United States of America v. Dominique Holliday, also known as $SlickkRickk13

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1957
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Dominique Holliday, also known as $SlickkRickk13
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
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Submitted: January 17, 2025
Filed: June 23, 2025
[Published]
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Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Dominique Holliday pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute
fentanyl and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. Holliday appeals
his sentence, and we affirm.

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I.
Approximately every two weeks from April through December 2021,
Holliday shipped between 200 and 300 fentanyl pills from Arizona, where he was
living, to a person named C.K. in Iowa. On December 9, C.K. sold ten pills he bought
from Holliday to A.R., who then took them and overdosed later that day. Emergency
personnel arrived and administered Narcan, and A.R. became responsive. The next
day, C.K. sold A.R. another ten fentanyl pills from the supply he obtained from
Holliday, A.R. overdosed after taking some of the pills, and emergency personnel
revived her with Narcan. Ten days later, law enforcement executed a search warrant
on C.K.’s residence and found 790 fentanyl pills, all of which he had purchased from
Holliday.
Holliday was charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute fentanyl, 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846, and one count of conspiracy to commit
money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). He pleaded guilty to both counts without a
plea agreement.1
At sentencing, Holliday objected to the PSR’s failure to recommend his
eligibility for relief under the safety-valve. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)–(5)
(identifying requirements that, if met, permit the court to impose a sentence below
the statutory minimum sentence); USSG §§ 2D1.1(b)(18) (providing for two-level
reduction in offense level if safety-valve requirements are met), 5C1.2(a). The
district court overruled the objection and calculated his Guidelines range at 87 to
108 months. Holliday moved for a downward variance to the 60-month mandatory
minimum sentence. The government moved for an upward departure under USSG
§ 5K2.2 because the offense resulted in “significant physical injury” or,
alternatively, an upward variance, and requested a 121-month sentence. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).
1 The parties dispute whether Holliday waived his right to appeal. Because we
affirm on the merits, we need not address this issue.

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The district court2 sentenced Holliday to 87 months’ imprisonment followed
by a five-year term of supervised release. Holliday appeals.
II.
Holliday argues that the district court erred in determining he was ineligible
for safety-valve relief. We review the district court’s “application of the Guidelines
de novo,” United States v. Hansen, 111 F.4th 863, 870 (8th Cir. 2024), and its
“factual findings as to safety-valve eligibility for clear error,” United States v.
McVay, 996 F.3d 845, 848 (8th Cir. 2021). “The defendant bears the burden to show
that he has satisfied the criteria for safety-valve relief.” Id.
To qualify for safety-valve relief, a defendant’s offense must not have
“result[ed] in death or serious bodily injury to any person.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); see
also USSG § 5C1.2(a)(3). Holliday does not contest that an overdose qualifies as
“serious bodily injury.” Rather, he argues that the evidence failed to establish a
“direct chain of custody” between the fentanyl pills he distributed to C.K. and those
that A.R. ingested. But Holliday did not object to the information in the PSR stating
that A.R. overdosed after taking fentanyl she bought from C.K., and that C.K. had
purchased the fentanyl from Holliday. As we have explained, “unless a defendant
objects to a specific factual allegation contained in the PSR, the court may accept
that fact as true for sentencing purposes.” United States v. Razo-Guerra, 534 F.3d
970, 975 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Moser, 168 F.3d 1130, 1132 (8th
Cir. 1999)). The district court did not clearly err in finding Holliday ineligible for
safety-valve relief based on the unobjected-to information in the PSR.
Holliday also challenges his sentence, arguing that it is “greater than necessary
to achieve the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” He points to several accomplishments
he has achieved in life, despite having had a difficult childhood, including success
2 The Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
the Northern District of Iowa.

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in high school, his “ability to work hard,” and his dedication to his daughter. He also
underscores the fact that he voluntarily “stepped away” from selling drugs, long
before he was indicted.
The district court considered these factors, noting Holliday had a “troubled
childhood” yet he later “graduated from high school with a very good GPA” and
“has been gainfully employed.” The court also recognized that Holliday “cease[d]
his own involvement in drug distribution on his own before he had contact with law
enforcement.” The court placed significant weight on the dangers of distributing
fentanyl—a drug it called “a poison” and that it noted Holliday was selling “just for
the money”—and on A.R.’s overdoses. And it found that Holliday’s role in the
overdoses warranted an upward departure under § 5K2.2 or, alternatively, an upward
variance. See USSG § 5K2.2 (“If significant physical injury resulted, the court may
increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range.”). But Holliday’s
voluntary choice to “step away from” his criminal conduct “on his own,” as well as
his ability to demonstrate in the following two years before he was indicted “that he
c[ould] lead a law-abiding life,” were significant in the court’s decision to ultimately
“vary downward” to a sentence lower than it otherwise would have imposed. We
discern no abuse of discretion. See United States v. Neri, 73 F.4th 984, 989 (8th Cir.
2023) (explaining that simply “disagree[ing] with how the district court chose to
weigh the § 3553(a) factors” does not “demonstrate an abuse of discretion”); see also
United States v. Anderson, 90 F.4th 1226, 1227 (8th Cir. 2024) (“A district court has
wide latitude in weighing relevant factors, including discretion to assign more
weight to the offense’s nature and circumstances than to the defendant’s ‘mitigating
personal characteristics.’” (quoting United States v. Frenchone One Horn, 62 F.4th
461, 463 (8th Cir. 2023))).
We affirm.
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