Karen Carroll v. Brunswick Corporation; Sea Ray Boats; Brunswick Boat Group

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1474
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Karen Carroll; Honor Carroll; Trace Carroll, As the Surviving Heirs and
Administratrix of the Estate of Shawn E. Carroll, Deceased
Plaintiffs - Appellants
The Estate of Shawn E. Carroll
Plaintiff
Lauren Wilken
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Brunswick Corporation; Sea Ray Boats; Brunswick Boat Group
Defendants - Appellees
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City
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Submitted: April 15, 2025
Filed: August 4, 2025
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Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.
In May 2020, a fire started in the engine of a recreational power boat (the
“Pajivo”) on the Lake of the Ozarks, causing an explosion that injured passenger
Lauren Wilken and killed passenger Shawn Carroll. This appeal concerns the
consequent suit brought by the Carroll family and Wilken against the boat designer,
manufacturer, and seller (collectively “Brunswick”) for defective design, failure to
warn, negligence, and wrongful death. After trial, the jury returned a verdict in
Brunswick’s favor. On appeal, the plaintiffs assert four district court1 errors. For
the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. Background
On May 2, 2020, Brent Solomon—the Pajivo’s primary caretaker—Carroll,
Wilken, and one other individual ended their day of boating on the Lake of the
Ozarks with a stop at the Bridgeview Marina to refuel. Once they had finished
refueling, Solomon briefly turned on fans that blow fuel vapor out of the engine
compartment but failed to raise the engine hatch to ensure gasoline fumes were not
present. Solomon then started the engine, triggering an explosion.
The Carroll family and Wilken sued Brunswick, alleging defective design,
failure to warn, negligence, and wrongful death. While the parties agreed that the
explosion occurred due to gasoline fumes in the boat’s right engine, they disputed
how the gasoline fumes got there. The plaintiffs faulted the fuel system design,
pointing out that the fuel fill hose, which fed fuel into the engine tanks, was bent.
They alleged that the bend caused the hose to weaken and crack over time, which in
turn allowed gasoline to leak from the hose into the engine compartment. For its
part, Brunswick asserted that the explosion resulted from a combination of failure to
perform critical maintenance and user errors on the day of the explosion.
1 The Honorable Brian C. Wimes, United States District Judge for the Western
District of Missouri.

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The plaintiffs retained J. Michael Hunter, a marine surveyor, to testify about
possible sources of fuel leaks and ignition that caused or contributed to the
explosion. Hunter had inspected three other Brunswick boats, which contained
cracks in the fuel fill hose. One of those boats—the Schroeder—had exploded in
2008, leading to litigation against Brunswick. In this case, the Pajivo’s fuel fill hose
was never recovered, but Hunter posited that cracks in the hose allowed gasoline to
leak into the engine compartment.
Prior to trial, Brunswick filed a motion in limine to exclude “[e]vidence,
[i]nference or [a]rguments regarding other [b]oat [e]xplosions,” claiming that
evidence of other boat explosions was “irrelevant, dissimilar, and would result in
confusion to the jury.” Specifically, Brunswick sought to exclude Hunter’s
testimony pertaining to the Schroeder explosion and Brunswick and Hunter’s joint
inspection of the Schroeder’s cracked fuel fill hose during the subsequent litigation.
The plaintiffs countered that the Schroeder explosion constituted admissible other-
similar-incident (“OSI”) evidence because the Pajivo and Schroeder were the same
model and the factual scenarios were substantially similar. The district court granted
Brunswick’s motion and instructed the plaintiffs that Hunter could “testify as an
expert related to the incident on this boat” but not about the Schroeder explosion or
Brunswick’s knowledge of the Schroeder’s cracked fuel fill hose. The plaintiffs’
counsel assured the district court that Hunter would not mention the Schroeder
explosion or subsequent litigation and would testify only that he discovered a leak
in the Schroeder’s fuel fill hose.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. During voir dire, Brunswick attempted to
strike the only two black venirepersons—Juror No. 13 and Juror No. 21. Brunswick
moved to strike Juror No. 21 for cause, alleging that he was sleeping during voir
dire. The district court denied that attempted strike, explaining that it had not
observed Juror No. 21 sleeping. Brunswick later used a peremptory strike to remove
Juror No. 13, explaining that her occupation as a registered nurse specializing in
oncology might unduly influence other jurors regarding doctors’ testimony about
predeath pain and suffering. The plaintiffs raised a Batson challenge, see Batson v.

