at 713–16 & n.27 (noting that inspection conducted
pursuant to scheme serving administrative and penal ends
was not pretextual). Instead, we merely observe that where
an administrative scheme serves only non-criminal ends, an
inspection under that scheme motivated only by the desire to
find evidence of criminal activity is more obviously pre-
textual.
Applying these principles here, for the government to
show Muzzillo’s traffic stop was justified in its inception un-
der the administrative inspection exception to the warrant re-

-- 20 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 21
quirement, the government must demonstrate two things. See
United States v. Dixon, 137 F.4th 592, 605 (7th Cir. 2025) (noting
the government bears the burden of proving warrantless
searches’ reasonableness). First, it must show that the State’s
regulatory scheme is reasonable under Burger. And second, it
must show that Muzzillo’s purpose for undertaking the ad-
ministrative inspection was not “pretext.” If the government
can prove both elements, then Muzzillo’s stop was justified in
its inception. But if Muzzillo’s sole purpose for the traffic stop
was to obtain evidence of Martinez’s involvement in criminal
activity, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant exception for an
administrative inspection would not apply. Burger, 482 U.S. at
716–17 n.27 (maintaining a pretextual administrative inspec-
tion isn’t “truly” an administrative inspection). And because
Muzzillo initiated the traffic stop without individualized sus-
picion of wrongdoing, it would follow that the stop was un-
reasonable and thus in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
1. Constitutionality of the Illinois Administrative Inspec-
tion Statute
The Illinois Motor Carrier Safety Law, 625 I LL. C OMP . S TAT.
5/18b-100 et seq., regulates the operation of certain commercial
vehicles, including semitrucks. This statute authorizes the Il-
linois State Police “to stop and inspect any commercial motor
vehicle or driver at any time for the purpose of determining
compliance” with the administrative inspection statutory
scheme and its implementing regulations. 625 I LL. C OMP .
S TAT. 5/18b-102(e); see also id. § 18b-101.
The statute’s implementing regulations specify seven dif-
ferent “levels” of “commercial vehicle inspections.” I LL.

-- 21 of 41 --

22 No. 24-1890
A DMIN . C ODE tit. 92 § 390.1020 (2016).6 Each level allows for
the administrative inspection of various items relating to the
driver or her vehicle. Id. The levels vary in their intrusiveness.
A Level 1 inspection, for example, calls for a review of the
driver’s records and a full safety inspection of her truck. Id. A
Level 3 inspection, by contrast, is less intrusive and entails
checking the driver’s license, insurance and registration doc-
uments, and the truck’s logbooks.
Martinez does not attack the constitutionality of Illinois’s
regulatory scheme permitting Illinois State Troopers to con-
duct administrative inspections of commercial vehicles. We
therefore accept, without deciding, that the Illinois Motor
Carrier Safety Law is reasonable under Burger.
2. Pretextual Administrative Inspection
Martinez maintains, however, that the traffic stop of his
semitruck was never a routine administrative inspection, ar-
guing instead that Muzzillo undertook the stop as a criminal
investigation into a tip that Martinez was transporting narcot-
ics. This appeal is a challenge to whether the stop was justified
in its inception as a true administrative inspection. See Burger,
482 U.S. at 716–17 n.27. Martinez contends the troopers im-
properly used Illinois’s motor vehicle regulatory scheme not
for the dual purpose of conducting an administrative inspec-
tion with knowledge of the tip, see Villamonte-Marquez,
462 U.S. at 584 n.3, but solely as pretext to investigate criminal
activity, see Burger, 482 U.S. at 716–17 n.27.
6 The most recent version of this regulation was recodified under a differ-
ent section number. See I LL . A DMIN . CODE tit. 92 § 3320.1020 (2025).

