Jeffery Todd Henson, Sr. v. Dwight Common School District No. 232

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 28, 2026*
Decided July 28, 2026
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 25-3276
JEFFERY TODD HENSON, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DWIGHT COMMON SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 232, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 1:25-cv-01160-MMM-RLH
Michael M. Mihm,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jeffery Henson, Sr., applied to serve as a volunteer at his child’s school, but the
school board denied his request in accordance with its policy of rejecting applicants
with criminal histories. Henson sued Dwight Common School District No. 232 and
several of its officials, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by refusing to
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-3276 Page 2
let him volunteer. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed Henson’s amended
complaint and declined to permit him to amend it for a second time. We affirm.
We draw our account from the well-pleaded allegations in Henson’s amended
complaint, as well as the documents he attached as exhibits. See Geinosky v. City of
Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing F ED. R. C IV. P. 10(c)). Henson filed
two applications to be placed on the District’s “Approved Volunteer List” so that he
could be a chaperone for his child’s school events. He did not receive a response, so he
reached out to District Superintendent Josh DeLong. DeLong informed Henson that his
applications had been denied because of his criminal history.1 When Henson pressed
DeLong to explain the District’s decision, DeLong stated that the District categorically
bans applicants with criminal histories from serving as school volunteers, regardless of
the specific circumstances surrounding the underlying convictions.
Henson sued the District, DeLong, and several members of the District’s school
board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by
rejecting his applications. Specifically, Henson argued that the defendants violated his
right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of
his protected liberty and parental interests without notice, hearing, or fair process, and
that they violated his right to equal protection by applying a “blanket policy to exclude”
him without individualized review of his circumstances. Further, he alleged that the
District violated the Illinois Uniform Conviction Information Act (“UCIA”), 20 ILCS
2635/2, by misusing his criminal history.
The district court dismissed Henson’s complaint. The court concluded that
Henson’s procedural due process claim failed because he did not show that he
possessed a protected liberty interest in volunteering for school activities. Further, his
equal protection claim fell short because the District’s policy of excluding applicants
with criminal histories from volunteering was supported by a rational basis—that is,
1 Henson’s response to the District’s motion to dismiss states that his record
contains only a “decades-old, non-violent conviction,” but the district court
appropriately took judicial notice of his convictions in 2021 for several felonies
including wire fraud, money laundering, and aggravated identity theft. See United States
v. Payne, 964 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing F ED. R. EVID. 201(b)) (stating that federal
courts “may judicially notice court records as evidence of prior judicial actions”). And
Henson admitted to these convictions during argument on the motion to dismiss his
amended complaint.

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No. 25-3276 Page 3
ensuring the safety of its students. And the court rejected Henson’s state-law claim
because Henson did not allege that the District “negligent[ly] disseminat[ed] inaccurate
or incomplete conviction information” such that he could pursue a civil action for
damages under the UCIA. 20 ILCS 2635/14. Nevertheless, the court granted Henson
leave to amend his complaint.
Henson filed an amended complaint that contained substantially similar
allegations but reformulated his grounds for relief. While he maintained his equal
protection claim (under a class-of-one theory), he swapped his procedural due process
and UCIA claims for claims that the defendants violated his constitutional right to
substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and that they acted “ultra
vires” and “contrary to Illinois public policy” by enforcing a blanket exclusion on
applicants with criminal histories. The amended complaint also included a standalone
claim for “irreparable injury,” in which Henson noted that his ongoing exclusion
created “irreparable harm to his parental relationship and constitutional rights.”
The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint—27 days after Henson
filed it—and Henson responded the same day. The district court then ordered the
defendants to explain why the court should consider the untimely motion. See F ED. R.
C IV. P. 15(a)(3) (setting 14-day deadline for responses to amended pleadings). The
defendants’ counsel explained that he had mistakenly (but in good faith) calendared the
deadline for the response on the wrong date and that Henson was not prejudiced by the
late filing because he responded to the motion on the day it was filed. In response,
Henson moved to strike the defendants’ motion to dismiss, arguing that Rule 6(b)(1)(B)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to accept a late filing only if the
moving party demonstrates that “excusable neglect” caused the delay, and that the
defendants had not done so here.
After a hearing, the district court denied Henson’s motion to strike and granted
the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court determined that the defendants’ late filing
did not prejudice Henson because he promptly responded to it on the day it was filed.
Moreover, Henson did not challenge the timeliness of the motion until after the district
court raised the issue sua sponte, at which time the motion was fully briefed. Turning to
the merits, the court concluded that Henson failed to state a claim that the defendants
violated his right to substantive due process because he did not have a fundamental
right to volunteer at his child’s school events, and the District’s policy of excluding
applicants with criminal histories satisfied rational-basis review. The court also
concluded that Henson’s equal protection claim, brought under a class-of-one theory,

