United States of America v. Elijah Lindell Wires

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2555
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United States of America,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,
v.
Elijah Lindell Wires,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern
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Submitted: May 16, 2025
Filed: August 1, 2025
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, SMITH and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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COLLOTON, Chief Judge.
Elijah Wires pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. See
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, in calculating an advisory guideline range, the

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district court* determined that Wires’s prior conviction for Iowa second-degree
robbery qualified as a crime of violence under USSG § 2K2.1. The court then
sentenced Wires to ninety-six months’ imprisonment. Wires appeals the sentence,
and we affirm.
After Wires pleaded guilty, the district court determined a base offense level
of twenty-two under § 2K2.1(a)(3). The court concluded that Wires committed the
offense of conviction after sustaining a prior conviction for a crime of violence. In
2021, Wires pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery in Iowa. See Iowa Code
§§ 711.1, 711.3. The court concluded that Wires’s robbery offense was a crime of
violence because it required “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another.” USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1). The court ultimately
determined a guideline range of seventy-seven to ninety-six months’ imprisonment
and imposed a sentence at the top of the range.
On appeal, Wires argues that the district court miscalculated his guideline
range because his robbery conviction does not qualify as a crime of violence. Iowa
Code § 711.1 provides:
1. A person commits a robbery when, having the intent to commit a
theft, the person does any of the following acts to assist or further the
commission of the intended theft or the person’s escape from the scene
thereof with or without the stolen property:
a. Commits an assault upon another.
b. Threatens another with or purposely puts another in fear of
immediate serious injury.
c. Threatens to commit immediately any forcible felony.
*The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa.
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Whether a violation of § 711.1 constitutes a crime of violence turns in part on
whether the statute encompasses a single offense that can be committed by various
means or multiple separate offenses. If the statute defines only a single, indivisible
offense, then a violation would not qualify as a crime of violence, because some
robberies by assault under § 711.1(1)(a) could be committed without using,
attempting to use, or threatening to use violent force. See Iowa Code § 708.1(2)(a),
(b); Mumford v. United States, 95 F.4th 545, 549-50 (8th Cir. 2019). But if the
statute is divisible into alternative offenses, then a violation of § 711.1(1)(b) would
qualify as a crime of violence, because it necessarily involves a threatened use of
violent force.
We reaffirm that § 711.1 is divisible into alternative offenses. This court has
explained that “the subsections of § 711.1 are alternative elements that define
different crimes, rather than ‘various factual ways of committing some component of
the offense.’” Golinveaux v. United States, 915 F.3d 564, 570 (8th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 506 (2016)); see Mumford, 95 F.4th
at 549. This conclusion draws support from State v. Johnson, 328 N.W.2d 918 (Iowa
1983), where the Iowa Supreme Court held that assault is a lesser included offense
of § 711.1(1)(a) but not of § 711.1(1)(b), because assault is an element of
§ 711.1(1)(a) only. Id. at 920; see also State v. Wilson, 523 N.W.2d 440, 441 (Iowa
1994) (“The essential elements of the robbery offense are (1) intent to commit a theft,
and (2) an assault in carrying out the intent to commit a theft.”).
Wires maintains that State v. Copenhaver, 844 N.W.2d 442 (Iowa 2014),
establishes that the subsections of § 711.1 are alternative means of committing the
same crime. Copenhaver held that the unit of prosecution for robbery is the intent to
commit a theft. Id. at 449. So if an offender intends to commit only one theft, then
he commits only one robbery, even if he takes multiple actions enumerated in § 711.1.
But “unit of prosecution” is conceptually distinct from elements of an offense. Smith
v. Garland, No. 21-6278-AG, 2023 WL 7147426, at *3 (2d Cir. Oct. 31, 2023);
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United States v. Rentz, 777 F.3d 1105, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 2015) (Matheson, J.,
concurring). Copenhaver may suggest that theft is an element of robbery, see United
States v. Brown, 73 F.4th 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 2023), but the decision does not
enlighten as to whether the enumerated acts in § 711.1(a)-(c) are means or elements.
In any event, Copenhaver was on the books when Golinveaux and Mumford were
decided, and there is no intervening Iowa decision that would justify departure from
our precedent. See Neidenbach v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 842 F.3d 560, 566 (8th Cir.
2016).
Wires argues alternatively that even if § 711.1 is divisible, the record does not
establish that he was convicted of a crime of violence. We review the district court’s
finding on this point for clear error. United States v. Thornton, 766 F.3d 875, 878
(8th Cir. 2014).
The district court concluded that Wires was convicted of violating
§ 711.1(1)(b). That subsection provides that an offender commits robbery if he
“[t]hreatens another with or purposely puts another in fear of immediate serious
injury.” Id. The district court relied on Wires’s admission in his plea agreement that
“I threatened the victim with or purposely put the victim in fear of immediate serious
injury.” There is no dispute that a violation of § 711.1(1)(b) is a crime of violence.
The statute requires either an explicit or implied threat of violent force. See State v.
Law, 306 N.W.2d 756, 759 (Iowa 1981).
Wires argues, however, that the record shows only a conviction under Iowa
Code § 711.1(1)(a). The written plea of guilty states that Wires was “charged with”
second-degree robbery “in violation of Iowa Code § 711.1(1)(a),” and the order
accepting Wires’s guilty plea states that Wires pleaded guilty to “Robbery Second
Degree in violation of 711.1(1)(a).” The sentencing order reports that Wires pleaded
guilty to § 711.1(3), a subsection that does not exist, so the post-plea record does not
clarify whether the conviction was based on § 711.1(1)(a) or (b).
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Faced with conflicting evidence, the district court did not clearly err by relying
on the factual basis set forth in the plea agreement. A guilty plea must be supported
by a factual basis. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b). Wires’s factual admission tracks
§ 711.1(1)(b) and its requirement that the defendant threaten the victim or place the
victim in fear of serious injury. There was thus a sufficient basis for the district court
to find that Wires was convicted under § 711.1(1)(b) rather than § 711.1(1)(a).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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