United States of America v. Rashaun Ladale Williams

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-2782
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Rashaun Ladale Williams
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
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Submitted: June 12, 2023
Filed: September 7, 2023
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Before GRUENDER, ARNOLD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.
Rashaun Williams appeals his sentence after pleading guilty to two drug
crimes. He argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel at sentencing when it allowed his lawyer to withdraw, neglected to appoint
another one, and failed to warn Williams about the risks of proceeding on his own.
Because we find that Williams waived his right to challenge these issues, we dismiss
his appeal.

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I.
Williams was indicted on three counts of drug possession with intent to
distribute. See 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)-(B). On the morning of trial, he
decided to plead guilty to two of them in exchange for dismissal of the third. The
district court performed the usual change-of-plea colloquy. Williams said that his
mind was “crystal clear” and that he was not on any medications or drugs. Yet some
of his responses showed hesitation. He said he had little time to go over the plea
agreement with his lawyer and felt rushed. On top of that, he regretted not taking an
earlier plea offer made while his mother’s recent death weighed heavily on him.
Still, the court found Williams competent to proceed with his proposed plea and
confirmed that he was satisfied with his attorney.
The court then turned to the plea agreement itself. Williams said that he had
not received any promises beyond those in the written agreement, though again he
hesitated: “But do, like—do, like, being promised stuff in the beginning to
cooperate, does that count, or that ain’t—that don’t matter?” Williams
acknowledged that the agreement contained nothing like that and that any remaining
issues, like his status as a career offender and credit for cooperation, would be dealt
with at sentencing. The court then reviewed the rights that Williams was waiving
by pleading guilty under the agreement. Among them, the right to appeal
all non-jurisdictional issues, including, but not limited to, any issues
relating to pre-trial motions, hearings and discovery and any issues
relating to the negotiation, taking or acceptance of the guilty plea or the
factual basis for the plea, including the sentence imposed or any issues
that relate to the establishment of the Guideline range, except that the
defendant reserves the right to appeal claims of prosecutorial
misconduct and the defendant reserves the right to appeal the sentence
if the defendant makes a contemporaneous objection because the
sentence imposed is above the Guideline range that is established at
sentencing.

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In a separate paragraph, the agreement stated that Williams waived the right “to
collaterally attack the conviction and sentence in any post-conviction proceeding,
. . . except for claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial
misconduct.” Finally, the agreement stated that Williams “has entered into [it]
consciously and deliberately, by [his] free choice, and without duress, undue
influence or otherwise being forced or compelled to do so.” The court accepted
Williams’s plea.
A couple of months later but before sentencing, Williams’s attorney moved to
withdraw because the attorney-client relationship had soured. As proof, the attorney
referenced a letter from Williams disagreeing with the presentence investigation
report’s recommendations and complaining about his attorney’s representation and
failure to adequately explain the plea deal. Williams had told his attorney “to fix
this problem or get off my case [so] I can file inefficient counsel.” In his motion,
the attorney suggested that Williams “should have another lawyer” who can advise
him about withdrawing his guilty plea. The next day, without a hearing or input
from Williams, the district court granted the attorney’s motion and stated that
“Defendant will be pro se until he retains new counsel.” Williams then filed a pro
se motion for a downward departure based on his substantial assistance to the
government. See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
No new counsel was appointed, and the court held the sentencing hearing two
weeks later, as scheduled. The court announced that Williams was “here present in
court representing himself” and had “terminated his attorney-client relationship”
with his lawyer. Williams said that he was ready to begin. No Faretta colloquy
occurred. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975).
Proceeding alone, Williams argued that he should be allowed to withdraw his
guilty plea. Still dissatisfied with the PSR’s recommendations, Williams claimed
that he was misled about the plea agreement. Apparently, he had expected that he
would not qualify as a career offender and that his cooperation with the government
would result in a lower advisory sentencing guidelines range. The district court