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Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), arguing that Brunswick’s proffered reasons for
striking the black prospective juror were pretextual, but the district court denied that
challenge.
The parties called various witnesses over the course of an eight-day trial. As
relevant here, the plaintiffs called Hunter as an expert witness to testify about the
Pajivo explosion. Despite the district court’s order barring testimony about the
Schroeder explosion, Hunter testified that the Schroeder had exploded and that
Brunswick’s counsel had inspected the Schroeder. Brunswick immediately moved
for a mistrial, requesting in the alternative that the district court strike Hunter’s
testimony regarding the Schroeder. The district court did not grant Brunswick’s
mistrial motion, but it instructed the jury that Hunter’s testimony and evidence
related to the Schroeder “is excluded . . . and is not to be considered by you in your
deliberations.”
However, that was not the district court’s last intervention related to the
excluded evidence. During closing arguments, Brunswick’s counsel asserted that
plaintiffs “haven’t met their burden of proof for liability,” asking, “[where are] all
the other explosions.” The plaintiffs objected and requested the district court
“instruct the jury that we were not allowed to present evidence of other explosions,”
or that they be permitted to argue “[t]hat there have been other explosions of
[Brunswick] boats.” The district court denied both requests, but instructed the jury
to “disregard the last comments made by the defense attorney.” Ultimately, the jury
returned a verdict in Brunswick’s favor on all claims.
II. Discussion
On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the district court erred in denying their
Batson challenge. They also raise several challenges to the district court’s exclusion
of evidence and statements pertaining to other similar incidents.

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A. Batson challenge
We begin with the plaintiffs’ claim that the district court erroneously denied
their Batson challenge. We review the district court’s Batson determination for clear
error, see United States v. Johnson, 954 F.3d 1106, 1111 (8th Cir. 2020), reversing
if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court’s finding
is mistaken,” United States v. Swinney, 970 F.2d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 1992). To prevail
on a Batson challenge, the party opposing the strike must establish a prima facie
case of discrimination and show that the proponent’s proffered reasons for the strike
were a pretext for race discrimination. United States v. Maxwell, 473 F.3d 868, 871
(8th Cir. 2007).
The plaintiffs contend that they have established pretext because Brunswick’s
proffered reason for striking Juror No. 13 was unreasonable. We must assess “how
reasonable, or how improbable, [Brunswick’s] explanations” were and “whether the
proffered rationale [had] some basis in accepted trial strategy.” Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003). A venireperson’s occupation provides a
reasonable ground for a peremptory strike that has a basis in accepted trial strategy.
See Maxwell, 473 F.3d at 872 (upholding strike where juror’s employment made
juror more sympathetic to the opponent); United States v. Velazquez-Rivera, 366
F.3d 661, 666 (8th Cir. 2004) (upholding strike where the juror was struck, in part,
because she was a nurse). Here, Brunswick’s counsel reasonably explained that he
struck Juror No. 13 due to her medical background as an oncology nurse, which he
thoroughly explored during voir dire through questions about her medical
experience and whether her medical training might lead her to favor one side’s
medical testimony. Because this case involved a claim “that the decedent suffered
from predeath pain and suffering,” Brunswick’s counsel concluded that Juror No.
13’s occupation as a registered nurse specializing in oncology might unduly
influence other jurors regarding the doctors’ testimony about predeath pain and
suffering. Additionally, she might be unduly sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ side of
the case, due to her exposure to pain and suffering as an oncology nurse. Thus,

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Brunswick’s explanation was “reasonable” and “[based] in accepted trial strategy.”
See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339.
In addition, the plaintiffs contend that the strike was pretextual because
Brunswick did not attempt to strike a similarly situated white panelist—Juror No. 8.
See Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 287-88 (2019); Devoil-El v. Groose, 160
F.3d 1184, 1187 (8th Cir. 1998). But here, venirepersons 8 and 13 had a significant
and relevant difference: during voir dire Juror No. 8 stated he had worked for
General Motors and recognized the importance of owners performing maintenance
on cars manufactured by General Motors. Brunswick’s defense rested on the theory
that “no critical basic maintenance was done on this boat [in two decades]” and “no
fuel system inspection was ever performed.” Thus, Juror No. 8’s employment with
General Motors and statement during voir dire that owners should perform “critical
maintenance” indicated that he might attribute the explosion to a lack of maintenance
rather than a design flaw. Though both Juror No. 8 and No. 13 worked in medical
fields, Juror No. 13 lacked the employment history and views on maintenance that
made Juror No. 8 a favorable juror for Brunswick. See Groose, 160 F.3d at 1187
(upholding a finding that the proffered reasons were nondiscriminatory where
“Caucasian jurors sharing the same characteristics were not removed,” “because the
combination of characteristics was different in the non-stricken venirepersons”).
Juror No. 8 possessed relevant characteristics that distinguished him from Juror No.
13. See id. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in rejecting the
plaintiffs’ Batson challenge.
B. Similar Incidents
We now turn to Carroll’s remaining challenges, which all pertain to the district
court’s exclusion of evidence or statements pertaining to other similar incidents
(“OSI”). First, the plaintiffs claim that the district court erred by excluding their
evidence of the Schroeder explosion and litigation. “The decision whether to admit
similar-incident evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the district court
and we will not overturn the decision to admit OSI evidence absent a clear and

