Eiad Barghouti v. Cheryl Hansen

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 28, 2026*
Decided July 28, 2026
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2610
EIAD BARGHOUTI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHERYL HANSEN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 22-1305
Sara Darrow,
Judge.
O R D E R
Eiad Barghouti, an Illinois prisoner, challenges the summary judgment rejecting
his claims that officials at Pontiac Correctional Center were deliberately indifferent to
his risk of serious illness after he ran out of a prescribed medication.1 The district court
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
1 Barghouti has since moved to Dixon Correctional Center.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 5 --

No. 24-2610 Page 2
determined that no reasonable jury could find that the defendants violated his rights
under the Eighth Amendment. We affirm.
I.
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to Barghouti, the nonmovant,
and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Barnes v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,
177 F.4th 825, 831 (7th Cir. 2026). In 2017, Barghouti was diagnosed with ulcerative
colitis and Crohn’s disease—illnesses that caused him intestinal inflammation and
bleeding, constant bowel movements, and severe abdominal pain. He was prescribed
mesalamine, an anti-inflammatory medication used to treat inflammatory bowel
disease, and his flare-ups decreased from once every couple of days to once every
couple of weeks.
In July 2018, Barghouti realized he would run out of mesalamine by the end of
the month. Several times, he sent requests for a refill from the prison’s health care unit.
On July 31, Barghouti stopped Sherri Powers, a licensed practical nurse, and asked for a
refill. Powers was not authorized to renew prescriptions on her own, but she said she
would notify Nurse Practitioner Cheryl Hansen, who could order medication with a
physician’s approval. By August 1, Barghouti had run out of mesalamine. On August 3,
he again requested a refill from Powers, who scheduled him for an appointment with a
physician’s assistant. On August 5, Barghouti informed two other nurses,
Josephina Brady and Jade Culkin, that he had run out of medication, and they agreed to
follow up. At an appointment on August 9, Physician Assistant Riliwan Ojelade wrote a
prescription for a refill of mesalamine.
Barghouti did not receive the refill. He faults Ojelade for not completing the
paperwork needed to approve the refill—an unapproved, non-formulary medication.
(According to Barghouti’s medical records, Nurse Brady requested an update from the
pharmacy on August 22 and learned that Barghouti “need[ed] a non-formulary
paperwork to be submitted.”)
Barghouti experienced a painful flare-up of his condition on August 17 and
began seeking help from correctional officers. That evening, Sergeant Christopher
Brady said that he contacted the health care unit on Barghouti’s behalf. The next
morning, Barghouti reported his pain and other symptoms to another correctional
officer, Brandon Himan. Himan returned with Sergeant Gerald Henkel, who agreed to
“look into it.”

-- 2 of 5 --

No. 24-2610 Page 3
Later that morning, Barghouti stopped Powers, and she called a physician who
prescribed a seven-day course of dicyclomine, another medication used to treat irritable
bowel syndrome. On August 20, Hansen advised Barghouti to continue taking
dicyclomine until the mesalamine’s arrival, but she denied his requests for Tylenol and
a bland diet.
Barghouti’s symptoms persisted. On August 23, Hansen admitted him to the
infirmary for observation. Barghouti reported abdominal pain and requested Tylenol
from Nurse Jodi Monroe, but she refused, noting in his chart that he did not have an
order for Tylenol. He was discharged the next day, after his flare-up passed and only
scant blood was seen in his stool.
When Barghouti experienced another flare-up on August 30, he alerted Sergeant
Kevin Edens, who agreed to contact Hansen. Barghouti received the refill of
mesalamine the next evening.
Barghouti brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against employees of both
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., and the Illinois Department of Corrections,2 asserting
that they were deliberately indifferent to risks posed by the delay in renewing his
prescription. Barghouti further asserted that the delay caused him to suffer flare-ups
more severe than usual.
The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that
the record did not support a reasonable inference that the defendants ignored
Barghouti’s complaints, were personally responsible for the delay, or otherwise acted
without medical judgment.
II.
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s objectively serious medical condition
violates the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). As the parties agree that his medical
condition is serious, Barghouti must put forward evidence upon which a reasonable
jury could find that the defendants were deliberately indifferent, meaning that they
knew of but disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. See id at 847. An
inference of deliberate indifference may be drawn from “an inexplicable delay in
2 Hansen, Ojelade, Powers, and Fisher are employed by Wexford Health Sources,
Inc. Nurse Brady, Culkin, Sergeant Brady, Himan, Henkel, Monroe, and Edens are
employed by the Illinois Department of Corrections.

-- 3 of 5 --

No. 24-2610 Page 4
treatment which serves no penological interest.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 730
(7th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
Barghouti first contends that the district court overlooked evidence that the
defendants were personally responsible for the delay in refilling the mesalamine,
specifically Ojelade’s failure to complete the paperwork necessary to authorize a
non-formulary medication. But deliberate indifference entails “more than negligence or
even medical malpractice.” Reck v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 27 F.4th 473, 483 (7th Cir.
2022). An “official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived
but did not … cannot … be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer,
511 U.S. at 838. Without evidence that Ojelade knew that the paperwork was
incomplete, a reasonable jury could not conclude that the error amounted to anything
more than negligence.
Even if the defendants did not cause the delay, Barghouti urges, their response to
the delay raises the reasonable inference that they were deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs. As Barghouti sees it, the district court overlooked evidence that the
defendants knew he had run out of mesalamine but failed to intervene—by ensuring
that he received the refill, prescribing in the interim other medications, or contacting
other members of the health care unit.
But evidence that the defendants responded reasonably to the risk caused by the
delay—even if they were unsuccessful in preventing harm—defeats Barghouti’s claim
of deliberate indifference. See Reck, 27 F.4th at 483. The nurses were allowed to defer to
Ojelade, who had permission to prescribe medication independently. See id. at 485. (“[I]t
is important to take into account the role that the nurse plays in the care of a patient.”).
Moreover, as soon as Powers found out about the flare-up, she called a physician to
prescribe a new medication; Brady followed up with the pharmacy; and Hansen
admitted him to the infirmary when his symptoms failed to abate. Although Barghouti
would have preferred mesalamine and Tylenol to dicyclomine, he was “not entitled to
demand specific care” or a specific medication. Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,
940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 754 (7th Cir.
2011)). There is no record evidence that these treatment decisions were made in the
absence of medical judgment or so “blatantly inappropriate” as to evince intentional
mistreatment. Peterson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 986 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 777 (7th Cir. 2015)).
And although Barghouti speculates that the correctional officers lied about
contacting medical staff, the district court correctly concluded that there is no record

-- 4 of 5 --

No. 24-2610 Page 5
evidence that the officers obstructed his access to medical treatment or otherwise
disregarded his pain. Mere speculation cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment.
See Flowers v. Kia Motors Fin., 105 F.4th 939, 946–47 (7th Cir. 2024). It gives us pause that
Barghouti waited for medical attention for half a day on August 17 and for a day and a
half on August 30. See Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556, 563–64 (7th Cir. 2017) (reasonable
inference of deliberate indifference where guards and nurse waited an hour and a half
to report prisoner’s debilitating muscle spasms). But the record does not indicate why
the delay occurred or who was responsible, much less whether the delay was the result
of deliberate indifference. See Walker, 940 F.3d at 964 (“[T]he plaintiff must show that
the defendant’s actions or inaction caused the delay in his treatment.”).
AFFIRMED

-- 5 of 5 --