United States of America v. Shaquan Coffer

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-1635
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Shaquan Coffer
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Eastern
____________
Submitted: March 20, 2025
Filed: September 17, 2025
____________
Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, ERICKSON and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
____________
ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.
Shaquan Coffer pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). Over Coffer’s objection, the
district court applied a two-level upward adjustment to his advisory Sentencing
Guidelines range for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or bodily injury
to another person while fleeing law enforcement. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. Because
the district court’s findings and evidence in the record do not support application of

-- 1 of 10 --

-2-
the enhancement, Coffer has demonstrated procedural error. Since the district court
indicated it might impose a different sentence if an appellate court determined it
erred in finding the enhancement applied, we vacate Coffer’s sentence and remand
for resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on April 2, 2023, Cedar Falls Police Officers
responded to a 911 call placed by Coffer’s girlfriend. She reported that Coffer had
kicked her windshield while sitting in her car, ultimately cracking it. Officers
located the car, conducted a traffic stop, and smelled alcohol and marijuana inside
the car. After separating the two, Coffer’s girlfriend told the responding officers that
Coffer was “super drunk” and armed with a firearm.
As Coffer was standing outside the vehicle speaking to an officer, the officer
observed Coffer attempting to conceal something in the front of his waistband.
When the officer initiated a pat-down search, Coffer fled on foot into the city center
area of downtown Cedar Falls. Streetlights illuminated the area. During the chase,
officers saw Coffer reach into the front of his pants and then heard what sounded
like metal hitting concrete. Eleven seconds later, officers retrieved a Glock Model
48 that had been painted white on the driveway of a tax business. The gun was
loaded with a 19-round capacity magazine, but no round was in the chamber.
Another officer responding in a patrol car was able to detain Coffer after he ran into
an area that was fenced.
The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSIR”) prepared following Coffer’s
guilty plea did not include an upward adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. The
prosecutor objected, arguing the enhancement applied, as Coffer had “discarded a
loaded firearm as he fled in a populated area, creating the risk that the firearm could
accidentally discharge.” The PSIR writer noted the prosecutor’s objection, stated,
in her opinion, it appeared the risk created by Coffer’s conduct was not of such a
nature and degree to amount to a gross deviation from the standard of care that a

-- 2 of 10 --

-3-
reasonable person would exercise in the situation, and left resolution of this question
to the court.
Prior to sentencing, both parties submitted sentencing memoranda with their
arguments as to the applicability of § 3C1.2. At sentencing, the district court
received several exhibits from each party, including body camera footage of the
chase and information specific to the Glock’s “revolutionary SAFE ACTION ®
System.” The prosecutor argued that § 3C1.2 applied because “common sense” tells
a person that loaded firearms are dangerous and discarding a firearm with 19 rounds
of ammunition while running from the police in an area where it could be found by
any member of the public, including a child, is dangerous and amounts to a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise. Coffer
opposed application of the enhancement for several reasons, including: (1) as
depicted by the body camera footage, the area was not populated at the time; (2) the
gun was not discarded in a residential area or nearby a school or playground thereby
lessening the risk a child would find the gun first; (3) there was no attempt to conceal
the gun when it was discarded; (4) the gun was on the ground for 11 seconds before
officers recovered it; (5) there was no risk of accidental discharge due to the gun’s
specific safety-design features; and (6) a round was not chambered.
The district court considered applicability of § 3C1.2 a close question in this
case. The district court noted in situations involving only the discard of a firearm,
without other aggravating factors such as discharge of the gun, struggling with law
enforcement, etc., the cases typically focus on two factors: (1) the risk of accidental
discharge, and (2) the risk to the community if a member of the public finds the
firearm before law enforcement. The district court expressly found the first basis
inapplicable in this case based on the design of the firearm, which made accidental
discharge “highly unlikely.” In applying the enhancement, the court relied on the
second basis, stating that “discarding a firearm in public, wherever it is, creates, in
my view, a substantial risk of harm.” The court also noted the unique attributes of
Coffer’s gun that made it look more like a toy and be attractive to children—painted
white with a gold cross sticker on it. The court concluded, “Nobody acting

-- 3 of 10 --

-4-
reasonable in this society would discard a loaded handgun in a public setting. . . .
And so I find under these circumstances that when an offender discards a firearm in
a public location and it’s loaded, that that does create a substantial risk of death or
serious bodily injury to others.”
With the enhancement, Coffer’s total offense level increased from 19 to 21,
yielding an advisory Sentencing Guideline range of 57 to 71 months. The district
court denied the prosecutor’s request for an upward departure or variance and denied
Coffer’s request for a downward variance, ultimately imposing a sentence of 71
months’ imprisonment. The district court explained that a sentence at the high end
of the range was appropriate due to danger to the community and high likelihood of
recidivism. On the other hand, the court noted that it “might sentence [Coffer] to a
lower sentence if the Eighth Circuit finds that I was incorrect in finding that the
discarding of a loaded handgun is sufficient for that enhancement.”
II. DISCUSSION
Section 3C1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines provides that a
defendant’s offense level should be increased by two levels “[i]f the defendant
recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another
person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” The commentary
in note 2 to § 3C1.2 states that the term “reckless” is defined in the commentary to
§ 2A1.4. The commentary to § 2A1.4 defines “reckless” to mean “a situation in
which the defendant was aware of the risk created by his conduct and the risk was
of such a nature and degree that to disregard that risk constituted a gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in such a
situation.” U.S.S.G. § 2A1.4 cmt. n.1.
The burden rests with the government to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence each of the facts necessary to establish a sentencing enhancement. United
States v. Campos, 79 F.4th 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2023). We review a district court’s
findings with respect to reckless endangerment during flight for clear error. United

