United States of America v. State of Missouri

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 23-1457
___________________________
United States of America,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,
v.
State of Missouri; Michael L. Parson, Governor of the State of Missouri, in his
official capacity; Andrew Bailey, Attorney General of the State of Missouri, in his
official capacity,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants.
------------------------------
Missouri Firearms Coalition; American Firearms Association; Iowa Gun Owners;
Ohio Gun Owners; Minnesota Gun Rights; Georgia Gun Owners; Wyoming Gun Owners,
lllllllllllllllllllllAmici Curiae - Amici on Behalf of Appellant(s),
Gun Owners of America, Inc.; Gun Owners Foundation; Gun Owners of
California; Heller Foundation; America’s Future; DownsizeDC.org; Downsize DC
Foundation; Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund; Virginia Delegate
David LaRock; The Freedom Center of Missouri,
lllllllllllllllllllllAmici on Behalf of Appellant(s),
Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence; Everytown for Gun Safety; March For Our
Lives; Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence; Missouri Coalition Against
Domestic and Sexual Violence; Jackson County Missouri; St. Louis County Missouri,
lllllllllllllllllllllAmici on Behalf of Appellee(s).

-- 1 of 10 --

____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City
____________
Submitted: February 23, 2024
Filed: August 26, 2024
____________
Before LOKEN, COLLOTON,1 and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
____________
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
Missouri’s Second Amendment Preservation Act classifies various federal laws
regulating firearms as “infringements on the people’s right to keep and bear arms, as
guaranteed by Amendment II of the Constitution of the United States and Article I,
Section 23 of the Constitution of Missouri.” The Act declares that these federal laws
are “invalid to this state,” “shall not be recognized by this state,” and “shall be
specifically rejected by this state.”
The United States sued the State of Missouri, the governor, and the attorney
general, alleging that the Act violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of
the United States. The district court2 denied Missouri’s motions to dismiss for lack
of standing and failure to state a claim, granted the motion of the United States for
1Judge Colloton became chief judge of the circuit on March 11, 2024. See 28
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
2The Honorable Brian C. Wimes, United States District Judge for the Western
District of Missouri.
-2-

-- 2 of 10 --

summary judgment, and enjoined implementation and enforcement of the Act. On
this appeal by the State, we agree that the United States has standing to sue. Because
the Act purports to invalidate federal law in violation of the Supremacy Clause, we
affirm the judgment.
I.
In 2021, the State of Missouri enacted a law entitled, “Second Amendment
Preservation Act.” Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1.410-1.485 (2021). The Act states:
The following federal acts, laws, executive orders, administrative orders,
rules, and regulations shall be considered infringements on the people’s
right to keep and bear arms, as guaranteed by Amendment II of the
Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 23 of the
Constitution of Missouri, within the borders of this state including, but
not limited to:
(1) Any tax, levy, fee, or stamp imposed on firearms, firearm
accessories, or ammunition not common to all other goods and services
and that might reasonably be expected to create a chilling effect on the
purchase or ownership of those items by law-abiding citizens;
(2) Any registration or tracking of firearms, firearm accessories, or
ammunition;
(3) Any registration or tracking of the ownership of firearms, firearm
accessories, or ammunition;
(4) Any act forbidding the possession, ownership, use, or transfer of a
firearm, firearm accessory, or ammunition by law-abiding citizens; and
-3-

-- 3 of 10 --

(5) Any act ordering the confiscation of firearms, firearm accessories, or
ammunition from law-abiding citizens.
Id. § 1.420.
The Act declares that these federal laws “shall be invalid to this state, shall not
be recognized by this state, shall be specifically rejected by this state, and shall not
be enforced by this state.” Id. § 1.430. The Act imposes a “duty” on “the courts and
law enforcement agencies of this state to protect the rights of law-abiding citizens . . .
from the infringements defined under section 1.420.” Id. 1.440. The Act also
mandates that “[n]o entity or person, including any public officer or employee of this
state or any political subdivision of this state, shall have the authority to enforce or
attempt to enforce” a federal law that “infring[es] on the right to keep and bear arms.”
Id. § 1.450.
Private persons may sue to enforce the Act. The Act creates a cause of action
against “[a]ny political subdivision or law enforcement agency” that either (1)
“employs a law enforcement officer who acts knowingly . . . to violate the provisions
of section 1.450,” or (2) “knowingly employs an individual acting or who previously
acted as an official, agent, employee, or deputy of the government of the United
States, or otherwise acted under the color of federal law within the borders of this
state, who has knowingly . . . [e]nforced,” “attempted to enforce,” or “[g]iven material
aid and support . . . to enforce any of the infringements identified in section 1.420.”
Id. §§ 1.460.1, 1.470.1. Each violation of the Act is punishable by a $50,000 penalty.
Id. Prevailing parties, “other than the state of Missouri or any political subdivision
of the state,” may recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Id. §§ 1.460.2,
1.470.3.
In 2022, the United States sued Missouri to enjoin implementation and
enforcement of the Act. The United States alleged that the Act impeded the federal
-4-