-- 22 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 23
As explained above, we are not asked to answer whether
Illinois’s commercial trucking regulatory scheme permitted
Muzzillo to conduct the Level 3 vehicle inspection. Instead,
the question is whether the government exceeded this author-
ity by utilizing this regulatory scheme to circumvent the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for criminal in-
vestigations. See Patel, 576 U.S. at 420 (the administrative in-
spection exception applies only “where the primary purpose
of the searches is distinguishable from the general interest in
crime control” (citation modified) (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S.
at 44)). Put another way, the legality of Muzzillo’s traffic stop
of Martinez under the administrative inspection exception
hinges on whether the stop was, in fact, pretextual.
Whether an administrative inspection is pretext for a crim-
inal investigation is a factual question. Johnson, 994 F.2d at 743
(citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 225–30 (1960)); see
also Bruce, 498 F.3d at 1242 n.19. “We review the record as a
whole to determine whether the district court’s apparent find-
ing that the administrative search was not a pretext for a crim-
inal investigation is supported by the evidence.” Johnson,
994 F.2d at 743.
At the evidentiary hearing for the suppression motion,
Muzzillo, a K9 handler, testified he was not on routine patrol
the night of the stop. Instead, he was “called out to assist” an-
other law enforcement agency with a tip that Martinez was
hauling a large quantity of drugs in his semitruck. From there,
Muzzillo enlisted support from Krol, another K9 trooper, and
they waited for at least thirty minutes in the middle of the
night in search of Martinez’s truck. Upon locating the vehicle
around 3 a.m., Muzzillo initiated the administrative inspec-
tion and conducted a dog sniff around the semitruck. After

-- 23 of 41 --

24 No. 24-1890
the K9 alerted for drugs, a member of the law enforcement
agency that provided the tip asked Muzzillo to search Mar-
tinez’s semitruck. The search yielded narcotics, and Muzzillo
handed the criminal investigation off to that agency member.
These circumstances, viewed in their totality, reveal a coordi-
nated law enforcement operation: two K9 handlers called out
for a middle-of-the-night stakeout to assist in investigating a
narcotics tip at the behest of another law enforcement agency.
Muzzillo’s testimony at the suppression hearing lends
further support for that conclusion. Muzzillo testified that he
stopped Martinez’s semitruck because he “had received
information” from another law enforcement agency that the
semitruck “was possibly carrying large-load narcotics.”
Nothing in the record suggests Muzzillo would have been out
on patrol—let alone have stopped Martinez—but for the other
law enforcement agency’s tip.
Taking the stop’s circumstances and Muzzillo’s admission
together, the record shows that Muzzillo’s sole motivation for
stopping Martinez was to further a criminal investigation, not
Illinois’s regulatory scheme.
Moreover, at no point has the government presented any
evidence or testimony identifying the administrative purpose
of the traffic stop. Both at the hearing and on appeal, the gov-
ernment has yet to present any delineation between the crim-
inal investigation and the alleged state regulatory inspection.
It has also failed to mitigate the significance of a K9 officer,
not on routine patrol, called in to assist with an administrative
inspection before the crack of dawn. See Bruce, 498 F.3d at 1244
(“Although a statute authorizing administrative searches
may be constitutional, actual searches conducted under that
authority may not.”). Respectfully, the dissent does not grap-

-- 24 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 25
ple with the government’s failure to meet this burden. There
has been no presentation by the government to establish that
Muzzillo’s stop was not pretextual.
In sum, the government has not met its burden of demon-
strating that Muzzillo’s stop was justified in its inception.
Dixon, 137 F.4th at 605. The record evidence, when viewed as
a whole, demonstrates that Muzzillo used the authority
granted by Illinois’s administrative inspection scheme solely
as a tool to bypass the Fourth Amendment’s warrant require-
ment and to further a criminal investigation. Put simply,
Muzzillo engaged in a pretextual administrative inspection.
The district court’s apparent finding to the contrary was
clearly erroneous. See United States v. Outland, 993 F.3d 1017,
1022 (7th Cir. 2021) (assessing whether district court “neces-
sarily or implicitly” made a factual determination when deny-
ing suppression motion).
And because the factual finding of pretext requires “the
legal conclusion of unconstitutional unreasonableness,”
Bruce, 498 F.3d at 1242 n.19, the drug evidence obtained as the
fruit of Muzzillo’s stop must be suppressed unless an excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule applies.
B. Exclusionary Rule
The government argues that even if Muzzillo’s pretextual
administrative inspection violated Martinez’s Fourth Amend-
ment rights, the evidence seized from the search that followed
still should not be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.
That’s because, the government contends, Muzzillo relied in
good faith on Illinois’s administrative inspection scheme and
on binding appellate precedent when he decided to initiate
the stop.

