United States of America v. Steven Sainsbury

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-2327
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Steven Sainsbury
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska - Omaha
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Submitted: February 12, 2024
Filed: May 2, 2024
[Unpublished]
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Before SMITH, Chief Judge,1 BENTON and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Steven Eric Sainsbury pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with
intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine (actual) in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 and possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime in violation
1 Judge Smith completed his term as chief judge of the circuit on March 10,
2024. See 28 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3)(A).

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of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Before sentencing, Sainsbury orally moved to
withdraw his guilty plea. The district court2 denied the motion. It sentenced him to
300 months in prison. He appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this
court affirms.
Sainsbury argues the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea. The government contends he waived his right to appeal. This court
reviews the validity of an appeal waiver de novo. See United States v. Seizys, 864
F.3d 930, 931 (8th Cir. 2017). “When reviewing a purported waiver,” this court
“must first confirm that the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver and that both
the waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily. Even
when these conditions are met, however,” this court “will not enforce a waiver where
to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d
886, 889-90 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Sainsbury’s plea agreement said:
The defendant hereby knowingly and expressly waives any and all
rights to appeal the defendant’s conviction and sentence, including any
restitution order in this case, and including a waiver of all motions,
defenses, and objections which the defendant could assert to the charges
or to the Court’s entry of Judgment against the defendant, and including
review pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 of any sentence imposed, except:
(a) As provided in Section I above, (if this is a conditional
guilty plea); and
(b) A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The agreement also said that “By signing this agreement, the defendant waives the
right to withdraw defendant’s plea of guilty pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(d)” unless the court rejects the plea agreement.
2 The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Jr., Chief Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Nebraska.

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At the change of plea hearing, the district court discussed the appeal waiver
with Sainsbury: “You’ve agreed to what’s called an appeal waiver. What that means
is, with certain limited exceptions, once I decide what your sentence will be, it’s
going to be difficult for you to appeal that or otherwise attack it.” He confirmed he
understood. He also affirmed that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation
and that his assent was voluntary. The court questioned him about his mental health.
Sainsbury reported that he had taken his prescribed medication and that none of his
medications affected his “ability to know what’s going on here” or his “decision-
making today.” The district court concluded:
I find the defendant is competent to plead; he understands the nature of
the charge filed against him and the—charges filed against him and the
possible penalties that may be imposed; he understands his rights; he
willingly, voluntarily, and knowingly waives those rights; and he fully
understands the consequences of waiving those rights, including the
fact that if he pleads guilty, there will be no trial.
The parties do not dispute that the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily
or that the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver. See Seizys, 864 F.3d at 932
(holding a waiver was knowing and voluntary where the defendant confirmed he
read the agreement and discussed it with his attorney). Enforcing the waiver is not
a miscarriage of justice. See Andis, 333 F.3d at 891 (“Although we have not
provided an exhaustive list of the circumstances that might constitute a miscarriage
of justice, we recognize that these waivers are contractual agreements between a
defendant and the Government and should not be easily voided by the courts.”).
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The judgment is affirmed.
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