United States of America v. Mohamed Worku

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 4, 2026
Decided August 4, 2026
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1600
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MOHAMED WORKU,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:24-CR-00037(1)
Matthew F. Kennelly,
Judge.
O R D E R
A jury convicted Mohamed Worku of bank robbery and bank theft, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a), (b), and the district court imposed 21 months’ imprisonment. He appeals, but
his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of
the case and addresses potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to
involve. Because counsel’s brief appears thorough, and Worku did not respond to the
motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects counsel discusses. See
United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We grant the motion and dismiss
the appeal.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Background
On December 29, 2021, Worku entered a Fifth Third Bank on West 26th Street in
Chicago and handed a note to a teller that said, “Give me the money Please thank you.”
The teller gave him $595, and Worku left the bank. He was arrested shortly after and
charged with one count of bank robbery. See United States v. Worku, No. 1:21-CR-00771
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2024). Worku was detained until the jury trial began on January 16,
2024. The jury acquitted him on January 19, 2024, and Worku was released from jail.
Three days after his acquittal and release, Worku entered the Citibank at 2001
North Halstead in Chicago and handed a note to a teller that said, “Please give me the
money, I’ll pay it back soon. Banker’s gife [sic] to me in advance.” The teller gave him
$2,068 and, after Worku left the bank, triggered the alarm. The branch manager called
911 and described the man who robbed the bank. Less than an hour later, a police
officer spotted a man walking a half mile from the bank who matched the description of
the suspect. When the officer approached Worku, he detected the odor of burnt
marijuana and saw that Worku was holding a marijuana cigarette in his hand. The
officer arrested Worku for public consumption of marijuana. The items recovered from
Worku included a gray backpack with $1,848 in cash.
Worku was then charged with one count of bank robbery by intimidation and
one count of bank theft. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (b). At trial, the jury heard testimony
from bank employees, including the head teller who had interacted with Worku. At the
close of the government’s case, Worku moved for judgment of acquittal, and the district
court took the motion under advisement. The jury convicted Worku on both counts,
and Worku filed a combined motion for a new trial and for judgment of acquittal. At
sentencing, the district judge denied the motions and imposed 21 months’
imprisonment.
Discussion
1. Pretrial Motions
Counsel initially considers, and rightly rejects as frivolous, potential challenges
to the district judge’s pretrial rulings.
a. Motion to Suppress
Worku sought to suppress the evidence seized during his arrest, arguing that
Officer James Brownridge lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Worku, did not have

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No. 25-1600 Page 3
probable cause to arrest Worku, and that the resulting search was improper. We would
review the district judge’s factual findings for clear error and legal questions, including
mixed questions of law and fact, de novo. United States v. Reedy, 989 F.3d 548, 553
(7th Cir. 2021).
Counsel rightly rejects any potential argument as frivolous. An officer has
reasonable suspicion when he can point to “specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”
United States v. Eymann, 962 F.3d 273, 282 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 21 (1968)). The district judge explained that the officer had at least reasonable
suspicion that Worku was the suspected robber: Worku matched the general
description because he was a black man wearing a blue hoodie, dark jeans, and black
shoes with white soles, and he was carrying a light blue face mask. And the aspects that
did not match the description, including Worku’s gray backpack, black (rather than
blue) jacket, and glasses, were mutable characteristics that a person could easily change.
See United States v. Adair, 925 F.3d 931, 935–36 (7th Cir. 2019) (suspect’s imperfect match
with general description does not negate reasonable suspicion). Further, the judge
explained that other factors supported reasonable suspicion, including that Worku was
found less than a half mile from the bank about 40 minutes after the robbery occurred,
and he was traveling in the same direction as the suspect. See United States v. Swinney,
28 F.4th 864, 869 (7th Cir. 2022) (suspect’s location combined with his appearance can
lead to reasonable suspicion).
We also agree with counsel that any argument that the officer lacked probable
cause to arrest Worku would be frivolous. In the district court, Worku agreed that
under Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001), an officer with probable
cause to believe that an individual has committed a non-jailable offense in his presence
may arrest the offender without violating the Fourth Amendment. Illinois law forbids
the public consumption of marijuana. See 410 ILCS 705/10-35(a)(3)(F). The district judge
rightly determined that the officer had probable cause to arrest Worku because he
smelled burnt marijuana and observed that Worku was holding a marijuana cigarette
and a lighter. See United States v. Paige, 870 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir. 2017) (marijuana odor
localized to specific person provides probable cause to arrest for marijuana possession).
Moreover, counsel rightly concludes it would be frivolous to argue that the officer
needed probable cause to arrest Worku for the bank robbery. An “arrest may be
supported by probable cause that the arrestee committed any offense, regardless of the
crime charged or the crime the officer thought had been committed.” United States v.
Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 745 (7th Cir. 2015).