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denied Williams’s motion “based on [his] earlier clear statements” at the change-of-
plea hearing.
Before imposing sentence, the court offered Williams an opportunity for
allocution. He tried to speak, but the court, perhaps not noticing, immediately turned
to the Government. After hearing from the Government, the court sentenced
Williams to 240 months’ imprisonment, below the guidelines range of 292 to 365
months. It then asked if there was “anything else we need to tend to.” Williams
seized the opportunity: “I was just wondering, I was trying to ask before you passed
the sentence down, was the proffer or any of that real or all of that—I don’t get no
reduction from all of that? I mean, that’s the whole reason I kind of took the plea,
because I knew I was going to get a reduction.” The court responded that Williams
got a reduction—down to 240 months.
Now with new counsel, Williams appeals, asking us to vacate his sentence
and remand for a new one. He argues that the district court violated his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel at sentencing and his right to allocution, see Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) (“Before imposing sentence, the court must . . . address the
defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any
information to mitigate the sentence.”). Relying on the plea agreement’s waiver, the
Government moved to dismiss the appeal. We took the motion with the case.
II.
When pleading guilty, defendants may choose to waive appellate rights.
United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Sometimes,
they appeal anyway. We must then review the waiver to confirm that the attempted
appeal falls within its scope and that the defendant entered both the plea agreement
and the waiver knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 889-90. Yet even then, we will not
enforce the waiver if doing so would result in a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 890.
We review the validity and applicability of an appeal waiver de novo. United States
v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010).

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At the outset, Williams’s appeal falls within the waiver’s scope. The waiver
covers “all non-jurisdictional issues” on direct appeal, including “any issues relating
to the negotiation, taking or acceptance of the guilty plea” and to “the sentence
imposed or any issues that relate to the establishment of the Guideline range.” The
Sixth Amendment and allocution issues that Williams raises are non-jurisdictional.
Williams tries to avoid this outcome by pointing to the waiver’s exception for
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. But that exception appears in a separate
paragraph specifically addressing collateral attacks in post-conviction proceedings.
Williams’s challenge—to the extent it can even be regarded as an ineffective-
assistance claim—comes on direct appeal, not in a post-conviction proceeding.
Thus, the plea agreement’s broader appellate waiver of “all non-jurisdictional
issues” applies to this appeal.
With scope resolved against Williams, we must dismiss his appeal unless his
waiver was not knowingly and voluntarily made or unless doing so would result in
a miscarriage of justice. See Andis, 333 F.3d at 889-90. On the first point, Williams
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal. As the agreement itself states,
and as the change-of-plea hearing confirmed, Williams reviewed the proposed
agreement with counsel. See United States v. Guzman, 707 F.3d 938, 941-42 (8th
Cir. 2013). He acknowledged that sentencing-related issues would be ironed out
later. And although Williams hesitated in the hearing, the record reflects that he
understood the significance of pleading guilty and waiving his appellate rights. The
district court thoroughly questioned him about his understanding and gave him
several chances to refuse going forward with the change of plea. See Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(b); United States v. Griffin, 668 F.3d 987, 990 (8th Cir. 2012). Each time,
Williams assured the court that he wanted to plead guilty. Finally, after the court
reviewed the appeal-waiver provisions, Williams said the plea agreement was in his
best interest. We take him at his word.
On the second point, Williams’s arguments about miscarriage of justice are
somewhat muddled. In opposing the Government’s motion to dismiss, he argues

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that he never waived his right to counsel at sentencing so it would be a miscarriage
of justice to enforce such a “waiver.”1 But Williams grapples with the wrong waiver.
Whether Williams validly waived his right to counsel at sentencing is separate from
whether he validly waived his right to appeal the issue at all. The former goes to the
merits; the latter to reviewability. Here, we must decide reviewability—specifically,
whether it would be a miscarriage of justice to enforce nonreviewability.
With the right waiver in focus, Williams makes two colorable arguments
about a potential miscarriage of justice. The first asserts that ineffective-assistance
claims generally satisfy the miscarriage-of-justice exception under our precedent.
As for the other, Williams maintains—without citing legal authority—that enforcing
the waiver would be a miscarriage of justice because it relied on an implicit
assumption: that he would be “in a position to . . . put his absolute best foot forward
before the trial court.” In other words, he could not have foreseen that he would be
deprived of counsel at sentencing. Thus, he says, he should be allowed to challenge
that deprivation on appeal despite the broad waiver provision.
Neither persuades us. The miscarriage-of-justice exception “is a narrow one”
that “arise[s] in only limited contexts.” United States v. Sisco, 576 F.3d 791, 798
(8th Cir. 2009). We have recognized it for challenges to an illegal sentence, to a
sentence that violates the terms of an agreement, and where ineffective assistance of
counsel rendered the appeal waiver itself unknowing and involuntary. See Andis,
333 F.3d at 891 (citing DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919, 923-24 (8th Cir.
2000)). None apply here. Williams’s sentence is below the statutory maximum.
See United States v. Howard, 27 F.4th 1367, 1370 (8th Cir. 2022) (per curiam). He
1 Indeed, Williams discusses the standard for evaluating the validity of a
waiver of the right to counsel. That standard looks to whether the waiver “is both
voluntary, and intelligently and knowingly made,” something courts determine by
reviewing the record for evidence of any Faretta colloquy or the defendant’s
familiarity with the criminal justice system. United States v. Crawford, 487 F.3d
1101, 1105-06 (8th Cir. 2007). Not our task here—Williams’s appeal waiver came
two months before his purportedly invalid waiver of the right to counsel, and he was
represented at that time.