-- 4 of 10 --

-5-
States v. Henry, 132 F.4th 1063, 1064 (8th Cir. 2025). Under clear error review,
reversal is warranted “only when the entire record definitely and firmly illustrates
that the lower court made a mistake.” United States v. Masood, 133 F.4th 799, 808
(8th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Bradley, 127 F.4th 1127, 1132 (8th Cir.
2025)). We apply de novo review to the district court’s construction and application
of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 806. Miscalculating the applicable Sentencing
Guideline range is a procedural error. United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461
(8th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
None of the underlying facts regarding the condition of the firearm, when it
was discarded, or where it was recovered by law enforcement are in dispute in this
case. The dispute centers on whether the risk posed by Coffer’s conduct created a
substantial risk of serious bodily injury or death and amounts to a gross deviation
from the standard of care a reasonable person in the situation would exercise. Coffer
asserts the district court improperly increased his Sentencing Guideline range when
it interpreted § 3C1.2 to mean any time an offender drops a firearm while fleeing
law enforcement, regardless of other circumstances, he recklessly creates a
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. In the government’s view, the
district court properly applied the enhancement when it relied on the following facts:
the firearm was loaded, it was discarded in a public place where someone might
happen upon it, and its unique appearance made it especially attractive to children.
While other circuits have determined that discarding a firearm while fleeing
law enforcement alone is insufficient to support application of § 3C1.2, this Court
has not resolved that issue. Henry, 132 F.4th at 1064–65 (collecting cases and
declining to resolve the question due to the existence of other facts in the record
supporting application of the enhancement). In analyzing U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, the
Fourth Circuit found that to comport with the plain language of the guideline, the
facts must show “something more” than merely throwing a loaded firearm while
fleeing law enforcement. United States v. Shivers, 56 F.4th 320, 325–26 (4th Cir.
2022). The Tenth Circuit has reached the same conclusion. United States v. Zamora,
97 F.4th 1202, 1212 & n.8 (10th Cir. 2024) (noting the court has “long assumed” the

-- 5 of 10 --

-6-
facts must show something more than mere instinctive armed flight). We find these
cases persuasive.
To warrant application of § 3C1.2, evidence supporting a substantial risk of
death or serious bodily injury to another person must be more than speculative. See
Shivers, 56 F.4th at 326 (determining that the government failed to meet its burden
when the gun was discarded in view of a police officer within an established
perimeter, there was no evidence the gun could have gone unnoticed by the officer,
and there was no evidence of bystanders in the area who could have picked up the
gun); United States v. Mukes, 980 F.3d 526, 538 (6th Cir. 2020) (concluding the
record was inadequate to support the government’s theory that running from the
discarded firearm created a substantial risk of harm when there was no evidence of
any potential risk that a bystander might have come across the weapon during the
brief 2:00 a.m. encounter between the defendant and law enforcement).
Here, Coffer’s girlfriend informed responding officers that Coffer was armed.
An officer observed Coffer attempting to conceal something in the front of his pants
before he began to run. While running, there was enough illumination for officers
to see Coffer reach in the front of his pants. That observation was followed by the
sound of a metallic object hitting the pavement. Pursuing officers recovered the
white gun 11 seconds after Coffer discarded it. Coffer points out that when this
incident took place at 1:00 a.m., the officers’ body camera footage does not depict
the presence of others in the area. The government did not present evidence to rebut
this claim. In addition, given the evidence in the record regarding the gun’s unique
safety features, neither the district court nor the government relied on accidental
discharge as a basis for applying the enhancement.
This case is unusual due to the evidence in the record and the court’s finding
that accidental discharge of the firearm was not at issue. It is also unusual in that
there is a lack of evidence in the record showing “something more” than the mere
discard of a loaded gun. The district court erred when it determined that § 3C1.2
applies anytime a defendant discards a loaded firearm in public while fleeing law

