United States of America v. Laguerre Payen

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1166
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Laguerre Payen
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield
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Submitted: January 16, 2025
Filed: July 18, 2025
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Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Laguerre Payen, a federal inmate whose sentence was about to expire, appeals
the district court1 order under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 committing him to the custody of the
1The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendation of the
Honorable Willie J. Epps, Jr., Chief United States Magistrate Judge for the Western
District of Missouri.

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Attorney General for involuntary hospitalization. After holding the hearing required
by § 4246(c), the court found “by clear and convincing evidence that [Payen] is
presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release
would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage
to property of another.” § 4246(d). Payen argues the district court erred because it
relied on erroneous facts and the government failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that his release would cause a substantial risk of bodily injury or serious
damage to property. Reviewing the district court’s finding of dangerousness for clear
error, we affirm. See United States v. Steil, 916 F.2d 485, 487-88 (8th Cir.1990)
(standard of review) (citations omitted).2
I. Background
In October 2010, a Southern District of New York jury convicted Payen, a
native of Haiti, of conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, attempting to use
weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles,
attempting to acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles, and conspiracy to kill officers and
employees of the United States. In 2011, the district court sentenced Payen to the
mandatory minimum 25 years imprisonment.
By 2015, Payen had an extensive history of disruptive, dangerous, and
assaultive behavior in prison, committing dozens of Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
violations, many for assault, threatening bodily harm, destroying property, possessing
a dangerous weapon, and sexual misconduct. He was transferred to the United States
Penitentiary in Tucson, Arizona, where he was uncooperative, unwilling to take
medication, catatonic, and unable to attend to his hygiene. In February 2016, he was
2For decades, this court and other circuits have used the term finding of
dangerousness “to refer to the . . . statute’s somewhat awkwardly phrased double-
negative [substantial risk] standard.” United States v. Gilgert, 314 F.3d 506, 512 n.3
(10th Cir. 2002). It is the statutory standard that of course must be satisfied.
-2-

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transferred to the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield,
Missouri (USMCFP) for a mental health assessment. There, he was sexually
inappropriate to female staff, aggressive, confused, psychotic, and suicidal. Payen
objected to inpatient treatment. Clinical Psychologist Elizabeth Tyner diagnosed him
with schizophrenia and mild intellectual disability and requested commitment
proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 4245.3 The district court for the Western District of
Missouri granted the government’s motion and involuntarily committed Payen for
hospital care and treatment. Payen’s behavior improved, and the district court
terminated § 4245 commitment in October 2017.
After his commitment terminated, Payen refused continued psychiatric
medication. He became psychotic and delusional, unresponsive, unhygienic, and
made sexually suggestive gestures to a nurse. USMCFP psychiatry services
determined that “involuntary administration of medication remains necessary.” On
March 5, 2018, the district court granted the government’s second § 4245 petition.
In December 2019, Payen arrived at USMCFP’s Transitional Care Unit, where
he was counseled numerous times, cited for stalking, and twice found guilty of
inappropriate sexual behavior. From March to August of 2021, he declined most
treatment, became defensive, rude, swore at staff, and engaged in rule-breaking
behavior such as being in another inmate’s cell and possessing pornography. His
health and behavior significantly improved in 2022 and 2023, but he was inconsistent
3Section 4245 provides that “[i]f a person serving a sentence of imprisonment
objects . . . to being transferred to a suitable facility for care or treatment, . . . the
Government, at the request of the director of the facility in which the person is
imprisoned, may file a motion with the court . . . in which the facility is located for
a hearing on the present mental condition of the person. The court shall grant the
motion if there is reasonable cause to believe that the person may presently be
suffering from a mental disease or defect for the treatment of which he is in need of
custody for care or treatment in a suitable facility.”
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in adhering to appropriate boundaries and rules and had little insight regarding past
commitment and mental health treatment. He remained committed until the end of
incarceration in 2023.
In July 2023, the Southern District of New York, ruling on Payen’s 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) compassionate release motion, reduced his sentence to time served
plus 90 days. United States v. Williams, No. 09 CR 558 (CM), 2023 WL 4785286,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2023) (Williams Order). The Decision stated that “Payen . . .
should not be released from custody without being immediately transferred to some
sort of supportive housing in order to deal with his mental health issues.”
