Michael Jones v. City of St. Louis; Jeff Carson; Michael Guzy; Dale Glass

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-3624
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Michael Jones
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
City of St. Louis; Jeff Carson; Michael Guzy; Dale Glass
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants
Charlene Deeken
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
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Submitted: November 16, 2023
Filed: June 17, 2024
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Before LOKEN, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
This is an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity. In
February 2021, Michael Jones filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against the City of

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St. Louis and four present and former City employees, sued in their individual
capacities: Jeff Carson, Superintendent of the St. Louis Medium Security Institution
(“MSI”); Dale Glass, Commissioner of the Division of Corrections; Charlene Deeken,
former Director of the Department of Public Safety; and Michael Guzy, former
employee of the City of St. Louis Sheriff.1 Jones alleges that Defendants were
responsible for holding him in custody as a pretrial detainee for eight months after
pending criminal charges against him were dismissed by the state court, and for not
informing Jones that he was entitled to be released.
The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserted claims under state and federal
law in fourteen counts and 231 numbered paragraphs. Defendants moved to dismiss
all fourteen counts. Seven counts were dismissed and are not at issue, four alleging
unsanitary conditions of confinement at MSI and three asserting claims of fraud.
Before the district court ruled, Jones moved to voluntarily dismiss as “duplicative”
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims in Count II; these claims were
dismissed without prejudice. Thus, there are no federal due process claims against
the individual Defendants at issue on appeal. As we will explain, Count II is relevant
but, by Jones’s choice, not at issue.
Defendants appeal the denial of their motion to dismiss Counts I, V, VI, and
VII, arguing the FAC fails to allege plausible constitutional violations and the
individual Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity from damage
claims. Count I alleges Defendants violated Jones’s Fourth and Fourteenth
1Deeken and Guzy have since passed away. Before this appeal, Deeken was
dismissed by the district court on joint motion of the parties. Defendants filed a
Suggestion of Death for Guzy a week before oral argument. The parties have not
briefed whether Jones’s claims survive his death. If so, the FAC fails to plausibly
allege a federal constitutional violation for the reasons explained in this opinion.
Whether remaining pendent state law claims against Guzy survive his death is an
issue for the district court on remand.
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Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure by detaining him after his
criminal charges were dismissed. Counts V, VI, and VII allege Defendants failed to
establish policies and train staff to ensure that citizens are not wrongfully imprisoned,
and followed a pattern or practice of keeping citizens incarcerated after their criminal
charges have been dismissed. Two counts asserting pendent state law claims for
intentional and negligent false imprisonment remain pending in the district court.
We have jurisdiction over the denial of a motion to dismiss based on qualified
immunity, including whether the FAC states a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face. Lyons v. Vaught, 781 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted).
“Evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint is not a ‘fact-based’ question of law” so
an order denying qualified immunity on this ground is a final decision appealable
under the collateral order doctrine. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 674-75 (2009).
We review the denial of qualified immunity de novo, accepting factual allegations in
Jones’s FAC as true. Faulk v. City of St. Louis, 30 F.4th 739, 744 (8th Cir. 2022)
(standard of review). In reviewing whether Jones pleaded a plausible claim for
violation of a constitutional or statutory right, we “accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint,” but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678; see Faulk, 30 F.4th at 744. “Courts must not presume the truth of legal
conclusions couched as factual allegations.” Hager v. Ark. Dep’t of Health, 735
F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2013). Applying these standards of review, we reverse the
denial of qualified immunity; direct that Counts I, V, VI, and VII claims be dismissed
with prejudice; and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
I.
The primary issue is whether the individual defendants are entitled to dismissal
of Jones’s wrongful detention claims for failure to state a claim. The FAC’s claims
of prolonged detention invoke two distinct constitutional rights that apply to state
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officials under the Fourteenth Amendment -- the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions on
unreasonable seizures in Count I, and the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections
in Count II. The Fifth Amendment claims have been dismissed without prejudice.
The starting point for assessing the adequacy of the Fourth Amendment claims
asserted in Count I was established over thirty years ago in Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989), a Fourth Amendment excessive force case:
As we have said many times, § 1983 is not itself a source of substantive
rights . . . . In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983,
analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly
infringed by the challenged application of force. . . . In most instances,
that will be either the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
unreasonable seizures of the person, or the Eighth Amendments’ ban on
cruel and unusual punishments . . . . The validity of the claim must then
be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard which
governs that right, rather than some generalized “excessive force”
standard. . . . Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises in the
context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most
properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. (Quotations and citations omitted.)