-- 25 of 41 --

26 No. 24-1890
Although the government raised this argument below, the
district court did not address it. But because we review de
novo the legal determination of whether the exclusionary rule
applies, United States v. Hueston, 90 F.4th 897, 902 (7th Cir.
2024), we can make that determination ourselves on the rec-
ord before us, see United States v. Reyna, 165 F.4th 1056, 1060,
1062–65 (7th Cir. 2026) (concluding parties’ briefing supplied
adequate record to decide legal question not answered by dis-
trict court); cf. Janiga v. Questar Cap. Corp., 615 F.3d 735, 742
(7th Cir. 2010) (resolving whether contract existed between
parties because we review that issue de novo and “the record
contain[ed] enough information to permit a decision” on the
issue).
“The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly
precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its
commands[.]” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
But to “compel respect for the constitutional guaranty” of-
fered by the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court created
the exclusionary rule. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236
(2011) (citations omitted). “A defendant may invoke the rule
to prevent tainted evidence from being used against him at
trial, but the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional
right, and its application exacts a heavy toll on both the judi-
cial system and society at large.” United States v. Felton,
159 F.4th 1128, 1135 (7th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). That’s
why the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment only if suppres-
sion’s deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.
Davis, 564 U.S. at 237.
The Supreme Court, in a line of cases beginning with
United States v. Leon, has calibrated its “cost-benefit analysis

-- 26 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 27
in exclusion cases to focus the inquiry on the ‘flagrancy of the
police misconduct’ at issue” under what’s known as the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 238 (quoting
Leon, 468 U.S. at 909, 911). “The basic insight of the Leon line
of cases is that the deterrence benefits of exclusion vary with
the culpability of the law enforcement conduct at issue.” Id.
(citation modified) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
135, 143 (2009)). The “deterrence rationale loses much of its
force,” and thus “exclusion cannot ‘pay its way,’” id. (citation
modified) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 n.6, 919), when, for
example, “the police act with an objectively reasonable good-
faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct
involves only simple, isolated negligence,” id. (citation modi-
fied) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 909, and Herring, 555 U.S. at 137).
But “[w]hen the police exhibit ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or
‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment rights,
the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to out-
weigh the resulting costs.” Id. (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at
144). Leon and its progeny demonstrate how “the exclusion-
ary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to
punish the errors of judges.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.
And as the Supreme Court has expanded the good faith
exception to other contexts since Leon, those cases “have
sounded a similar theme.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 239. For example,
in Illinois v. Krull, the Court applied the good faith exception
to warrantless administrative inspections conducted by offic-
ers reasonably relying on legislative statutes later invalidated,
reasoning that “legislators, like judicial officers, are not the fo-
cus of the [exclusionary] rule.” 480 U.S. 340, 350 (1987). And
more recently in Davis, the Court applied the good faith ex-
ception to searches conducted in reasonable reliance on bind-
ing appellate precedent that is later overturned, reasoning an

