United States of America v. Leonard Hatten, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-2594
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Leonard Hatten, Jr.
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska - Omaha
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Submitted: May 6, 2024
Filed: August 12, 2024
[Unpublished]
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Before SMITH, KELLY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
A jury found Leonard Hatten, Jr., guilty of one count of conspiracy to interfere
with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2 (Count 1); two
counts of interference with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951
and 2 (Counts 2 and 6); and two counts of brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a
crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 2 (Counts 3 and 7).

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The district court1 imposed concurrent sentences of 100 months’ imprisonment on
Counts 1, 2, and 6 and consecutive sentences of 84 months’ imprisonment each on
Counts 3 and 7. This resulted in a total sentence of 268 months’ imprisonment. Hatten
appeals, arguing that his 268-month sentence is substantively unreasonable. We
affirm.
I. Background
On October 10, 2019, Hatten, with the assistance of codefendants Spencer
Allen Scott and Donovan Shaw, robbed at gunpoint employees of a Family Dollar
Store in Omaha, Nebraska, taking money and cigarettes. On October 24, Hatten and
Scott, who were both armed, robbed a Domino’s Pizza in Council Bluffs, Iowa.
Hatten and Scott held a delivery driver at gunpoint during the robbery. Hatten also
grabbed the manager by the throat, threw her under the desk in the office, pointed the
gun at her head, and demanded that she show him the money. Hatten and Scott took
$1,200 in cash. On October 29, Hatten, with Scott’s assistance, robbed at gunpoint
a store clerk at a Kwik Shop in Omaha, Nebraska. On November 2, Hatten, acting
alone, committed another armed robbery at a Tobacco Hut in Council Bluffs, Iowa.
During that robbery, Hatten pointed a gun toward the pregnant clerk’s stomach and
struck her on her backside. Hatten also turned the gun on a male clerk, who then
opened the registers. In addition to these crimes, Hatten’s codefendants committed
several other armed robberies without Hatten’s assistance.
Subsequently, a 17-count second superseding indictment was filed in the
District of Nebraska against Hatten, Scott, and Shaw. Relevant to the present case,
Count 1 charged them with conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery and
included the October 10 robbery in Omaha, October 24 robbery in Council Bluffs,
and October 29 robbery in Omaha as overt acts. Count 2 charged Hatten and Shaw
1The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Jr., Chief Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Nebraska.
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with interference with commerce by robbery for the October 10 robbery in Omaha.
Count 3 charged Hatten and Shaw with brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a
crime of violence for the October 10 robbery in Omaha. Count 6 charged Hatten and
Scott with interference with commerce by robbery for the October 29 robbery in
Omaha. Count 7 charged Hatten and Scott with brandishing a firearm in furtherance
of a crime of violence for the October 29 robbery in Omaha. A jury found Hatten
guilty on these counts. Both Scott and Shaw pleaded guilty to Count 1, as well as to
interference with commerce by robbery and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of
a crime of violence for a robbery that Hatten did not take part in. Scott was sentenced
to 90 months’ imprisonment; Shaw was sentenced to 112 months’ imprisonment.
In preparation for Hatten’s sentencing, the district court reviewed the second
superseding indictment, the jury’s verdict, the revised presentence report (PSR), the
sentencing recommendation, and the government’s sentencing memorandum. At
sentencing, neither the government nor Hatten objected to the PSR, and the district
court adopted it without change. The district court reviewed the PSR’s Guidelines
calculation, which reported a total offense level of 27 and a criminal history category
of IV. Based on those calculations, the district court concluded that the Guidelines
range on Counts 1, 2, and 6 was 100 to 125 months’ imprisonment and that the
Guidelines range on Counts 3 and 7 was 84 months’ imprisonment on each count,
which must be imposed to run consecutive to all other counts. Hatten did not object
to the district court’s Guidelines calculations. The probation office recommended a
Guidelines sentence of 100 months’ imprisonment each on Counts 1, 2, and 6, to be
served concurrently, in addition to 84 months’ imprisonment each on Counts 3 and
7, to be served consecutively to all other counts. This resulted in a total Guidelines
sentence of 268 months’ imprisonment.
Hatten argued that this recommended within-Guidelines range sentence was
excessive despite being within the applicable Guidelines range. In support, Hatten
cited to the lower cumulative sentences that Scott and Shaw received. After
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“listen[ing] to the arguments of the parties and directly from [Hatten],” the district
court set forth its reasons for imposing a total sentence of 268 months’ imprisonment.