-- 4 of 10 --

government’s ability to enforce federal law by causing state officials to withdraw
from joint task forces with federal law enforcement, by disrupting information sharing
between state and federal officers, and by causing confusion about the status of
federal firearm regulations in the State.
Missouri moved to dismiss. First, the State asserted that the United States
lacked standing to sue Missouri because the law is enforced by private citizens rather
than state actors. Second, the State argued that the United States failed to state a
claim because the Act is a constitutional exercise of state power under Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
The district court ruled that the United States has standing because the federal
government was injured by the withdrawal of state resources, and that injury was
attributable to the State. On the merits, the district court ruled that the Act violates
the Supremacy Clause because it purports to invalidate federal law. The district court
enjoined “any and all implementation and enforcement” of the Act. We review the
district court’s rulings de novo. Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730, 734 (8th
Cir. 2001).
II.
A.
We first consider whether the United States has standing to challenge the Act.
“[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To
demonstrate Article III standing, a plaintiff “must have (1) suffered an injury in fact,
(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578
U.S. 330, 338 (2016).
-5-

-- 5 of 10 --

“To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an
invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and
‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 339 (quoting Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560). The United States has a legally protected interest in
enforcing federal law. See United States v. Colo. Sup. Ct., 87 F.3d 1161, 1165 (10th
Cir. 1996); cf. Crow Indian Tribe v. United States, 965 F.3d 662, 676 (9th Cir. 2020).
The United States presented uncontroverted evidence that implementation of the Act
impaired that interest, because state officials withdrew resources and manpower that
further the enforcement of federal law. The federal government’s injury was thus
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” Colo. Sup. Ct., 87 F.3d at
1165.
Missouri argues that the federal government’s interest is not legally protected
because the United States is not entitled to the State’s assistance with the enforcement
of federal law. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. That argument confuses standing with
the merits of the dispute. To say that the United States was injured by the withdrawal
of state assistance “is not to say that [it] is entitled” to that assistance. McDaniel v.
Precythe, 897 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2018). A “plaintiff can have standing . . . even
though the interest would not be protected by the law in that case.” In re Special
Grand Jury 89-2, 450 F.3d 1159, 1172 (10th Cir. 2006); see Cottrell v. Alcon Lab’ys,
874 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2017). Interference with the federal government’s interest
in enforcing federal law is sufficient to establish that the Act’s implementation
injured the United States. Whether the United States is entitled to relief from that
injury is a question on the merits of the dispute.
The injury of the United States is both traceable to Missouri and redressable
by a favorable decision. The Act makes it unlawful for state officials to “enforce or
attempt to enforce any federal acts, laws, executive orders, administrative orders,
rules, regulations, statutes, or ordinances infringing on the right to keep and bear arms
as described” in the Act. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1.1450-1.1460. To comply with the Act,
-6-

-- 6 of 10 --

state officials have withdrawn resources that were devoted to assisting federal law
enforcement. An injunction enjoining the State from implementing the Act would
prevent state officials from treating federal law as invalid and withdrawing from
participation in federal law enforcement on that basis.
Missouri argues that the United States lacks standing to challenge the Act’s
purported invalidation of federal law because that portion of the Act “has no means
of enforcement.” California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659, 669 (2021). The State relies on
the Supreme Court of Missouri’s description of sections 1.410, 1.420, 1.430, and
1.440 of the Act as “legislative findings and declarations.” City of St. Louis v. State,
643 S.W.3d 295, 297 (Mo. 2022). The United States responds that this description
is dicta because it appears in a section of the court’s opinion titled, “Factual and
Procedural Background.” Whatever the status of the cited language, we fail to see
how the state court’s decision renders the Act’s purported invalidation of federal law
unenforceable. The supreme court explained that the “five remaining sections [of the
Act] comprise the substantive provisions to enforce these legislative declarations.”
Id. (emphasis added).
Missouri also argues that the federal government’s injury is not redressable by
any named defendant because the Act is enforced only by private-citizen suits. A
federal court cannot enjoin private citizens who are not parties to the case on the
grounds that they may someday file a lawsuit under the Act. See Whole Woman’s
Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 44 (2021); cf. Digit. Recognition Network, Inc. v.
Hutchinson, 803 F.3d 952, 958 (8th Cir. 2015). But “[s]o long as a state official is
giving effect to a state statute in a manner that allegedly injures a plaintiff and
violates [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights, an action to enjoin implementation of
the statute . . . is available against the state official.” McDaniel, 897 F.3d at 952.
State officials have a duty under the Act to refrain from enforcing certain federal
firearms laws. These officials give effect to the Act by withdrawing from
participation in federal law enforcement activities, and a favorable decision would
-7-