-- 27 of 41 --

28 No. 24-1890
officer conducting such a search “does no more than act as a
reasonable officer would and should act under the circum-
stances.” 564 U.S. at 241 (citation modified).
The government, relying on Krull, argues Muzzillo was
entitled to rely on Illinois’s administrative scheme. The Su-
preme Court applied the good faith exception in Krull because
excluding evidence “obtained by an officer acting in objec-
tively reasonable reliance on a statute would have as little de-
terrent effect on the officer’s actions as would the exclusion of
evidence when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reli-
ance on a warrant.” 480 U.S. at 349. The primary purpose of
the judicially developed exclusionary rule was always to de-
ter future police misconduct, not penalize officers for a mag-
istrate or legislature’s mistake. Id. at 350. Krull has little force
here, where, as discussed above, Muzzillo undertook the ad-
ministrative inspection as pretext for an ongoing drug inves-
tigation. Put another way, the relevant actors here are not Il-
linois legislators, but police officers like Muzzillo “who con-
cededly are ‘engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.’” Id. at 360 n.17 (quoting Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).7
The government failed to sufficiently rebut the conclusion
that Muzzillo initiated the traffic stop with the sole purpose
of furthering a criminal investigation. Cf. Leon, 468 U.S. at 915
n.13 (observing officers’ good faith reliance must be tested ob-
7 This is also why the Court in Krull declined “to recognize an exception
for an officer who erroneously, but in good faith, believes he is acting
within the scope of a statute.” 480 U.S. at 360 n.17. The Court reasoned
that such an exception “does not follow inexorably from” its holding in
that case, as the inquiry required for such an exception would center on
the action of officers, not legislators or magistrates. Id.

-- 28 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 29
jectively to adequately guard against police abuse of discre-
tion). It could have offered numerous types of evidence to do
this. For example, the government offered no evidence that
this stretch of highway commonly presented safety concerns
for semitrucks or other motorists. Nor did the government
demonstrate that it was routine for law enforcement to use K9
officers to conduct middle-of-the-night administrative inspec-
tions. To fit within Krull, the government had to demonstrate
that suppression stood only to punish Muzzillo for the mis-
take of legislators. It didn’t do so. Given that, the benefits of
deterring future police misconduct under these circumstances
remain strong.
The government also argues that under Davis, Muzzillo
was entitled to rely on binding appellate precedent. That ar-
gument, however, stumbles out of the gate. Davis guards
against punishing officers for following “binding appellate
precedent [that] specifically authorizes a particular police
practice” and that precedent is overturned after the fact.
564 U.S. at 241 (emphasis omitted). But Davis also observed
that “[r]esponsible law enforcement officers will take care to
learn what is required of them under Fourth Amendment
precedent and will conform their conduct to these rules.” Id.
(citation modified). As detailed above, decades of Supreme
Court precedent has required officers to undertake warrant-
less administrative inspections in furtherance of the adminis-
trative scheme, not as a pretext for criminal investigation. See,
e.g., al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 736; Whren, 517 U.S. at 811–12; Burger,
482 U.S. at 702, 716–17 n.27. That’s why Davis offers no safe
harbor to the government here—the good faith exception
does not shield officers from the consequences of ignoring
longstanding, binding precedent.

-- 29 of 41 --

30 No. 24-1890
Finally, the government argues that even if the exclusion-
ary rule applies here, the proper remedy would be to remand
for another hearing to flesh out testimony about the pre-
textual nature of Muzzillo’s actions. But we decline the gov-
ernment’s invitation. As discussed above, the record before us
was adequate to determine that the district court clearly erred
in its apparent finding that Muzzillo didn’t engage in a pre-
textual administrative inspection. Compare United States v.
Combs, 222 F.3d 353, 362 (7th Cir. 2000) (explicit finding that
police read suspect his Miranda rights not required where
such a finding was implicit in court’s order), with Outland,
993 F.3d at 1023 (remanding because district court made no
determination about Miranda rights waiver). And to the ex-
tent the record could have been more developed on this point,
the government shoulders the blame for that lack of develop-
ment. This is because it argued both in its suppression motion
papers and at the suppression hearing that Muzzillo’s traffic
stop was justified at its inception, regardless of whether Muz-
zillo harbored a pretextual subjective intent. That this argu-
ment was incorrect does not justify giving the government a
second chance to contest Martinez’s suppression motion.
Taken all together, the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule does not apply here. That means the evidence
seized without a warrant due to Muzzillo’s unlawful pre-
textual administrative inspection must be suppressed.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we REVERSE the denial of the suppres-
sion motion and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