The district court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order ignored Graham’s
mandate in denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claims in
Count I. The court stated that the individual Defendants “can be held to answer
§ 1983 claims stemming from prolonged detention where there are allegations (or
evidence) that the supervisory employees had actual or constructive notice that the
wrongfully detained person was entitled to be released,” citing Davis v. Hall, 375
F.3d 703, 716 (8th Cir. 2004). But in that case, we affirmed the denial of summary
judgment dismissing a due process prolonged detention claim. Thus, Davis v. Hall
does not establish that the Fourth Amendment is “the specific constitutional right
allegedly infringed” and certainly did not address “the specific constitutional standard
which governs that right” in this unusual case. Nor did the FAC, the district court,
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or the parties on appeal even attempt to define the elements of a Fourth Amendment
claim based on this type of “prolonged incarceration.” The failure of the district court
to apply this controlling Supreme Court law, and the failure of both parties to even
recognize the issue on appeal, greatly increases the difficulty of our task.
II.
Count I alleges that the individual Defendants violated Jones’s Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure when they
“depriv[ed him] of his freedom” by incarcerating him for nearly eight months “after
the criminal charges against him were dismissed.” The FAC cryptically states the
§ 1983 claims in the following paragraphs:
47. Defendants’ actions wrongfully deprived Plaintiff of his
freedom and due process.
. . .
Count I: Violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to be Free from Unreasonable Seizure . . .
63. Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff was
wrongly imprisoned.
64. Defendants failed to release Plaintiff from his imprisonment
when his charges were dismissed.
. . .
67. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights from state action.
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68. Defendants, therefore, violated Plaintiff’s Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizure of
his person.
69. Defendants fraudulently concealed from Plaintiff the fact that
he was wrongfully imprisoned . . . .
70. Defendants acted with malicious, intentional, or reckless and
callous disregard for Plaintiff’s civil rights.
In Slone v. Herman, our leading prolonged detention case, we held that
correction officials violated plaintiff’s “clearly established liberty interest in being
freed from prison” when they continued his detention with knowledge that a court
order that he be released was “final and nonappealable.” 983 F.2d 107, 110 (8th Cir.
1993). Similarly, in Davis v. Hall, where plaintiff alleged that correction officials
ignored for months his complaint that a Judgment and Sentence Order provided for
immediate discharge from custody, we upheld the denial of qualified immunity
because failing to respond to his requests to be released based on the court order
deprived Davis of a clearly established liberty interest. 375 F.3d at 719. Golberg v.
Hennepin County involved a plaintiff whose lawful detention under a felony
complaint was mistakenly extended ten hours after bail was posted. We affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of her claim that the excessive detention violated her
constitutional rights, specifically rejecting a Fourth Amendment claim:
Golberg’s seizure [under the felony complaint] was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment without the need for further judicial process such as
a probable cause hearing. . . . Claims alleging the excessive detention
of one who has established the right to be released are typically analyzed
under the Due Process Clause.
417 F.3d 808, 811 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); see Lund v. Hennepin County,
427 F.3d 1123, 1127 (8th Cir. 2005). The basis for this distinction derives from the
plain language of the Fourth Amendment. As succinctly stated by Judge Richard
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Posner of the Seventh Circuit: “There is a difference between seizing a person and
not letting him go.” Llovet v. City of Chicago, 761 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2014).
In the Facts section, the FAC alleges that Jones was “charged with one felony
and one misdemeanor [and] was held at the [MSI] pending trial on a bond he could
not afford to pay.” As in Golberg, the initial detention was not an unreasonable
seizure within the parameters of the Fourth Amendment. “[A]t common law damages
for detention after issuance of process or arraignment would be attributable to a tort
other than the unlawful arrest alleged . . . and probably a tort chargeable to defendants
other than the [arresting police officers].” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 313 (2007).
There is another type of illegal detention § 1983 claim that does directly
implicate the Fourth Amendment -- when the initial seizure is based upon false or
manufactured allegations or evidence of probable cause to detain, used either to
justify a warrantless seizure (arrest) or to defend an arrest warrant obtained by a
flawed showing of probable cause. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994). In
Manuel v. City of Joliet, police officers arrested the § 1983 plaintiff without a warrant
based on fabricated evidence he possessed a controlled substance, evidence that was
then used to obtain a judicial determination of probable cause to prosecute. 580 U.S.
357, 360-62 (2017). Resolving a conflict in the circuits, the Supreme Court held “that
the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful detention even beyond the start
of legal process” and only “drops out” once trial has occurred. Id. at 369 & n.8. On
appeal, both parties assume without analysis that Manuel decided that a claim
challenging prolonged detention falls within the Fourth Amendment, not the Due
Process Clause, whether or not the initial detention (seizure) was lawful.