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No. 25-1600 Page 4
Finally, we agree with counsel that Worku could not plausibly challenge the
search of his backpack. Because the officer had probable cause to arrest Worku, he also
could conduct a search incident to that lawful arrest. See Paige, 870 F.3d at 700.
b. Motion to Dismiss the Indictment
Counsel next addresses whether Worku could challenge the district judge’s
refusal to dismiss the bank robbery charge from the indictment. The judge rejected
Worku’s argument that the indictment was insufficient on its face. We would review
that ruling de novo. United States v. Clark, 140 F.4th 395, 418 (7th Cir. 2025). An
indictment that states “the offense in the words of the statute itself” and “the elements
necessary to constitute the offense” will generally survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 419
(quoting United States v. Bates, 96 F.3d 964, 970 (7th Cir. 1996)); see F ED. R. C RIM . P.
7(c)(1) (indictment requires only “a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense charged”). The district judge appropriately
denied the motion to dismiss the bank robbery charge because the indictment alleged
all elements of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), so we agree with counsel that it
would be frivolous to challenge this ruling.
2. Trial
Counsel next considers, and rightly rejects as frivolous, potential challenges to
various aspects of Worku’s trial.
a. Jury Selection
Counsel considers but correctly rejects a challenge to the district judge’s
dismissal for cause of a potential juror who was a criminal defense attorney and had
represented Citibank in foreclosure proceedings for more than 20 years. The district
judge sustained the government’s challenge to the criminal defense attorney as well the
defense’s challenge to a former ATF agent, stating that “it just hits too close to home on
both of them.” Because “[t]here is ‘no legally cognizable right to have any particular
juror participate in [a defendant’s] case,’” any argument that the district judge erred
would be frivolous. United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959, 973 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting
United States v. Polichemi, 201 F.3d 858, 865 (7th Cir. 2000)).
b. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Counsel next considers, but correctly rejects, a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. We would reverse only if no rational jury could have found the essential

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No. 25-1600 Page 5
elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Clark, 227 F.3d
771, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2000).
For the bank robbery charge, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), the element in dispute was
whether Worku took the money by intimidation. Intimidation means “saying or doing
something in such a way as would place a reasonable person in fear.” United States v.
Burnley, 533 F.3d 901, 903 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Clark, 227 F.3d at 775). Intimidation
exists when a defendant’s actions and words are “calculated to create the impression
that any resistance or defiance by the teller would be met with force.” Clark, 227 F.3d at
775 (quoting United States v. Jones, 932 F.3d 624, 625 (7th Cir. 1991)).
At trial, the jury heard testimony from the head teller at the Citibank branch. She
testified that she was greeting customers near the front of the bank when Worku
walked in. He headed directly to the back without speaking and was wearing a face
mask. Confused, the teller told Worku multiple times to go to the teller line. Worku
made her uncomfortable, she said, by walking too close to her as she went back to the
teller station. And she felt scared when Worku tried to follow her through an employee-
only door that led to the teller stations. When Worku got to the teller station, he handed
her a note demanding money, which she gave him. The teller testified that she was
scared because she did not know whether Worku was carrying a gun, and that she
panicked when he reached into his pockets. After she gave Worku the money, the teller
waited until Worku left the bank before triggering the alarm because she was scared for
her safety and that of her coworkers and did not know whether Worku was armed.
Although Worku did not make explicit verbal or written threats while in the
Citibank, the context of the crime and the combination of his appearance and actions
during the offense was sufficient evidence of intimidation. See Clark, 227 F.3d at 775.
Worku covered his face, followed the teller too closely, ignored directions repeatedly,
approached an employees-only door, and demanded money via a note. See id.
(defendant intimidated bank employee where he confronted her at window and
demanded money, even though he was unarmed and did not explicitly threaten her);
United States v. Gordon, 642 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A] demand note alone may
contain an implicit threat that rises to the level of intimidation.”). Moreover, while the
intimidation element has an objective test, the teller’s fear is probative evidence of
intimidation. Clark, 227 F.3d at 775; Gordon, 642 F.3d at 598. The teller testified that
Worku’s actions made her fear that Worku would use force if she did not give him
money. Accordingly, we agree with counsel that it would be frivolous to argue that
insufficient evidence supported the bank robbery charge.