-- 30 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 31
K IRSCH , Circuit Judge, dissenting. I disagree with my col-
leagues that the evidence seized by Trooper Anthony Muz-
zillo should be suppressed. That Trooper Muzzillo followed
a tip from another law enforcement agency does not make an
otherwise objectively reasonable seizure pursuant to a valid
administrative scheme unconstitutional. And because there
are no other reasons to exclude the cocaine seized by Trooper
Muzzillo, I respectfully dissent.
I
Illinois State Police Trooper Anthony Muzzillo received a
tip from another law enforcement agency that a semitruck
might be transporting a large quantity of narcotics, so he
drove down the interstate to intercept the truck. At 3:16 am,
he pulled the truck over to perform a Level III regulatory in-
spection, also sometimes called a paper inspection, under 625
Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/18b-102(e). That statute allows officers to
“stop and inspect any commercial motor vehicle or driver at
any time for the purpose of determining compliance with” the
regulatory scheme. Id. Inspections involve examining the
driver’s commercial driver’s license, insurance and registra-
tion documents, and logbooks, which record the vehicle’s
path, drive time, and rest time.
Trooper Muzzillo approached the cab, where he found
Ausencio Martinez. Trooper Muzzillo immediately con-
fronted what he described as the “overwhelming odor of air
freshener.” He requested Martinez’s papers and that Mar-
tinez join him in his squad car while he inspected them. Mar-
tinez agreed.
During the paper inspection, Trooper Muzzillo noticed
anomalies. For one, Martinez seemed extremely nervous.

-- 31 of 41 --

32 No. 24-1890
And the logbooks showed that Martinez had taken a long de-
tour; though he was hauling air filters from Texas to Illinois,
Martinez had driven 300 to 400 miles out of his way to the
area near Nashville, Tennessee. Martinez justified his aber-
rant path by explaining that his company had rerouted him
and then changed its mind. Lastly, though the truck’s bill of
lading said that the load had been sealed, when Trooper Muz-
zillo went to the back of the truck to confirm the serial number
from the bill of lading, he saw the seal had been removed,
contrary to typical practice.
At this point, Trooper Muzzillo prolonged the stop to con-
duct a dog sniff. He asked Martinez for permission to do so,
and the district court determined that Martinez consented. As
Trooper Muzzillo walked his dog Maverick around the
driver’s door, Maverick alerted. As a result, Trooper Muzzillo
searched the cab, where he found 15 kilograms of cocaine in-
side a black duffel bag.
A grand jury charged Martinez with possessing five or
more kilograms of cocaine with an intent to distribute in vio-
lation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A). Martinez moved to
suppress the evidence. He did not dispute that the law au-
thorized an administrative inspection, though he argued that
Trooper Muzzillo’s stop was unlawfully pretextual. He also
argued that Trooper Muzzillo lacked individualized suspi-
cion, lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the inspection
with a dog sniff, and that the dog’s alert did not provide prob-
able cause to search the truck.
At the suppression hearing, Trooper Muzzillo repeated
what he had written in his police report: that the administra-
tive inspection was “the reason … for the stop.” And Trooper
Muzzillo explained that he selected Martinez’s truck because

-- 32 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 33
he had received information that the truck was “possibly car-
rying large-load narcotics.”
The district court rejected Martinez’s arguments and de-
nied the motion to suppress. Martinez pled guilty but re-
served the right to appeal the denial of his motion. He re-
ceived the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years in
prison. Martinez appealed, and my colleagues are persuaded
by the arguments the district court rejected.
II
My colleagues say that Trooper Muzzillo’s administrative
inspection was invalid because he was acting on a tip and be-
cause he conducted the inspection under 625 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/18b-102(e), which supposedly has no criminal investigatory
or deterrent purpose. Yet as I explain below, that Trooper
Muzzillo was acting on a tip—his ulterior motive for the ad-
ministrative inspection—does not make the search unreason-
able under the Fourth Amendment. And the purpose of an
administrative program such as 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/18b-
102(e) is relevant only to determine the permissibility of the
administrative program, not to whether Trooper Muzzillo’s
subjective motivation for the search rendered it unconstitu-
tional.
A
The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. To uphold that right, the
Supreme Court has held that generally, evidence generated
from an unreasonable search “shall not be used at all.” Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (quoting Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)). Typically, when
police don’t obtain a valid warrant from a neutral magistrate,

