United States of America v. Darold Maxfield

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1001
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United States of America,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,
v.
Darold Maxfield,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
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Submitted: November 18, 2024
Filed: April 30, 2025
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, BENTON and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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COLLOTON, Chief Judge.
Darold Maxfield was convicted of theft of public money and making a false
statement or representation to a department or agency of the United States. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 641, 1003(a)(3). Maxfield argues on appeal that the district court* erred
*The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.

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by admitting certain evidence at trial. We conclude that there was no reversible error
and affirm the judgment.
Maxfield, a military veteran, was a supervisory veteran service representative
at the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. The evidence at trial showed
that Maxfield used his knowledge of the disability claims process and access to VA
facilities to submit a falsified disability benefits questionnaire. This submission
allowed him to receive a higher monthly veteran’s disability benefit.
A jury convicted Maxfield, and the district court sentenced him to five months’
imprisonment and one year of supervised release. The court ordered restitution in the
amount of $25,152.08.
Before trial, the government filed a notice of intent to introduce into evidence
a memorandum of reprimand that Leah Burris, Maxfield’s supervisor, issued to him
for exhibiting a “lack of candor.” In the memorandum, Burris stated that Maxfield
falsified time logs relating to a work trip by claiming that he had worked more hours
than were reflected by the global positioning system (“GPS”) in the government
vehicle that he operated. The district court excluded the memorandum on the ground
that it did not satisfy the admissibility requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b).
At trial, Maxfield testified on his own behalf. The government cross-examined
Maxfield about the memorandum of reprimand. The government also called Burris
as a rebuttal witness to contradict Maxfield’s account of the circumstances
surrounding the reprimand. Citing Rule 404, Maxfield objected to the government’s
cross-examination about the memorandum and Burris’s rebuttal testimony. The
district court overruled both objections.
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On appeal, Maxfield argues that the district court erred by allowing the
government to present “the very propensity evidence” that the court had deemed
inadmissible character evidence under Rule 404(b) when it excluded the
memorandum of reprimand. Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of a crime, wrong,
or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. Fed. R. Evid.
404(b)(1).
On cross-examination, Maxfield acknowledged that he had received the
memorandum from Burris in which she alleged his lack of candor relating to the trip
logs, but denied that he had exhibited a lack of candor. During redirect examination,
Maxfield testified that the allegedly excessive hours stemmed from a panic attack that
occurred while he was driving between his home and the destination. He further
claimed that when Burris presented him with the memorandum of reprimand, he
“tried to explain to her” that the discrepancy between his time card and the vehicle’s
GPS trip log stemmed from the panic attack. Maxfield also offered inconsistent
claims about when he was allowed to begin recording hours for travel: He initially
said that he was permitted to start when he left home, but later stated that he was on
the clock once he started to get dressed.
Burris’s account contradicted Maxfield’s testimony. Burris testified that when
she presented the memorandum of reprimand to Maxfield, he did not give her any
explanation for the discrepancy between his time card and the vehicle’s GPS trip log
and did not tell her that he had a panic attack while driving. Burris also said that
when VA employees log hours worked during official travel, the time starts when the
employee leaves the office, and employees may not log hours for time spent getting
dressed.
We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion. The challenged evidence
was not offered to prove Maxfield’s character in order to show that on a particular
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occasion he acted in accordance with the character, as prohibited by Rule 404(b)(1).
Rather, the disputed cross-examination was admissible under Rule 608(b)(1). That
rule provides that the court may, on cross-examination, allow inquiry into specific
instances of a witness’s conduct if they are probative of the witness’s character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness. Although the district court rejected the government’s
proposal to introduce the memorandum in its case in chief, the court properly
evaluated the issue differently once Maxfield elected to testify and his character for
untruthfulness became relevant. Burris’s allegation in the memorandum that
Maxfield exhibited a lack of candor is probative of Maxfield’s character for
untruthfulness, and was thus a proper subject of inquiry on cross-examination under
Rule 608(b). See United States v. McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 392 (8th Cir. 1985).
The rebuttal testimony was properly admitted to impeach Maxfield’s testimony
by specific contradiction. See United States v. Rojas, 826 F.3d 1126, 1131 (8th Cir.
2016); United States v. McClintic, 570 F.2d 685, 691 (8th Cir. 1978). Burris
contradicted Maxfield’s claims that he told her about having a panic attack while
driving and that he was allowed to log time for official travel once he began to get
dressed. While Rule 608(b) generally makes extrinsic evidence inadmissible to attack
a witness’s character for truthfulness, the rule “does not address the admissibility of
extrinsic evidence used to impeach a witness through . . . contradiction.” Rojas, 826
F.3d at 1131. Once Maxfield testified in a manner that left himself open to specific
contradiction by his supervisor, the district court properly allowed limited rebuttal
evidence on those points. The district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting
this line of questioning.
Maxfield next challenges the district court’s ruling to permit the government
to elicit opinion and reputation testimony about Maxfield’s character for truthfulness
from Burris and another witness, James McLean. Under Rule 608(a), “[a] witness’s
credibility may be attacked or supported by testimony about the witness’s reputation
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for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form
of an opinion about that character.” Fed. R. Evid. 608(a).
When asked for her opinion on Maxfield’s truthfulness, Burris stated, “I do not
believe he’s very truthful.” Burris also testified that Maxfield’s reputation among his
coworkers was that “he’s not truthful.” McLean, who worked with Maxfield for four
years, testified that in his opinion, Maxfield “has no problem lying.” McLean also
said that the VA personnel who had worked with Maxfield “probably know he bend
the truth.” These statements from Burris and McLean fall within the ambit of Rule
608(a), so the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the government
to elicit this testimony. See United States v. McMurray, 20 F.3d 831, 834 (8th Cir.
1994).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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