Domeco Fugenschuh v. Brian Minnehan, Individually

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1451
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Domeco Fugenschuh
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Brian Minnehan, Individually and in his official capacity as a law enforcement
officer for the Des Moines, Iowa Police Department; Ryan Steinkamp, Individually
and in his official capacity as a law enforcement officer for the Des Moines, Iowa
Police Department
Defendants - Appellants
City of Des Moines, Iowa; Dana Wingert, Individually and in his official capacity
as Chief of Police for the Des Moines, Iowa Police Department
Defendants
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
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Submitted: September 25, 2024
Filed: March 6, 2025
[Published]
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Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Domeco Fugenschuh brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Des
Moines Police Officers Ryan Steinkamp and Brian Minnehan in their individual
capacities, asserting they violated his constitutional rights during a traffic stop.1 The
officers moved for summary judgment, asserting they were entitled to qualified
immunity. The district court2 denied the motion in part, and the officers filed this
interlocutory appeal.
I.
On interlocutory review of the denial of qualified immunity, ‘“we accept as
true the facts that the district court found were adequately supported, as well as the
facts the district court likely assumed,’ viewing the record in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party.” Sterling v. Bd. of Trustees, 42 F.4th 901, 904 (8th Cir.
2022) (quoting Burbridge v. City of St. Louis, 2 F.4th 774, 779–80 (8th Cir. 2021)).
On July 6, 2018, Minnehan and Steinkamp were on patrol when Fugenschuh
drove past their car, sat up in his seat, and stared at them. The officers started to
follow him. Fugenschuh gave them the middle finger and held it up for eleven or
twelve blocks, before coming to a stop at a red light. Then, Fugenschuh signaled a
right turn and, with no other cars in the intersection, turned right and headed north.
After he completed his turn and exited the intersection, another car, also heading
north, proceeded through the intersection’s green light. The officers can be heard on
1 Fugenschuh raised additional state and federal claims against the officers,
which have either been dismissed or are otherwise not before us on appeal.
2 The Honorable Helen C. Adams, Chief Magistrate Judge for the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, by consent of the parties. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c).

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body camera footage saying that Fugenschuh cut off the other car because its driver
had to step on the brakes. They activated their lights and pulled Fugenschuh over.3
The officers proceeded to arrest Fugenschuh for, as they told him, cutting off
a car when he turned right at the intersection. In the course of the arrest, Steinkamp
pushed Fugenschuh against the hood of Fugenschuh’s car, and shoved Fugenschuh
into the officers’ patrol car.
Fugenschuh was later charged under Iowa Code § 321.311 with a “Turning at
Intersection Violation.”4 During an ensuing bench trial in Polk County district court,
the prosecutor amended the charge to failure to yield the right-of-way, in violation
of Iowa Code § 321.322(1).5 The prosecution did not admit into evidence any video
of the stop, and Fugenschuh, who represented himself, was not provided access to
it. The court found Fugenschuh guilty of the amended charge. Fugenschuh later
challenged his conviction, relying on the dash camera video he had obtained. After
viewing the video, the Polk County district court determined that Fugenschuh’s turn
caused “no actual danger or near collision or immediate hazard”; thus, the court
found that Fugenschuh was actually innocent of the violation and vacated the
conviction.
Fugenschuh then brought this § 1983 action against the officers in their
individual capacities, alleging that they violated his First and Fourth Amendment
3 The traffic stop, and Fugenschuh’s turn, were captured on both officers’ body
camera videos, and the patrol vehicle’s dash camera video.
4 This statute requires a driver to make a right turn “as close as practical to the
right-hand curb or edge of the roadway.” Iowa Code § 321.311(1)(a).
5 This statute requires drivers to “yield the right-of-way to any vehicle on the
intersecting roadway which has entered the intersection or which is approaching so
closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time the driver is moving
across or within the intersection.” Iowa Code § 321.322(1).