-- 33 of 41 --

34 No. 24-1890
searches and seizures are “per se unreasonable.” Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420, 423 (1981). But there are “a few specif-
ically established and well-delineated exceptions” to the gen-
eral warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967). Pertinent to this case, government officials can
conduct warrantless administrative inspections of perva-
sively regulated businesses or industries like commercial
trucking. Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of
Transp., 840 F.3d 879, 893 (7th Cir. 2016). That’s because when
it comes to pervasively regulated businesses, “the privacy in-
terests of the owner are weakened and the government inter-
ests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly
heightened.” New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987).
Courts are rightfully wary of allowing administrative in-
spections to morph into the kinds of general warrants that our
Founders forcefully opposed. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 583 (1980); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960)
(“The deliberate use by the Government of an administrative
warrant for the purpose of gathering evidence in a criminal
case must meet stern resistance by the courts.”). Conse-
quently, the Fourth Amendment protects against administra-
tive inspections conducted for invalid purposes. See City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45–46 (2000). As my col-
leagues explain, there are two levels at which we might con-
duct the purpose inquiry: the programmatic level and the in-
dividual officer level. Martinez never challenged Illinois’s
regulatory scheme, so he waived any argument about its con-
stitutionality. See United States v. Waldrip, 859 F.3d 446, 449
(7th Cir. 2017). As for the individual officer inquiry, the ma-
jority asserts that Supreme Court cases, primarily Burger and
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), instruct us to ex-
amine the subjective purpose of the officer on the scene. And

-- 34 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 35
my colleagues write extensively about how two other cases,
Edmond and Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), do not
foreclose that officer-level inquiry. There is at least some rea-
son to think that they are mistaken: in United States v. Johnson,
889 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018), for instance, a majority of the
panel read Edmond and Brigham City to say that “an individual
officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant to the Fourth
Amendment, even when the programmatic motivation be-
hind an administrative scheme might matter.” Id. at 1130
(O’Scannlain & Bea, JJ., concurring) (per curiam). But I need
not address any dispute about what Edmond and Brigham City
say, because even if the majority is right that we must con-
sider the individual officer’s subjective purpose, the sole pur-
pose test it proposes is satisfied here.
My colleagues say that an officer’s subjective purpose for
conducting an administrative inspection can invalidate the in-
spection only if the officer’s sole purpose was impermissible
(such as to investigate crime). In such contexts, searches and
seizures are subject to the normal Fourth Amendment rules.
That means, according to my colleagues’ test, that if there is
at least one legal purpose for a seizure made pursuant to an
administrative inspection, the officer’s ulterior motive doesn’t
matter. Their test is satisfied here. Trooper Muzzillo didn’t act
with the sole purpose of criminal investigation. Furthermore,
I see no basis for the majority’s conclusion that the purpose of
the administrative scheme is relevant to our evaluation of an
officer’s ulterior motive.
The district court did not clearly err in finding that
Trooper Muzzillo had more than one purpose for the stop. He
sought to follow up on the tip, as the majority emphasizes,
but also to conduct a Level III inspection. Trooper Muzzillo’s

