United States of America v. Jerry D. Bedell, also known as D’Andre

24-1903Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit30 juin 2025

Texte intégral

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1186
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jerry D. Bedell, also known as D’Andre
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri
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Submitted: January 13, 2025
Filed: June 11, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before GRASZ, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Jerry D. Bedell challenges his sentence following his guilty plea for
conspiring to distribute fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)
and 846, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). In light of the government’s concession that

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it failed to provide evidence at sentencing to prove facts related to three
enhancements, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
Bedell’s conviction arises from a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
investigation of a drug trafficking organization. Bedell ultimately pled guilty to
conspiring to distribute heroin and fentanyl and knowingly possessing a firearm in
furtherance of that conspiracy. Prior to sentencing, Bedell objected to the drug
quantity calculation and the three recommended sentencing enhancements outlined
in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). Although Bedell personally sold
only approximately ten kilograms of fentanyl, the PSR attributed twelve to thirty-
six kilograms to him, which was the overall quantity of fentanyl involved in the
conspiracy. At sentencing, the district court overruled Bedell’s objections and
adopted the PSR’s drug calculation, resulting in an initial base offense level of 36.
The district court also adopted three separate sentencing enhancements
recommended in the PSR: (1) a 2-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12)
for maintaining a premises for distributing drugs, (2) a 3-level aggravating-role
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), and (3) a 2-level criminal-livelihood
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(16)(E). Additionally, the district court
adopted the PSR’s determination that Bedell was a career offender under U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1. Ultimately, the district court calculated Bedell’s total offense level at 40
and his criminal history at Category VI, resulting in a United States Sentencing
Guidelines Manual range of 360 months to life imprisonment.
We first address Bedell’s argument that the district court committed
procedural error in applying the three sentencing enhancements described above.
“We review factual findings at sentencing for clear error.” United States v. Foard,
108 F.4th 729, 736 (8th Cir. 2024). “[S]entencing judges are required to find
sentence-enhancing facts only by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 736
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Norwood, 774 F.3d 476, 479 (8th
Cir. 2014)). “The burden is on the government to show a sentence enhancement was
warranted.” Id. Here, the government concedes it failed to provide evidence at

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sentencing to prove facts supporting the offense-level enhancements. The
application of the enhancements without evidentiary support was clear error.
In light of our holding regarding the enhancements, it is unnecessary to
determine whether the district court also erred when calculating the drug quantity to
establish the base offense level. Without these enhancements, Bedell’s adjusted
offense level would have been 36 if the district court’s drug calculation was correct
and 34 if it was not. Either way, Bedell’s total offense level would be the same
because he was determined to be a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) and
he does not challenge that determination on appeal. When the offense level
determined by the career offender table is greater than an otherwise applicable
offense level, we apply the higher career offender offense level. See U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1(b). Based on the statutory maximum of life imprisonment for 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A), Bedell’s career offender offense level would be 37. See U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1(b). Therefore, regardless of whether Bedell’s drug quantity calculation
should have resulted in an adjusted offense level of 34, as he claims, or 36, as the
district court found, the higher career offender offense level of 37 would apply.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s judgment and
remand for resentencing.
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