This issue was not raised nor addressed by the Court in Manuel, a case that
involved an alleged unlawful initial seizure. The district court did not cite Manuel
or even acknowledge that this is a serious issue because choosing the Fourth
Amendment as “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed” by Defendants
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necessarily implies that the Supreme Court in Manuel intended to overrule our
otherwise controlling due process precedents, a question the Court did not discuss.
Though other circuits have considered prolonged detention claims after Manuel, we
have not addressed this issue.
III.
We conclude we need not decide this difficult question in this case because,
even if the Fourth Amendment does apply to Jones’s prolonged detention claims, we
must reverse the denial of the individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss because the
FAC fails to plausibly allege a Fourth Amendment violation. We quote the FAC fact
paragraphs most relevant to this issue:
13. In or around August 2013, Plaintiff was charged with one felony and
one misdemeanor by the City of St. Louis Circuit Attorney’s Office.
14. Plaintiff was held at the St. Louis [MSI] pending trial on a bond he
could not afford to pay.
15. Plaintiff was represented in his criminal case by the St. Louis City
Public Defender’s Office.
16. On November 26, 2013, Plaintiff’s case was dismissed by the court.
17. Despite his charges being dismissed, Plaintiff remained in the St.
Louis [MSI].
18. Defendants Carson, Guzy, Deeken, and Glass kept Plaintiff
incarcerated in St. Louis before and after Plaintiff’s charges were dismissed.
19. Defendants Carson, Guzy, Deeken, and Glass failed to inform
Plaintiff and failed to ensure Plaintiff was informed that his charges were
dismissed and that he was still being detained despite his charges being
dismissed.
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20. Plaintiff was eventually released on or after July 24, 2014, without
anyone telling him that he was detained despite his case being dismissed.
21. Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff was
incarcerated despite his charges being dismissed.
22. Defendants concealed from Plaintiff the fact that he was
incarcerated despite his charge being dismissed.
. . .
24. On or around August 2019, Plaintiff first learned that he was
detained until July 2014 in St. Louis correctional facilities despite his charges
being dismissed on November 26, 2013.
. . .
28. Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff to inform him that he had been
wrongfully imprisoned because Defendants had superior information regarding
Plaintiff’s incarceration not reasonably available to Plaintiff.
. . .
36. Defendants Carson, Guzy, Deeken, and Glass have or had a
responsibility to determine when people are supposed to be released from the
custody of Defendant City of St. Louis and to provide for their immediate
release.
The first glaring omission is that the FAC does not allege that Carson or Glass
or Guzy were personally involved in Jones’s prolonged detention. “Section § 1983
liability is personal.” Dahl v. Weber, 580 F.3d 730, 733 (8th Cir. 2009). To establish
liability against supervisory officials like Carson and Glass or an employee like Guzy,
Jones “must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or direct responsibility
for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights.” Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d
962, 967 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 823 (2007); see Dahl, 580 F.3d at 733;
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Ouzts v. Cummins, 825 F.2d 1276, 1277 (8th Cir. 1987). Here, there is no factual
support for the allegation defendants knew of Jones’s prolonged detention, and the
allegation they “should have known that Plaintiff was incarcerated despite his charges
being dismissed” is an allegation of negligence that fails to state Fourth Amendment
or due process claims. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986); Marsh v.
Phelps County, 902 F.3d 745, 754 (8th Cir. 2018). These are nothing more than
unsupported “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (quotation omitted).
The district court concluded that Carson and Glass are high-level supervisory
officials and therefore, “[w]hile the paucity of specific facts makes this a close
question . . . a reasonable inference can be drawn based on the limited record that the
individual defendants . . . were on notice of and deliberately indifferent to or
authorized the violations alleged.” We disagree. “Because vicarious liability is
inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see Marsh, 902 F.3d at 754. Deliberate
indifference is an element of an Eighth Amendment or a due process claim, not a
Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim.
Second, the FAC alleges that defendants, knowing Jones was entitled to be
released because the criminal charges were dismissed, “owed a duty to Plaintiff to
inform him that he had been wrongfully imprisoned because Defendants had superior
information regarding Plaintiff’s incarceration not reasonably available to Plaintiff.”
Our due process cases establish an official duty to investigate whether a detainee’s
lawful detention is being unlawfully prolonged if “the authorities know that they have
no basis for detention.” Davis, 375 F.3d at 716. Neither the district court nor Jones
on appeal cited any case holding that the Fourth Amendment imposes such a duty
when the initial seizure was lawful. And even assuming without deciding that
Manuel imposes such a Fourth Amendment duty, the FAC simply alleges that, at
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some unspecified time, the Public Defender’s Office informed Defendants “that
people were being wrongfully detained in correction facilities in St. Louis City.”