-- 35 of 41 --

36 No. 24-1890
assertions, his behavior, and the discretion afforded to him by
the Illinois statute (which is not contested) all support that he
had more than one purpose for the seizure. First, he asserted
a legal purpose for conducting the inspection. In his investi-
gative report, Trooper Muzzillo specified that the purpose of
the stop was to conduct a Level III commercial motor vehicle
inspection. And at the suppression hearing, Trooper Muzzillo
stated that the Level III inspection was “the reason, again, for
the stop.” Second, his behavior suggests that the purpose of
his stop was at least partially to legally conduct a Level III in-
spection. He actually carried out that inspection and did so
adhering to proper procedure. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S.
367, 375 (1987) (emphasizing the importance of standardized
procedures to the administrative inspection analysis). Indeed,
Trooper Muzzillo would have only looked at Martinez’s log-
books for the purpose of performing a Level III inspection.
And he didn’t proceed beyond the paper inspection until he
had developed more than sufficient suspicion to do so. Third,
it is uncontested that the statute allowed Trooper Muzzillo to
stop Martinez and search his papers since Martinez was op-
erating a commercial motor vehicle. Therefore Trooper Muz-
zillo, by his affirmations, his actions, and the statute’s text,
had a valid administrative purpose distinct from his criminal
investigatory motive. Surely Trooper Muzzillo was motivated
to find what he described as “[t]he possibility of contraband.”
But that was his primary, not his sole, purpose.
We need only look at United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,
462 U.S. 579 (1983) to see how thin an officer’s administrative
purpose may be without impacting the inspection’s constitu-
tionality. That case concerned an administrative inspection of
a sailboat. Id. at 584 n.3. Customs officers, “accompanied by a
Louisiana State Policeman,” were “following an informant’s

-- 36 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 37
tip that a vessel in the ship channel was thought to be carrying
marijuana,” when they approached a sailboat rocking in an-
other ship’s wake and asked if the sailboat and crew were all
right. Id. at 582–84 & n.3. After a man on the deck “shrugged
his shoulders in an unresponsive manner,” the officers
boarded the sailboat “and asked to see the vessel’s documen-
tation.” Id. at 583.
The defendants argued that the authorizing statute could
not have sustained the inspection because, among other rea-
sons, the search followed an informant’s tip—that is to say,
because it was pretextual. Id. at 584 n.3. And in fact, the offic-
ers did have ulterior motives: as the Fifth Circuit made clear,
the officers targeted the boat for a search precisely because an
informant had told them that “there were two loads of mari-
juana on two separate vessels” on their way to Louisiana.
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 482 (5th Cir.
1981).
But the Supreme Court focused only on the fact that the
officers boarded the sailboat “to see the vessel’s documenta-
tion.” Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 583. The statute was
enough to justify the inspection when the officers conducted
it according to procedure, and the officers’ ulterior motive did
not strip them of their administrative authority to do so. See
Whren, 517 U.S. at 811–12. The Supreme Court emphasized
“[w]e would see little logic in sanctioning such examinations
of ordinary, unsuspect vessels but forbidding them in the case
of suspected smugglers.” Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584
n.3 (quoting United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 846 (1st Cir.
1980)); see also United States v. Nechy, 827 F.2d 1161, 1167 (7th
Cir. 1987) (“[I]t does rather turn the Fourth Amendment on its
head to complain about not the dearth but the plethora of

-- 37 of 41 --

38 No. 24-1890
grounds for believing that a [highly regulated business] that
is to be inspected is involved in criminal activity.”).
My colleagues appear to concede that the officers in
Villamonte-Marquez acted with the same ulterior motive as did
Trooper Muzzillo. They nonetheless attempt to write around
Villamonte-Marquez, highlighting that in that case the statute
had a criminal deterrent purpose and reasoning that “where
an administrative scheme serves only non-criminal ends, an
inspection under that scheme motivated only by the desire to
find evidence of criminal activity is more obviously
pretextual.” Ante at 20. But that does not distinguish this case.
The Court’s conclusion that the search was not pretextual was
not related to the authorizing statute’s criminal deterrent
purpose; rather, the search wasn’t pretextual because the
officers actually conducted a document inspection as
permitted by the statute. See Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at
583, 585.
The same is true in Burger.* In that case, the state conceded
that it chose to search a junk yard to look for evidence of
crime. People v. Burger, 493 N.E.2d 926, 930 (N.Y. 1986). But
the Court nevertheless held that there was “no reason” to
think that the inspection was pretextual because the officers
conducted the search according to procedure. See Burger, 482
U.S. at 716–17 n.27 (referencing footnote 7 in the same opinion
* The majority emphasizes that Burger was decided after Villamonte-
Marquez to distinguish Villamonte-Marquez. See ante at 16. But my col-
leagues seem to ignore that Whren was decided after Burger, and Whren
reaffirmed that in Villamonte-Marquez, the Supreme Court “flatly dis-
missed the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip the agents of
their legal justification.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 812. And, as I’ll explain, Burger
supports my position.