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does not argue that his sentence violates the terms of his agreement. And his
ineffective-assistance challenge concerns assistance at sentencing, not in the making
of the plea agreement. See DeRoo, 223 F.3d at 923-24; cf. Griffin, 668 F.3d at 989
(finding no miscarriage of justice even where the appellant’s ineffective-assistance
argument concerned the making of the plea agreement itself because she could
pursue her challenge in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding). We therefore agree with
the Government that our precedents do not support finding a miscarriage of justice.
Nor does Williams’s scant “implicit assumption” argument convince us to
broaden the exception to suit his case. He essentially argues that this right is so
important and that this error was so egregious that we cannot let it stand because of
a mere appeal waiver. Yet he offers no principled way to apply the miscarriage-of-
justice exception that would not “swallow the general rule that waivers of appellate
rights are valid.” See Andis, 333 F.3d at 891. After all, defendants may waive
important constitutional rights when pleading guilty. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20,
29 (1992). As a corollary, “we would be hard-pressed to find a reason to prohibit a
defendant from waiving [the] purely statutory right” to appeal. Andis, 333 F.3d at
889. Therefore, appellate waivers are generally valid as long as they satisfy the
limits outlined above. Id. at 889-890. Williams’s waiver does.
Consider that the district court might have erred for a whole host of reasons
within the scope of his waiver. Some might have even been constitutional errors.
Cf., e.g., United States v. Lugo-Barcenas, 57 F.4th 633, 637 (8th Cir. 2023)
(reviewing equal-protection challenge to sentence because it was not within the
scope of the appeal waiver); Griffin, 668 F.3d at 990 (dismissing an appeal involving
a speedy-trial challenge under the Sixth Amendment). Would enforcing an appellate
waiver against all constitutional errors result in a miscarriage of justice? If not, what
makes Williams’s claimed constitutional error special? He does not say. See United
States v. Whitlow, 815 F.3d 430, 433 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[I]t is not this court’s job
to research the law to support an appellant’s argument.” (quoting Viking Supply v.
Nat’l Cart Co., 310 F.3d 1092, 1099 (8th Cir. 2002))); see also United States v.
Stuckey, 255 F.3d 528, 531 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e regularly decline to consider

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cursory or summary arguments that are unsupported by citations to legal
authorities.”).
Consider, too, that even if Williams had an attorney at sentencing, that
attorney might have been ineffective. We doubt that enforcing an appeal waiver
there would result in a miscarriage of justice. See DeRoo, 223 F.3d at 923-24; United
States v. Djelevic, 161 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (rejecting
“emphatically” the contention that an otherwise valid waiver should be set aside for
ineffective counsel “not at the time of the plea, but at sentencing” because “[i]f we
were to allow a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing as a means
of circumventing plain language in a waiver agreement, the waiver of appeal
provision would be rendered meaningless”); United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336,
344 (5th Cir. 2002) (agreeing with Djelevic). Williams fails to show how, under his
theory, woefully ineffective counsel is less problematic than no counsel at all.
Might the district court have arrived at a different guidelines range or sentence
had Williams been represented? Possibly. Williams speculates that effective
counsel at sentencing could have secured a more favorable guidelines range, more
credit for substantial assistance to the government, no career-offender status, and
maybe even a fighting chance at withdrawing his guilty plea. But this argument
amounts to little more than an attempted end run around the waiver to attack his
sentence, see Djelevic, 161 F.3d at 107, and Williams does not appeal the denial of
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Altogether, enforcing Williams’s waiver
would not result in a miscarriage of justice.2 See Griffin, 668 F.3d at 990-91.
2 Of course, we certainly do not condone what transpired here. The district
court allowed Williams to appear at his sentencing hearing alone and without
adequate warning about the risks of self-representation, a clear Faretta violation.
See Crawford, 487 F.3d at 1105.