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rights.6 Relevant here, Fugenschuh raised claims for unreasonable search and
seizure, excessive force, and First Amendment retaliation. The parties filed cross
motions for summary judgment. The district court denied Fugenschuh’s motion and
denied the officers’ motion in part, finding that there were genuine disputes of
material fact about whether the officers violated Fugenschuh’s constitutional rights.
The officers appeal.
II.
“[W]e have limited jurisdiction to review” the “pretrial denial of qualified
immunity to officers.” Dunn v. Does 1-22, 116 F.4th 737, 745 (8th Cir. 2024). We
review the denial de novo, Humes v. Jones, 109 F.4th 1112, 1115 (8th Cir. 2024)
(quoting Martin v. Turner, 73 F.4th 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 2023)), but our jurisdiction
“extends only to abstract issues of law, not to determinations that the evidence is
sufficient to permit a particular finding of fact after trial.” Id. at 1115–16 (quoting
Langford v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445, 455 (8th Cir. 2010)); see Sterling, 42 F.4th at 904.
Qualified immunity consists of two questions: whether a constitutional violation
occurred; and whether the right violated was clearly established. See Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
The officers raise only two arguments we may consider in this interlocutory
appeal. First, the officers assert that the district court erred in its analysis of
Fugenschuh’s unreasonable search and seizure claim because, in assessing the
constitutionality of the stop, the court noted that the prosecutor changed the charging
instrument at trial from a turning violation to a right-of-way violation. The officers
rightly point out that their subjective intent to stop Fugenschuh for either violation
is irrelevant to this claim. See United States v. White, 928 F.3d 734, 740 (8th Cir.
2019) (noting that “the subjective intent of an officer cannot vitiate otherwise
6 Fugenschuh sued additional defendants who have since been dismissed.
Fugenschuh does not challenge these dismissals on appeal.

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objectively reasonable conduct”). But the district court determined that factual
disputes remained about whether the officers observed sufficient evidence to stop
Fugenschuh at all, and we see nothing to suggest that the district court impermissibly
relied on the officers’ subjective intent in denying summary judgment. To the extent
the officers contest the district court’s finding that there are factual disputes about
whether the officers observed enough to reasonably suspect Fugenschuh had
committed a traffic violation, that argument is beyond our jurisdictional limits. See
Estate of Nash v. Folsom, 92 F.4th 746, 755 (8th Cir. 2024) (“In qualified-immunity
cases, when the district court determines that disputed facts remain for a trier of fact
to decide, we lack jurisdiction to address the denial of qualified immunity in an
interlocutory appeal.”).
Second, the officers argue that the district court erred when it “abandon[ed]
the officers’ points of view” and failed to make inferences in their favor. But the
district court did not abandon the officers’ perspective in assessing the
constitutionality of the stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (analyzing
reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment claim based on “the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the seizure or the search”). And at this stage of the
proceedings, the officers are not entitled to inferences in their favor. See Sterling, 42
F.4th at 904 (noting that on appeal from denial of qualified immunity, we view the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant). The officers raise no other
arguments for us to consider on this claim, and we affirm the district court’s denial
of qualified immunity.
In the opening brief, Steinkamp raised, but did not develop, an argument
regarding Fugenschuh’s excessive force claim.7 See United States v. Gonzales, 90
F.3d 1363, 1369–70 (8th Cir. 1996) (declining to consider a “cursory and summary
assertion” that made “no specific assignment of error”). In any event, he appears to
challenge only the district court’s decision that factual issues precluded summary
7 Fugenschuh alleged that only Steinkamp violated his Fourth Amendment
right to be free from excessive force.

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judgment, and we cannot review that finding. Folsom, 92 F.4th at 755. Nor can we
review the denial of qualified immunity on Fugenschuh’s retaliation claim, because
the officers failed to provide any argument at all in support of reversal. See Milligan
v. City of Red Oak, 230 F.3d 355, 360 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding waiver where an issue
was “mention[ed] in passing” with no “argument or legal authority” in support);
United States v. Aldridge, 561 F.3d 759, 765 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Because the brief
does not support this assertion with any argument, this court deems the issue
abandoned.”). And, consistent with our usual practice, we decline to consider any
arguments raised for the first time in the officers’ reply brief. See Gatewood v. City
of O’Fallon, 70 F.4th 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 2023).
We affirm.
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