-- 38 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 39
to show that a warrantless administrative inspection is illegal
pretext when the officers could not have possibly relied on the
authorizing statute).
Just so here. We know why Trooper Muzzillo chose to con-
duct an administrative inspection of Martinez’s truck. But we
also know from Villamonte-Marquez and Burger that his ulte-
rior motive for stopping the vehicle is not enough to invali-
date the inspection because he was authorized to conduct the
inspection and followed the proper procedure.
There’s another reason that the majority’s attempt to dis-
tinguish this case from Supreme Court precedent on the
ground that the statutes in those cases were meant to deter
crime is problematic: it ignores the Court’s warnings. Time
and time again, the Court has warned about the encroach-
ment of administrative inspection exceptions on Fourth
Amendment protections. See, e.g., Abel, 362 U.S. at 226. The
majority concludes that individuals have less protection un-
der the Fourth Amendment if the law authorizing a warrant-
less administrative inspection is designed to further the
state’s criminal investigatory or deterrent interest than if it
isn’t.
We do not know on this record whether the Illinois statute
was meant to deter crime (although it probably was, at least
in part). The majority faults the government, claiming that it
“failed to present evidence that the Illinois administrative in-
spection program at issue serves to support the state’s crimi-
nal investigatory interest.” Ante at 19. But the government
had no reason to present such evidence: it could not have an-
ticipated the majority’s test, and the purpose of the Illinois ad-
ministrative scheme was not at issue. To the extent that the
purpose of the administrative scheme matters, it would be to

-- 39 of 41 --

40 No. 24-1890
determine the scheme’s constitutionality, but Martinez did
not challenge that. There was simply no reason for the gov-
ernment to have submitted any of the evidence that the ma-
jority faults it for omitting.
In Nechy, we warned that because the motive to gather
criminal evidence “will always be present” in any search,
arguments about an officer’s subjective purpose are
“disguised attacks on the constitutionality” of the underlying
administrative regime. 827 F.2d at 1166. Here, the majority’s
ruling is an example of that. The majority suggests that if the
government had established that the purpose of the Illinois
administrative scheme was in part to support the state’s
criminal investigatory purpose, then Trooper Muzzillo’s
pretextual search would have passed constitutional muster
under Villamonte-Marquez. But as far as the Fourth
Amendment is concerned, the program’s purpose does not
inform whether an officer may act with ulterior motives.
B
After finding the stop unconstitutional based on Trooper
Muzzillo’s subjective motivations, the majority ended its
analysis. But the initial stop was only the first step. The re-
maining ones were plainly constitutional. Based on the log-
books showing the truck had diverted hundreds of miles from
its original route, the overwhelming smell of air freshener,
Martinez’s nervousness, and the missing trailer seal, Trooper
Muzzillo developed reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop
and walk Maverick around the truck. And only then, after the
dog alerted, did Trooper Muzzillo search the cab. During that
search, which Martinez doesn’t contest on appeal, Trooper
Muzzillo found the duffel bag with 15 kilograms of cocaine.

-- 40 of 41 --

No. 24-1890 41
Because I do not think any part of the search and seizure was
unconstitutional, I dissent.

-- 41 of 41 --