-- 7 of 10 --

enjoin them from withdrawing on that basis. The requested injunction would redress
the federal government’s injury. The United States thus has standing.
B.
The Supremacy Clause states that federal law is “the supreme Law of the Land,
. . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. “By this declaration, the states are
prohibited from passing any acts which shall be repugnant to a law of the United
States.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 361 (1819). The “Second
Amendment Preservation Act” states that certain federal laws are “invalid to this
state,” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.430, but a State cannot invalidate federal law to itself.
Missouri does not seriously contest these bedrock principles of our constitutional
structure. The State instead advances two arguments.
First, the State argues that the United States cannot sue to enforce the
Supremacy Clause because it lacks a cause of action. While there is no implied right
of action under the Supremacy Clause, there is an equitable tradition of suits to enjoin
unconstitutional actions by state actors. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.,
575 U.S. 320, 326-27 (2015). Based on that equitable tradition, the United States has
sued in other cases to enjoin a state law’s implementation and enforcement or for
other appropriate relief. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 596 U.S. 832, 837
(2022); United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 194 (1926); Sanitary Dist. of Chi.
v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925). We see no reason why the United
States cannot proceed similarly in this case.
Second, Missouri contends that the Act is constitutional because the State may
constitutionally withdraw the authority of state officers to enforce federal law. The
State argues that the reason why it withdrew its authority—i.e., because the State
declared federal law invalid—is immaterial.
-8-

-- 8 of 10 --

That Missouri may lawfully withhold its assistance from federal law
enforcement, however, does not mean that the State may do so by purporting to
invalidate federal law. In this context, as in others, the Constitution “is concerned
with means as well as ends.” Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 362 (2015).
Missouri has the power to withhold state assistance, “but the means it uses to achieve
its ends must be ‘consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the constitution.’” Id.
(quoting McCulloch, 7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421) (alteration in original). Missouri’s
assertion that federal laws regulating firearms are “invalid to this State” is
inconsistent with both. If the State prefers as a matter of policy to discontinue
assistance with the enforcement of valid federal firearms laws, then it may do so by
other means that are lawful, and assume political accountability for that decision.
Because Missouri’s attempt to invalidate federal law is unconstitutional, we
must determine whether this portion of the law is severable from the rest of the Act.
Whether one provision of a statute is severable from the remainder is a question of
state law. Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996). Under Missouri law, the
statute is not severable if “the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and
inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot
be presumed the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the void
one.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.140. The Act itself states:
If any provision of sections 1.410 to 1.485 or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, such determination shall not
affect the provisions or applications of sections 1.410 to 1.485 that may
be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and the
provisions of sections 1.410 to 1.485 are severable.
Id. § 1.485.
We conclude that the law is not severable because the entire Act is founded on
the invalidity of federal law. Section 1.410 purports to limit the supremacy of federal
-9-

-- 9 of 10 --

law by stating that federal “supremacy does not extend to various federal statutes,
executive orders, administrative orders, court orders, rules, regulations, or other
actions that collect data or restrict or prohibit the manufacture, ownership, or use of
firearms, firearm accessories, or ammunition exclusively within the borders of
Missouri.” Section 1.420 lists the federal laws that “shall be considered
infringements on the people’s right to keep and bear arms,” and section 1.430
declares that those laws are “invalid to this state.” Because these federal laws are
“infringements” and thus “invalid to this state,” the Act imposes a “duty” upon “law
enforcement agencies of this state to protect the rights of law-abiding citizens to keep
and bear arms.” Id. §§ 1.420-1.440.
The Act’s command that state law enforcement officers must not enforce
“invalid” federal law, and the Act’s creation of causes of action against state entities
that employ officers who do so, are means to “enforce” sections 1.410, 1.420, 1.430,
and 1.440. City of St. Louis, 643 S.W.3d at 297. The court thus cannot give effect
to any provision of the Act without enforcing Missouri’s attempt to invalidate federal
law. Accordingly, the district court’s order enjoining state officials from
implementing and enforcing the Act was proper. See Missouri v. United States, 144
S. Ct. 7, 7 (2023) (statement of Gorsuch, J.).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
______________________________
-10-

-- 10 of 10 --