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* * *
Recognizing the validity of appeal waivers provides defendants with an
important bargaining chip. See Andis, 333 F.3d at 895 (M. Arnold, J., concurring)
(“One of the few things that a criminal defendant has to trade with his or her accuser
is the right to appeal . . . .”). Applying the miscarriage-of-justice exception here
would weaken that presumption of validity and reduce defendants’ bargaining
power. See Howard, 27 F.4th at 1371 (Gruender, J., concurring). This is especially
so where an error may have been obvious. Id. (“[A]ppeal waivers would not
empower criminal defendants in plea negotiations unless we enforced them against
meritorious claims.”). Here, we have a valid appeal waiver and no showing that a
miscarriage of justice would result from its enforcement. Accordingly, we dismiss.
KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In his plea agreement, Williams agreed to waive the right to appeal all non-
jurisdictional issues. Everyone agrees that Williams has raised a non-jurisdictional
issue that falls within the scope of his appeal waiver: he seeks a remand because he
was denied counsel at his sentencing hearing. The question is whether enforcing the
otherwise valid appeal waiver in this case would result in a miscarriage of justice.
See Andis, 333 F.3d at 891 (“Assuming that a waiver has been entered into
knowingly and voluntarily, we will still refuse to enforce an otherwise valid waiver
if to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.”). Because I believe the complete
denial of counsel at sentencing falls within this narrow exception, I respectfully
dissent.
We have described the miscarriage of justice exception, or “the illegal
sentence exception,” as “extremely narrow.” See id. at 892 (“Any sentence imposed
within the statutory range is not subject to appeal.”). And we have cautioned, as the
court notes, that this narrow exception “will not be allowed to swallow the general
rule that waivers of appellate rights are valid.” Id. at 891. Here, however, Williams
does not appeal his sentence. Rather, he says that he was denied counsel at

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sentencing, without any Faretta-type inquiry into whether he desired to represent
himself. That error, in my view, is qualitatively different.
The Supreme Court has recognized that some errors reflect a “defect affecting
the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial
process itself.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (citation omitted). One
such error is a complete denial of counsel. Id. (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963)). These structural errors “necessarily render a trial fundamentally
unfair.” Id. (citation omitted). And while most constitutional errors are subject to
harmless error review, structural errors are not, in part because the consequences
“are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.” Id. at 10-11 (citation omitted).
Williams, of course, did not go to trial. But a criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to counsel at every critical stage of the criminal proceedings,
including sentencing. See United States v. Thompson¸713 F.3d 388, 394 (8th Cir.
2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that ‘sentencing is a critical state of the
criminal proceedings at which [a defendant] is entitled to the effective assistance of
counsel.’”) (citations omitted). A “complete denial of counsel” at sentencing is the
type of error that, like a structural error, renders the proceeding “fundamentally
unfair.” And recognizing it as falling into the narrow miscarriage of justice
exception would not threaten to “swallow the rule that waivers of appellate rights
are valid,” Andis, 333 F.3d at 891, because structural errors, or those sufficiently
akin to them, are narrowly defined. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 (noting that structural
errors fall into a “very limited class” and citing cases).
Not enforcing the appeal waiver here—where doing so would allow an error
affecting the fundamental fairness of the criminal proceedings to go unchecked—
would also not upend good faith plea negotiations. As an initial matter, I question
how much “power” an appeal waiver gives criminal defendants in plea negotiations.
Theoretically, the parties would enter plea negotiations with equal bargaining power,
and a defendant would receive a benefit of equal value from the government in return
for waiving their right to appeal. As a practical matter, however, that is not how the

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give-and-take works in many, if not most, cases. In any event, even if the playing
field is level, both prosecutors and defendants have a vested interest in ensuring a
criminal proceeding is fundamentally fair. It could hardly be said that the
government would purposely bargain for the result here.
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