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No. 25-1600 Page 6
As to the bank theft charge, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b), the element in dispute was
whether Worku intended to steal the money he took from the bank. In this context,
“steal” means “to take with the intent to deprive the owner permanently of the rights
and benefits of ownership.” United States v. Kucik, 909 F.2d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 1990).
Though Worku’s demand note suggested that the money was a gift, and that he would
“pay it back soon,” a jury could rationally conclude that Worku was not requesting
money to which he was entitled. The demand note did not include, for example, an
account number, account type, or name, and it did not bear any indicia of a loan such as
a borrower, amount, or length of the loan.
c. Jury Instructions
Next, counsel considers, and appropriately rejects, any challenge to the jury
instructions. Worku agreed to the instructions, so any argument would be waived.
See United States v. Crowder, 164 F.4th 993, 1002 (7th Cir. 2026). Moreover, the
instructions were substantially based on the Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions,
and we would presume that pattern jury instructions accurately state the law. See United
States v. Farias, 147 F.4th 764, 771 (7th Cir. 2025).
d. Replacement of a Deliberating Juror
Counsel next rightly rejects a challenge to the district judge’s decision to replace
a juror who, after deliberations began, fell ill. We would review the district judge’s
ruling for an abuse of discretion. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 24(c)(3); United States v. Turner,
836 F.3d 849, 865 (7th Cir. 2016). If the district judge has a “legitimate basis for th[e]
decision [to replace a juror], there is no abuse of discretion.” Turner, 836 F.3d at 865
(quoting United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 689 (7th Cir. 2007)). Although defense
counsel initially objected to the replacement of the juror, she withdrew the objection
after the judge spoke with the sick juror and confirmed that she required medical
attention. The juror’s illness, therefore, was a legitimate reason to replace the juror.
e. Supplemental Instructions
Counsel relatedly contemplates whether Worku could plausibly challenge the
responses to three questions received from the jury during deliberation. The jurors’ first
question asked for “a legal definition of intimidation with synonyms.” The parties
agreed that the judge should not provide a definition beyond what was in the
instructions and should encourage the jury to continue deliberating. The second
question asked about the consequences of reaching unanimity on only one of the two

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No. 25-1600 Page 7
counts. The parties agreed that the judge should advise the jury not to be concerned
about the ramifications and to continue deliberating. The jurors’ third note stated that
they could not agree unanimously on the bank robbery charge. Worku agreed with the
government that the judge should reread the instruction given pursuant to United States
v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc), telling the jury to continue deliberating.
Counsel correctly concludes that any argument about these responses would be
frivolous. A district judge has broad discretion to respond to questions from a
deliberating jury. United States v. Young, 316 F.3d 649, 661 (7th Cir. 2002). When it is
apparent that the jury is having difficulty with the original instructions, a supplemental
instruction may be appropriate. See id. A judge should strive to dispel any difficulties
quickly and with concrete accuracy. See id. at 661–62. We consider whether the
supplemental instruction as a whole fairly and adequately treated the issue, correctly
stated the law, and answered the jury’s question specifically. Id. Because defense
counsel agreed with the instructions, our review would be limited to plain error. See
United States v. Sims, 329 F.3d 937, 942–43 (7th Cir. 2003); F ED. R. C RIM . P. 30(d), 52(b).
It would be frivolous to argue that the district judge’s responses amounted to
plain error. First, the judge directed the jury to the definition of intimidation in the
instructions, which correctly stated the law. Second, the judge rightly instructed the jury
not to be concerned about the consequences of failing to reach unanimity on one of the
charges. Finally, when the jury responded that they were deadlocked, the judge
followed our clear, established procedure by repeating the model Silvern instruction.
f. Combined Motion for a New Trial and Judgment of Acquittal
Counsel rightly declines to argue that the district judge erred by denying
Worku’s combined motion for a new trial and a judgment of acquittal. We would
review de novo the denial of the motion for a judgment of acquittal. United States v.
Sorensen, 134 F.4th 493, 497 (7th Cir. 2025). “[P]ractically speaking, however, the
standard of review is that for sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 497–98 (quoting United
States v. Peterson, 823 F.3d 1113, 1120 (7th Cir. 2016)). And we have already concluded
that an argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence would be frivolous. As to
the motion for a new trial, our review would be “highly deferential, recognizing that
the exercise of power conferred by Rule 33 is reserved for only the most extreme cases.”
United States v. Edwards, 161 F.4th 1088, 1099 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v.
Hamdan, 910 F.3d 351, 357 (7th Cir. 2018)). And the motion did not specify any errors, so
an argument that the district judge erred would be frivolous.