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prejudicial abuse of discretion.” Adams v. Toyota Motor Corp., 867 F.3d 903, 911
(8th Cir. 2017) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “There are no hard
or fast rules as to what degree of similarity there must be to make the evidence
admissible.” Henwood v. Chaney, 156 F.2d 392, 397 (8th Cir. 1946). Indeed, “[t]he
substantial similarity analysis is ‘case specific’ and fact-intensive.” Scott v. Dyno
Nobel, Inc., 108 F.4th 615, 632 (8th Cir. 2024). In general, the other similar
incidents must be “sufficiently similar in time, place or circumstances to be
probative.” Thomas v. Chrysler Corp., 717 F.2d 1223, 1225 (8th. Cir. 1983).
Additionally, courts may bar evidence of other incidents when the conditions of the
products are dissimilar. See, e.g., id. (affirming exclusion of other accidents where
the appellant failed to demonstrate that the vans were in similar condition).
The plaintiffs claim that the district court’s exclusion of the Schroeder
explosion and related litigation was erroneous because the boats, explosions, and
causes in the Schroeder case and this one were substantially similar. The boats were
the same model (albeit slightly different model years), had the same type of fuel fill
hose, routed the fuel fill hoses the same way, were on the Lake of the Ozarks, and
experienced an explosion at or around the time of refueling. But the plaintiffs failed
to show that the Pajivo and the Schroeder were in similar condition when the
explosions occurred.2 The plaintiffs offered no proof concerning the mileage,
maintenance, or the condition of the Schroeder when it exploded. Although the
plaintiffs are correct that our precedent does not always require parties produce proof
of “maintenance history,” that precedent confirms that the boat’s condition at the
time of explosion is relevant. See, e.g., Adams, 867 F.3d at 913 (requiring proof of
similar conditions at the time of the incident—namely, similar vehicle mileage).
2 The plaintiffs contend that Brunswick did not raise this argument in its
motion in limine. We disagree. In their motion in limine, Brunswick argued that
introducing evidence of boats with “unknown mechanical histories,” and “unknown
causes and origins of the fires/explosions” would prejudice the jury against it.

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Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion3 in excluding evidence of
the Schroeder explosion and litigation.
Second, the plaintiffs contend that the district court erred by striking Hunter’s
testimony during trial regarding the Schroeder as a sanction for Hunter’s violation
of its order. A district court’s imposition of a sanction for a violation of its order is
reviewed for abuse of discretion, Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991)
and is given “substantial deference,” Willhite v. Collins, 459 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir.
2006). To impose a sanction, the court need not find bad faith by the violating party.
See Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 745 (8th Cir. 2004).
We recently affirmed a sanction imposed by a district court where counsel
elicited testimony at odds with the district court’s orders on motions in limine,
amongst other conduct. RightCHOICE Managed Care, Inc. v. Hosp. Partners, Inc.,
109 F.4th 1054, 1060 (8th Cir. 2024). Here too, the district court acted well within
its discretion in finding a violation of its order and fashioning an appropriate
sanction. Hunter’s testimony violated the district court’s order by stating that the
Schroeder exploded and that Brunswick’s counsel had inspected the Schroeder. The
district court recognized that those comments violated its order but chose to sanction
with restraint. Instead of granting a mistrial, it struck Hunter’s testimony about the
Schroeder while still admitting his testimony and evidence regarding the other two
comparison vessels. Altogether, we detect no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s sanction.
Finally, the plaintiffs claim that the district court erred by precluding them
from introducing evidence of the Schroeder explosion as a remedy for the comment
during closing argument by Brunswick’s counsel. To constitute reversible error,
statements made by counsel in closing argument must be “plainly unwarranted and
3 Brunswick argues that the plaintiffs did not preserve this OSI issue for
appeal, and that therefore we should review for plain error. We need not address
this argument, because the plaintiff’s claim fails under an abuse of discretion
standard.

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clearly injurious.” Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 385 (8th Cir. 1992);
see City of Malden v. Union Elec. Co., 887 F.2d 157, 164 (8th Cir. 1989). We will
not disturb a district court’s ruling on comments made during closing arguments
unless the district court abused its discretion. Vanskike v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 725
F.2d 1146, 1149 (8th Cir. 1984). We review for an abuse of discretion because “[t]he
district court is in a better position to determine whether prejudice has resulted from
a closing argument.” Burroughs v. Mackie Moving Sys. Corp., 690 F.3d 1047, 1051
(8th Cir. 2012).
Here, even though Brunswick’s counsel’s comment—“w[h]ere [are] all the
other explosions”—may have prejudiced the plaintiffs if uncured, the district court
did take curative action. See Gilster v. Primebank, 747 F.3d 1007, 1011-12 (8th Cir.
2014). Following the comment, the plaintiffs asked the district court to “instruct the
jury to disregard his last comments.” The district court did just that, curing “any
prejudice that might have been caused by the comment.” See Harrison v. Purdy
Bros. Trucking Co., Inc., 312 F.3d 346, 353 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding similar
instruction cured any prejudice from counsel’s reference to pre-trial settlement
discussions in closing argument); Lockley v. Deere & Co., 933 F.2d 1378, 1388-89
(8th Cir. 1991) (holding court’s similar admonition to jury cured any prejudice from
counsel’s reference to a gross sale figure where court had informed counsel that such
a figure could not be used to show defendant’s current net worth). Therefore,
detecting no abuse of discretion, the plaintiffs’ final argument also fails.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
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