-- 6 of 10 --

-7-
enforcement. “The Sentencing Commission promulgated § 3C1.2 in order to adopt
the view that mere flight from arrest was not sufficient for an adjustment, but that
flight plus endangerment was enough.” United States v. Brown, 31 F.4th 39, 46
(1st Cir. 2022) (internal quotation and citation omitted). As this Circuit’s cases and
others indicate, possession of a loaded firearm may be sufficient to establish
endangerment for purposes of § 3C1.2 if there are sufficient facts to show the
defendant’s conduct created a substantial risk—not a speculative risk—of death or
serious bodily injury to others. The government’s reliance on the possibility a
member of the public could have found the gun (but did not establish the presence
of bystanders) and characteristics of the gun that might make it more attractive to a
child is inadequate, as these facts demonstrate only a hypothetical or speculative
risk. The government did not satisfy its burden of showing another person was
placed at substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury when Coffer discarded his
gun while being pursued by law enforcement. The district court erred when it found
§ 3C1.2 applied.
III. CONCLUSION
The district court miscalculated Coffer’s advisory Sentencing Guideline
range. Because the court indicated it might sentence Coffer differently if § 3C1.2
did not apply, the error is not harmless. See United States v. Wardlow, 830 F.3d
817, 822 (8th Cir. 2016) (noting remand is required if there is a non-harmless error
in the Sentencing Guidelines calculation). We vacate Coffer’s sentence and remand
for resentencing.
COLLOTON, Chief Judge, dissenting.
Under the correct standard of appellate review, I would affirm the judgment.
Whether the defendant’s reckless act of discarding a loaded firearm in a public area
created a substantial risk of serious injury to others under USSG § 3C1.2 is a
question of fact. A district court’s finding of substantial risk is reviewed only for
clear error. United States v. Williams, 30 F.4th 796, 799 (8th Cir. 2022); United

-- 7 of 10 --

-8-
States v. Balzaldua, 506 F.3d 671, 675 (8th Cir. 2007). Therefore, a court of appeals
may not reverse unless the record “definitely and firmly illustrates” that the district
court made a mistake. United States v. Marshall, 411 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 2005).
After recounting that Coffer discarded a loaded gun while fleeing police at
night in a public setting, the district court found that “under these circumstances,”
the defendant’s reckless act created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury
to others. Although officers recovered the gun, the court found it “lucky” that “the
police officers did find it, did hear it hit the ground, did note to look for a firearm,
but many of those things could have gone the other way.” The court found that
Coffer did not make an effort to surrender the gun safely or intentionally discard the
gun in a lighted area so that police could find it. Rather, the court found that Coffer
“was struggling to get the gun out of his pants and finally threw it when he finally
got it out of his pants.” Implicit in the district court’s ruling is the suggestion that if
Coffer had intentionally facilitated recovery of the weapon by police, then the
adjustment based on substantial risk to others may well have been inapplicable. The
district court’s ruling was tied to the facts of this case, and the court unfairly
attributes to the district court a blanket determination “that § 3C1.2 applies anytime
a defendant discards a loaded firearm in public while fleeing law enforcement.”
Ante, at 6-7.
On these facts, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Coffer’s
reckless act created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to others.
When Coffer discarded the loaded gun, there was no guarantee that police would
recover it promptly. This is not a situation like that in United States v. Shivers, 56
F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2022), where the defendant discarded a gun “in view of a police
officer within an established perimeter,” so that no reasonable factfinder could have
inferred a substantial risk to others. Id. at 326. Coffer discarded his gun in an
unrestricted public area, and it was serendipitous that police recovered the weapon
immediately. The incident occurred at the end of a Saturday night in downtown
Cedar Falls. It was not unreasonable to infer a substantial risk that a passerby could

-- 8 of 10 --

-9-
have happened upon the loaded gun if police continued to chase Coffer without
seizing the weapon.
The court’s conclusion to the contrary appears to rest on its overstatement of
the district court’s ruling and two more analytical errors. First, the court fails to
apply the “clear error” standard of review dictated by our precedent. Determining
only that the district court “erred” under de novo review, the court substitutes its
own appellate finding of insubstantial risk for the district court’s assessment.
Second, the court purports to adopt a legal standard from other circuits but
mischaracterizes the cited decisions. As the court would have it, the sentencing
guidelines require the government to prove “something more” than a defendant’s
discard of a loaded weapon in a public area in order to show a substantial risk of
death or serious bodily injury to others. But the cited authorities say something quite
different.
Some courts have said that the government must show “something more” than
instinctive armed flight to establish reckless endangerment under USSG § 3C1.2.
See Shivers, 56 F.4th at 326 (“[W]e have required ‘something more’ than mere
instinctive armed flight.”); United States v. Zamora, 97 F.4th 1202, 1210 (10th Cir.
2024) (explaining that Shivers “held what we have long assumed—that the facts
must show ‘something more’ than mere instinctive armed flight to support
§ 3C1.2.”) (internal quotation omitted); cf. United States v. Henry, 132 F.4th 1063,
1064 (8th Cir. 2025) (“This court has not decided whether possessing a firearm
during flight is alone sufficient to support the § 3C1.2 enhancement.”). But of course
this case involved more than instinctive armed flight: the defendant, while fleeing,
jettisoned the firearm in a public area. The question is not whether there is
“something more,” but whether the circumstances surrounding Coffer’s discard of
the loaded firearm support a finding of substantial risk to others.
For the reasons discussed, under the circumstances here, the district court did
not clearly err in finding that Coffer’s reckless act of discarding a loaded firearm in

-- 9 of 10 --

-10-
a public area created a substantial risk of death or serious injury to others. I would
therefore affirm the judgment.
______________________________

-- 10 of 10 --