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No. 25-1600 Page 8
g. Double Jeopardy
Counsel advises that Worku would like to argue that he cannot be convicted of
both bank robbery and bank theft based on the same offense conduct. But we agree
with counsel that any challenge on this basis would be frivolous. Worku did not raise
this issue in the district court, so our review would be for plain error. United States v.
Morgan, 929 F.3d 411, 421 (7th Cir. 2019). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment “protects against both actual punishment and the attempt to convict and
punish a defendant twice for the same crime.” United States v. Faulkner, 793 F.3d 752, 755
(7th Cir. 2015). “[T]he statutory elements define how many distinct crimes have been
created,” and where “each statute contains an element that the other does not, then the
offenses are different.” United States v. Loniello, 610 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 2010). Bank
robbery and bank theft are distinct crimes that contain different elements, see Carter v.
United States, 530 U.S. 255, 259, 274 (2000), so double jeopardy is not implicated here.
3. Sentencing
Counsel considers, and rightly rejects as frivolous, potential challenges to
Worku’s sentence.
a. Calculation of the Guidelines Range
Counsel correctly concludes that a challenge to the calculation of the guidelines
range would be frivolous. The district court properly calculated Worku’s guidelines
range of 46 to 57 months based on a total offense level of 22 and a criminal history
category of II. The court rightly applied U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(a), which has a base level of 20,
because the underlying activity was robbery, and correctly added two levels because
Worku took money from a financial institution, id. § 2B3.1(b)(1). And the court properly
assessed Worku’s criminal history category at II based on the three points he received
for two prior convictions for possessing controlled substances.
b. Consideration of Acquitted Conduct
We also agree with counsel that it would be frivolous to argue that the district
judge erred by considering conduct from Worku’s earlier bank robbery case even
though Worku was acquitted at trial. The Sentencing Guidelines limit a judge’s
consideration of acquitted conduct only in calculating a defendant’s guidelines range.
See United States v. Coleman, 138 F.4th 489, 512 (7th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 275
(citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c)). In determining the appropriate sentence, however, the judge

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“may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background,
character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law.” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.4; see also United States v. Gaines, 164 F.4th 984, 991 (7th Cir. 2026) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1)). Here, the district judge did not consider Worku’s acquitted conduct as
relevant conduct for purposes of calculating the guidelines range. Rather, the judge
properly addressed Worku’s acquitted conduct in his discussion of the § 3553(a) factors
and his decision to impose supervised release. Moreover, the judge’s consideration of
Worku’s prior detention worked, at least in part, in Worku’s favor: The judge reduced
Worku’s sentence by 25 months to account for the time he spent in jail awaiting trial in
the first bank robbery case.
c. Substantive Reasonableness
Counsel also rightly declines to challenge the substantive reasonableness of
Worku’s 21-month sentence, which is below the guidelines range. A below-guidelines
sentence is presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Oregon, 58 F.4th 298, 302
(7th Cir. 2023). And the judge adequately justified Worku’s sentence based on the
§ 3553(a) factors. See, e.g., United States v. Boatman, 786 F.3d 590, 594 (7th Cir. 2015). The
judge reasonably balanced Worku’s personal history and characteristics (noting his
difficult childhood and mental health issues) and the non-violent nature of the robbery,
with the high likelihood that Worku would reoffend in the future.
d. Supervised Release
Finally, counsel considers and rightly rejects challenging a condition of Worku’s
supervised release requiring him to live in a community correction center at the end of
his confinement. Worku objected to the condition at sentencing, explaining that he
would like to find his own living arrangement, and that the condition was not necessary
where he expected to be removed from the country based on his immigration status
upon his release from confinement. The judge disagreed, concluding that supervised
release, including the community-confinement condition, was necessary as a deterrent
given Worku’s criminal history and his statements during the hearing that he would
likely reoffend. Moreover, although the Sentencing Guidelines recommend that courts
“ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised release” where a person is likely to
be deported after imprisonment, U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c), the Guidelines also advise that a
court may do so as an added measure of deterrence, id. App. Note 5.
* * *
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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