On August 31, in anticipation of his release, Payen was transferred to USMCFP
to undergo a risk assessment to determine whether he was suffering from a mental
disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of
bodily injury or serious damage to property of another, warranting commitment and
continuing custody. See § 4247(b).
The USMCFP Risk Assessment Panel (Panel), consisting of Tyner and
Forensic Postdoctoral Fellow Katlyn Hanson, thoroughly analyzed historical, clinical,
and risk management factors and recommended commitment, opining in a 19-page
Forensic Psychological Risk Assessment Report that Payen “currently suffers from
a mental disease,” specifically schizophrenia and intellectual disability, and that, if
he were released, there would be a “substantial risk of bodily injury to another person
or serious damage to the property of another” (Panel Report).
The government then filed in the Western District of Missouri a § 4246 Petition
To Determine Present Mental Condition of an Imprisoned Person, submitting the
Panel Report, a Certificate of Mental Disease or Defect and Dangerousness from the
USMCFP Warden, conviction and sentencing records from the Southern District of
New York, and documents showing that suitable arrangements for state custody and
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care of Payen had been sought but were unavailable. The court granted a motion by
Payen’s counsel for an independent psychological evaluation. Like the Panel, the
independent evaluator, Licensed Psychologist Shawna Baron, recommended
commitment, opining that Payen suffers from schizophrenia and mild intellectual
developmental disorder and that “[h]is risk for re-offense is directly related to his
mental illness (e.g., disorganization, delusions, paranoia) and leaves him at
substantial risk for harm to himself, others, and property at this time.”
Magistrate Judge Epps held a brief hearing. See § 4246(c). Payen admitted he
has “some type of mental disease” and testified he would continue to follow his
doctor’s treatment instructions and did not believe he would pose a danger to himself,
other people, or their property if released. Relying on the Panel Report, Dr. Baron’s
report, and Payen’s testimony, Judge Epps determined that there is clear and
convincing evidence “of a substantial risk to others or their property if Mr. Payen
were released” and recommended that the district judge “enter an order committing
[Payen] to the custody of the Attorney General in accordance with the provisions of
[§ 4246].” See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Payen filed a general objection to the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation. On January 9, 2024, the district court adopted
the findings and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Epps, noting that “[t]he experts
agree that [Payen] suffers from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his
release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious
damage to the property of another.” The court ordered Payen committed
under § 4246. This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
Section 4246 provides for the commitment of a person whose sentence is about
to expire, and who, because of a mental disease or defect, poses a substantial danger
to the public. See United States v. Thomas, 949 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 2020).
Our statement of what the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence
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to warrant commitment has varied somewhat over the years but was accurately
summarized in United States v. Dalasta, 3 F.4th 1121, 1125 (8th Cir. 2021):
[T]he statute requires the government to prove that the person (1) has a
mental disease or defect and (2) will be dangerous (“would create a
substantial risk of bodily injury or serious property damage”) if released.
In addition, the government must prove that there is “a direct causal
nexus between the mental disease or defect and dangerousness” and that
there is not a “suitable state placement.”
(citations omitted.) Payen’s appeal is limited to the second prong. He argues that (i)
the government failed to meet its burden of proving dangerousness by clear and
convincing evidence and (ii) the district court erred by failing to consider the totality
of the circumstances surrounding Payen’s BOP disciplinary record and strongly
conflicting evidence, the Williams Order.
A. Standard of Review. We review the district court’s finding of
dangerousness for clear error, reversing only if we are left with “a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Thomas, 949 F.3d at 1123 (quotation
omitted). The government argues Payen failed to preserve the argument that the
district court erred in not considering the Williams Order because he did not raise that
order in the commitment proceedings. Payen responds that the government was
responsible for failing to inform the court because it only attached the Southern
District of New York’s one-page order to its § 4246 Petition. We need not resolve
this rather silly squabble. Neither counsel advised us that the Panel Report lists the
Williams Order as one of its sources of information, meaning the district court knew
the Williams Order had been considered by the Panel in finding that Payen “meets
criteria for commitment under § 4246.” The issue was adequately if imperfectly
preserved.