R. Doc. 228, at 11. The court acknowledged its “consideration [of] all of the
[§] 3553(a) factors, including the defendant’s history and characteristics [and] the
nature and circumstances of the offense.” Id. The district court also noted that each
of Hatten’s two firearm-brandishing convictions, Counts 3 and 7, required sentences
of 84 months each, to be served consecutively.
The court then addressed Hatten’s argument that the recommended sentence
was excessive in light of the sentences that his codefendants received. The court
distinguished the codefendants’ sentences based on the charges that they included in
their plea agreements. In fashioning Hatten’s sentence, the court also considered his
violent conduct, including “the circumstance at the Tobacco Hut in Council Bluffs
where the . . . pregnant employee was struck on her backside and had a gun held to
her stomach.” Id. at 12. The court found “plenty of evidence at trial . . . of violence
or at least [the crime] being viewed that way . . . by the victims.” Id. Having “looked
at all of [the relevant] factors” and “looked at the sentencing disparities,” id., the
court imposed 100 months’ imprisonment each on Counts 1, 2, and 6, to be served
concurrently with each other. On Counts 3 and 7, the district court sentenced Hatten
to 84 months on each count, to be served consecutive to each other and to the
sentence imposed on Counts 1, 2, and 6. The resulting total sentence was 268 months.
Hatten raised no procedural objections to the sentence.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Hatten argues that his 268-month sentence is substantively
unreasonable because of the disparity between his sentence and the sentences that
Scott and Shaw received (respectively, 90 months and 112 months).
“We review a defendant’s challenge to substantive reasonableness under a
highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Jones, 71 F.4th
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1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 2023); see also United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464
(8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“[S]ubstantive appellate review in sentencing cases is
narrow and deferential.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “A district court abuses
its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received
significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or
(3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a
clear error of judgment.” Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[The defendant] bears the burden of showing that his sentence should have
been lower considering the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States
v. Travis, 659 F. App’x 368, 371 (8th Cir. 2016) (unpublished per curiam) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A sentence within the Guidelines range is accorded a
presumption of substantive reasonableness on appeal.” United States v. Garcia, 946
F.3d 413, 419 (8th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[A] district court has wide latitude under § 3553(a) to lend more weight to
some sentencing factors than it does to others.” United States v. Palen, No. 22-3664,
2023 WL 8015528, at *2 (8th Cir. Nov. 20, 2023) (unpublished per curiam). A
district court need not “mechanically recite the § 3553(a) factors, nor is it obligated
to make specific factual findings for each factor that it references.” Id. Instead, “[a]ll
that is generally required to satisfy the appellate court is evidence that the district
court was aware of the relevant factors.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[W]here the district court heard argument from counsel about specific § 3553(a)
factors, we may presume that the court considered those factors.” United States v.
Keating, 579 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir. 2009). “[A] defendant’s disagreement with the
district court’s balancing of relevant considerations does not show that the court
abused its discretion.” United States v. Campbell, 986 F.3d 782, 800 (8th Cir. 2021).
Because Hatten’s 268-month sentence is within the Guidelines range, we afford
it a presumption of reasonableness. See Garcia, 946 F.3d at 419. Hatten has not
overcome this presumption. As the government points out, the 268-month sentence
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“was at the bottom of the applicable Guideline[s] range, 100 months on Counts 1, 2,
and 6 and the statutory minimum 7 years each on Counts 3 and 7.” Appellee’s Br. at
12. And the district court stated that it had fully considered all the § 3553(a) factors
when arriving at Hatten’s sentence, in addition to the Guidelines, the record, and the
parties’ filings in the case. The district court explained that it did not give much
weight to the disparity between Hatten’s sentence and those of his codefendants
because “the differences between [Scott and Shaw] who were sentenced here have to
do more with what charges were dealt with and not dealt with through the plea
agreement.” R. Doc. 228, at 12. In other words, Scott’s and Shaw’s plea agreements
and acceptance of responsibility affected their sentences, neither of which are
applicable to Hatten. See Garcia, 946 F.3d at 419–20 (holding that the district court’s
imposition of a within-Guidelines sentence was reasonable where it appropriately
weighed the § 3553(a) factors, regardless of the sentence imposed on a codefendant).
Additionally, the court expressly stated that the circumstances of the offense impacted
its sentencing determination. R. Doc. 228, at 12 (“I also took into consideration
. . . the circumstance at the Tobacco Hut in Council Bluffs where the . . . pregnant
employee was struck on her backside and had a gun held to her stomach. . . . I think
there’s plenty of evidence at trial . . . of violence or at least being viewed that way
. . . by the victims.”). The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
within-Guidelines sentence of 268 months’ imprisonment.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.2
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2Hatten’s motion for newly discovered evidence is denied.
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