United States of America v. Matthew Peter Fuller

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 18-1706
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Matthew Peter Fuller
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Pierre
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Submitted: December 20, 2018
Filed: December 27, 2018
[Unpublished]
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Before WOLLMAN, GRUENDER, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Matthew Fuller directly appeals after the district court revoked his supervised1
release, and sentenced him within his Chapter 7 advisory Guidelines range. His
The Honorable Roberto A. Lange, United States District Judge for the District1
of South Dakota.

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counsel has moved to withdraw, and has filed a brief suggesting that the revocation
sentence is substantively unreasonable, that the district court erred in denying a
motion to continue the revocation hearing, and that counsel was ineffective. In pro
se filings, Fuller further claims that he was misadvised by the court regarding the
maximum revocation sentence he faced, and suggests that he was not competent to
admit that he had committed supervised-release violations. Also pending are two
motions in which Fuller challenges the manner in which some of his appellate filings
have been construed by the clerk’s office, and requests a remand.
We conclude that Fuller’s revocation sentence, which is within the statutory
limits and the undisputed Guidelines range, is not substantively unreasonable. See
United States v. Growden, 663 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding
that a revocation sentence is reviewed for substantive reasonableness under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard); United States v. Petreikas, 551 F.3d 822,
824-25 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying a presumption of reasonableness to a within-
Guidelines revocation sentence). We further conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying counsel’s request for a continuance. See United States
v. Redd, 318 F.3d 778, 782 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that this court will reverse a denial
of a requested continuance only upon a showing of a prejudicial abuse of discretion).
Next, we decline to consider any ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. See
United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826-27 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding
that ineffective-assistance claims are usually best litigated in collateral proceedings,
where a record can be properly developed). As to the other issues raised in Fuller’s
pro se filings, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing
to make a sua sponte finding that Fuller was incompetent, in light of Fuller’s
statements at the initial appearance. Cf. United States v. Contreras, 816 F.3d 502,
514 (8th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the determination of whether a defendant is
competent is committed to the district court’s discretion). Finally, we conclude that
any error in the magistrate judge’s advice regarding the maximum revocation
sentence Fuller faced was harmless because Fuller’s own statements clearly showed
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that he knew he faced a maximum of two years in prison. Cf. United States v. Young,
927 F.2d 1062, 1063 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the district court’s failure to advise
the defendant of the statutory maximum and minimum penalties was harmless where
the transcript clearly showed that the defendant actually knew the statutory range of
punishments). We therefore affirm, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. In
addition, Fuller’s pending motions are denied.
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