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B. Was Dangerousness Proved by Clear and Convincing Evidence? As in
other § 4246 appeals, we have little difficulty concluding that the district court’s
finding of dangerousness is supported by clear and convincing evidence -- the
unanimous opinion of experts, including independent evaluator Dr. Baron, that Payen
suffers from a mental illness or defect as a result of which his release would create
a substantial risk of bodily injury or serious property damage to others; Payen’s
hearing testimony; and the other documents submitted with the § 4246(a) Petition.
Cf. United States v. Lewis, 929 F.2d 440, 442 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. S.A.,
129 F.3d 995, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1011 (1998); Steil, 916
F.2d at 488.
In making its finding of dangerousness, the district court properly focused on
the detailed Panel Report and Dr. Baron’s independent report. The Panel Report was
prepared using observations and examinations, Payen’s self-report, and a variety of
records including reports prepared in anticipation of Payen’s § 4245 commitments,
the Williams Order, and BOP records. The Panel Report discussed Payen’s
upbringing, noting he did not graduate high school, was diagnosed with intellectual
disability, and began using illicit substances like crack, cocaine, and marijuana when
he was 15 years old. It then provided an overview of Payen’s criminal history prior
to the 2009 terrorism conviction: he was charged with petit larceny and possession
of marijuana at age 16; disorderly conduct at 17; attempted burglary and illegal entry
at 18; and attempted assault and intent to cause physical injury with a weapon at 20
when he shot two persons with a BB gun. The Panel outlined Payen’s 150 incident
code violations while in the BOP, noting that “[i]t appears that a significant portion
of these violations involved assault or threatening bodily harm.” It reviewed Payen’s
prior mental health diagnoses, which included schizophrenia, unspecified psychosis,
unspecified anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, intellectual disability, moderate
intellectual disability, and antisocial personality disorder.
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The Panel Report also recounted in detail Payen’s dangerous behavior while
in BOP custody. At USMCFP, he bit and spit on officers, defecated on the floor of
his cell, was sexually inappropriate to female staff, aggressive, confused, psychotic,
and suicidal. During the first several months of his second commitment, Payen
denied psychotic thought processes, resisted medication, and continued to struggle
with hygiene. His presentation and mood varied drastically; some days he was
catatonic, disruptive, or aggressive. He exposed his genitals to a nurse and made
sexually explicit comments and masturbated when the nurse confronted him about it.
Since entering BOP custody in 2009, Payen has been committed twice due to extreme
mental health and behavioral problems and cited for over 150 incident code violations
ranging from non-violent offenses like refusing to obey an order to violent, disturbing
offenses like assault resulting in serious injury, possessing a dangerous weapon,
threatening bodily harm, and making sexual proposals and threats.
The Panel Report then discussed the risk assessment analysis the Panel
conducted using the HCR-20-3, an instrument that looks to historical, clinical, and
risk management variables to assess a person’s future risk for violence, to predict
Payen’s risk of dangerous future behavior. The analysis explored historical risk
factors -- Payen’s history of violent criminal behavior before and during
incarceration; his chronic mental illness, uncontrolled when he was not involuntarily
medicated; his history of substance abuse and lack of stable employment. It
examined clinical factors -- Payen’s limited insight into his mental illness and need
for treatment and an unwillingness to take medication “when left to his own devices
both in the BOP and while in the community.” Finally, it considered risk
management factors -- he “does not have a sufficient proposed release plan. . . . There
appears to be no family or friends that would be a capable source of support for Mr.
Payen if he were to be released.” Payen’s “risk for violence only seems mitigated by
. . . involuntary psychiatric medications and placement in a highly structured
environment (such as . . . secured housing at USMCFP) . . . that is unlikely available
to him in the community.”
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The Panel diagnosed Payen with schizophrenia and mild intellectual disability.
The Panel Report concludes that “it is the opinion of the Risk Assessment reviewer
that Mr. Payen . . . meets criteria for [§ 4246] commitment . . . and inpatient mental
health treatment is recommended.
Dr. Baron’s report, prepared at Payen’s request, concurred with the Panel’s
assessment after interviewing and evaluating Payen and reviewing available records.
While Payen was cooperative and well oriented during the evaluation, he “did not
have a good understanding of his legal status or pending 4246 commitment, . . .