There is no allegation that Carson and Glass were told that Jones was being
wrongfully detained.
Third, the FAC alleges, with no supporting facts, that “Plaintiff’s case was
dismissed by the court.” There is no allegation what triggered the dismissal -- a
motion by Jones’s counsel; a voluntary dismissal by the St. Louis County prosecutor,
who is not a defendant; or sua sponte action by the court. Nor is there an allegation
of how and to whom the dismissal order was communicated. Was it a minute order
entered on the court’s electronic docket? Was a written order mailed to counsel for
the parties, in which case Jones’s attorney was responsible for his lack of knowledge?
Or did the clerk of court make a mistake, in which case the lack of notice could not
be attributable to defendants? Cf. Lewis v. City of St. Louis, 932 F.3d 646, 649 (8th
Cir. 2019). These facts, likely available to counsel for Jones had he made a trip to the
courthouse, are of critical importance in determining whether Defendants could be
liable under the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process Clause because they knew of,
and were deliberately indifferent to, Jones’s illegal prolonged detention for eight
more months. Cf. Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332 (2022).
Viewed in its entirety, the FAC “pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’
a defendant’s liability [but] ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged -- but it has not ‘show[n]’ -- ‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Id. at 679, quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). We reverse the denial of the
individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Count I federal claims.
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IV.
Given our decision that claims against the individual Defendants in Count I
must be dismissed, Jones’s municipal liability claims in Counts V, VI, and VII require
little discussion.2 In these Counts, Jones alleges the Defendants “knew or should
have known” that they “failed to establish effective release procedures,” “failed to
properly train staff to ensure that Plaintiff and other similarly situated innocent
citizens would not be wrongfully incarcerated,” and “established a pattern or practice
by which innocent citizens are wrongfully detained in St. Louis jails,” failings that
caused Jones’s prolonged incarceration. The district court denied the motion to
dismiss these Counts because Jones “has plausibly alleged that his right not to be
detained . . . was violated because of the [the City’s] hiring, training, supervision,
policies, customs, and practices, or lack thereof.”
Municipal entities are not entitled to qualified immunity. Leatherman v.
Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993). But
our jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity to individual supervisory
Defendants Carson and Glass includes jurisdiction over pendent claims against the
City that are “inextricably intertwined” with the qualified immunity claims. Muir v.
Decatur County, 917 F.3d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). A pendent
claim is inextricably intertwined “if resolution of the qualified immunity claim
‘necessarily resolves the pendent claim[] as well.’” Id. (quotation omitted).
It is well established that “there must be an unconstitutional act by a municipal
employee before a municipality can be held liable.” Muir, 917 F.3d at 1054
(quotation omitted). “[A] municipality is not liable for the negligent acts of its
2The FAC names Defendants Carson and Glass only in their individual
capacities, so the only official capacity Defendant is the City. We dismiss the
individual capacity claims against Carson and Glass in Counts V, VI, and VII for the
reasons stated in Part III.
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employees.” Russell v. Hennepin County, 420 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 2005), citing
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). Our conclusion that Jones has not
plausibly alleged that his right not to be detained was violated by any City employee
means that the alleged municipal policies and practices did not cause the
constitutional injury Jones alleges. Jones’s allegations that Defendants “should have
known” that he was incarcerated despite the criminal charges being dismissed fail to
state a claim under either the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process Clause.
Therefore, our conclusion that Count I must be dismissed for failure to state a claim
“necessarily resolves” the municipal liability issues. See Muir, 917 F.3d at 1054
(quotation omitted); LaCoe v. City of Sisseton, 82 F.4th 580, 586 (8th Cir. 2023).
The order of the district court denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts
I, V, VI, and VII of the FAC is reversed.
V. Counts IV and XIV
In the Memorandum Opinion and Order being appealed, the district court also
denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss the false imprisonment claims in Counts IV and
XIV, which are governed by state law. Defendants argued these claims accrued upon
Jones’s release from jail in 2014 and are therefore time-barred. Jones argued the
statute of limitations was tolled because Defendants concealed the fact of his illegal
detention, and it was not capable of ascertainment until August 2019. The district
court concluded that Jones “adequately pleaded sufficient facts to toll the statute of
limitations.” The court did not determine “[w]hether defendants may ultimately be
entitled to dismissal of these claims on statute of limitations grounds.” Defendants
did not appeal this ruling. Therefore, on remand, the district court must resolve these
state law claims, as well as any other matters raised by the parties, or decline to
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over these claims because Jones’s federal
claims have been dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
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The Order of the district court dated November 21, 2022 is reversed and the
case is remanded with directions to dismiss Counts I, V, VI, and VII of the FAC with
prejudice and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
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