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was similarly unavailing because there was a rational basis for the District’s decision.
And the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Henson’s state-law
claim that the District acted ultra vires and contrary to state policy, noting that it was
dismissing the claim without prejudice and that Henson could file the claim in state
court. Finally, the court dismissed Henson’s claim of “irreparable injury,” stating that
Henson had failed to state a claim “upon which any relief, injunctive or otherwise,
could be granted.” Because, in the court’s view, any further amendment would be
futile, the court refused to allow Henson to amend his complaint a second time.
On appeal, Henson first argues that the district court abused its discretion by
considering the defendants’ late motion to dismiss without requiring a showing of
excusable neglect under Rule 6(b)(1)(B).2 In evaluating whether a late filing should be
allowed due to excusable neglect, “courts should consider all relevant circumstances
surrounding the party’s neglect, including the prejudice to the non-movant, length of
delay, and reason for delay.” Bowman v. Korte, 962 F.3d 995, 998 (7th Cir. 2020). Further,
the moving party must offer a meaningful explanation for the late filing. Id.
Because the court here appropriately evaluated the relevant circumstances, it did
not abuse its discretion to consider the late motion to dismiss and to deny Henson’s
motion to strike. See Simstad v. Scheub, 816 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that
decision to permit late filing under Rule 6(b)(1)(B) is reviewed only for abuse of
discretion). The defendants explained that the motion was filed late because of a good-
faith calendaring mistake. And in determining that it would entertain the motion to
dismiss, the court expressly considered the defendants’ explanation, the length of delay,
and the lack of prejudice to Henson, who responded to the motion the same day.
Next, Henson contends that the district court incorrectly interpreted his
procedural due process claim as a substantive due process claim implicating a
fundamental right. But Henson’s amended complaint did not present any procedural
due process theories. Rather, Henson explicitly alleged that the District’s denial of his
2 Henson also complains that the defendants never filed a formal motion to
excuse the late filing. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 6(b)(1)(B) (stating that district court may, with
good cause, extend time for filing “on motion made after the time has expired”). But the
defendants’ response to the district court’s order regarding timeliness—which explicitly
requested that the district court entertain the late motion to dismiss—effectively served
as their Rule 6(b)(1)(B) motion. Indeed, Henson filed a response in opposition, stating
that he understood the filing to serve as a request to excuse the late filing of the motion.

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volunteer request violated his substantive due process right to participate in his child’s
education. Thus, the district court rightly recognized that to state a substantive due
process claim, there must be an alleged violation of a constitutional right or liberty. If
the right or liberty is fundamental, then the alleged violation must be “arbitrary and
irrational.” Campos v. Cook County, 932 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2019). Alternatively, if a
nonfundamental liberty is at stake, the purported violation of that liberty must not be
“rationally related to a legitimate government interest.” Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg
Cmty. Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2014).
The district court properly dismissed Henson’s substantive due process claim.
Although parents have a fundamental right “to direct the education and upbringing of
[their] children,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997), we have expressly
stated that there is no fundamental right for parents “to be playground monitors[] or to
attend school functions,” and “[s]chools have valid interests in limiting the parental
presence.” Crowley v. McKinney, 400 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2005). It follows that the
Constitution does not confer a fundamental right for a parent to serve as a volunteer at
his child’s school. And we agree with the district court that the District’s interference
with Henson’s nonfundamental liberty interest to be a school volunteer, based on his
criminal history, was rationally related to its legitimate interest in protecting the safety
of its students.
Henson’s equal protection claim similarly falls short. A plaintiff states an equal
protection claim under a class-of-one theory by alleging that, regardless of any group
affiliation, he has been “intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” United States v. Moore,
543 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
(2000)). But Henson does not allege that he was treated differently from other parents
with criminal histories who sought to volunteer in the District. To the contrary, Henson
alleges that the District employs a “blanket exclusion of all persons with a felony
conviction.” And, as discussed above, to the extent that Henson alleges that the District
violated his right to equal protection because he was treated differently than parents
without criminal histories, the District had a rational basis for treating applicants with
criminal histories differently than those without criminal histories.3
3 Henson does not challenge the district court’s rejection of his “irreparable
injury” claim or the court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-
law claim, so we do not address the dismissal of those claims.

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Finally, Henson argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to
permit him to amend his complaint a second time. He points to the district court’s
comments at the motion hearing that there were some unresolved factual issues
concerning the District’s volunteer policy—that is, whether the exclusion of applicants
with criminal histories was an official policy of the District or whether it was an
unwritten rule. True, Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that, “as a
general rule, a court ‘should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.’”
Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original)
(quoting F ED. R. C IV. P. 15(a)(2)). But district courts nevertheless “have broad discretion
to deny leave to amend … where the amendment would be futile.” Id. (citation
omitted). Here, the district court stated that it had already given Henson an opportunity
to amend his complaint, and—regardless of any outstanding disputes over the precise
nature of the volunteer policy—the amended complaint still failed to state a plausible
claim. Thus, the court concluded, it would be futile to afford Henson a second
opportunity to amend because the outcome would be the same. The district court acted
well within its discretion in reaching this conclusion.
AFFIRMED

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