[spoke] of irrelevant topics for extended periods of time, . . . exhibit[ed]
suspiciousness regarding prison staff, . . . [and] seemed to have limited judgment and
insight.” Like the Panel, Dr. Baron discussed Payen’s upbringing, criminal and
substance abuse history, his 150 BOP violations, mental health struggles, and his time
in the BOP. Dr. Baron diagnosed Payen with schizophrenia and mild intellectual
developmental disorder. Using the HCR-20-3 to assess future risk for violence, Dr.
Baron concluded that Payen is of “moderate to high risk for re-offense in terms of
violent behavior” due to his violent history, lack of insight into his mental illness and
need for treatment, difficulty functioning when unmedicated, and lack of a plan if
released. Dr. Baron concluded that “there is no evidence to suggest Mr. Payen’s
mental status would improve, or even remain stable, if released to the community. . . .
[H]e has never taken psychiatric medications voluntarily.”
The district court thoroughly discussed the Panel and Dr. Baron’s reports and
Payen’s testimony. Based on the expert opinions, and Payen’s “lack of insight,
history of violence in the community and while in BOP custody, and extensive history
of severe mental illness,” the district court found that the government presented clear
and convincing evidence that Payen is presently suffering from a mental disease or
defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury
to another person or serious damage to property of another and therefore commitment
under § 4246 is appropriate. We find no clear error.
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As noted, we have repeatedly upheld a district court’s finding of dangerousness
when experts, including an independent court-appointed expert, unanimously agree
that the defendant is dangerous and the defendant fails to present conflicting medical
or expert evidence. We have also upheld a court’s dangerousness finding when, as
in this case, the record reflects a long history of “violent and aggressive behavior and
mental instability . . . an extensive history of drug and alcohol abuse . . . [and] a
reluctance to continue medication on [one’s] own.” S.A., 129 F.3d at 1000-01; see
also United States v. Ecker, 30 F.3d 966, 970-71, 970 n.7 (8th Cir. 1994). The record
before us is littered with evidence suggesting a genuine possibility of harm to other
persons or their property -- Payen’s extensive history of violence, improper sexual
behavior, severe mental health issues, lack of insight, multiple BOP violations, and
the experts’ multiple reports.
Payen contends the district court “clearly erred in failing to consider the totality
of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Payen’s BOP disciplinary record.” Many
violations are not described in detail and after 2020, his conduct drastically improved,
with fewer and less serious violations. But many of the 150 violations -- assault with
threats of serious injury, fighting another person, threatening bodily harm, possessing
a dangerous weapon, stalking, and sexual threats -- suggest a likelihood of future
dangerousness, particularly if Payen again fails to take or refuses anti-psychotic
medications. “[O]vert acts of violence are not required for a dangerousness finding.”
United States v. Williams, 299 F.3d 673, 677 (8th Cir. 2002). And improved
behavior, even if “coupled with a detainee’s minimal history of actual violence,” does
not require a finding that a person presently in custody is not dangerous. Dalasta, 3
F.4th at 1125 (quotation omitted); see also S.A., 129 F.3d at 1001. “A finding of
substantial risk under § 4246 may be based on any activity that evinces a genuine
possibility of future harm to persons or property.” Dalasta, 3 F.4th at 1125.
Payen also contends the district court failed to consider the full Williams
Order, which in granting compassionate release contained “significant and persuasive
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evidence that Mr. Payen, if released, would not pose a substantial risk of bodily injury
to others.” As noted, the Panel Report advised the district court that the Panel
considered the full Williams Order and nonetheless concluded that Payen should be
committed. This is hardly surprising. The Williams Order focused on Payen’s past
history and why the nature of his terrorism crime warranted a sentence reduction. It
did not assess Payen’s future risk of dangerousness upon his release. Instead, the
New York court kept Payen in custody for 90 more days and cautioned that he
“should not be released from custody without being immediately transferred to some
sort of supportive housing in order to deal with his mental health issues.” 2023 WL
4785286, at *14. On this record, the district court was not required to further
consider or specifically address the Williams Order. The court properly focused on
Payen’s future dangerousness, not the circumstances surrounding his past dangerous
conduct.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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