United States of America v. Zachary James Flaherty

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-2257
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Zachary James Flaherty
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
____________
Submitted: September 15, 2025
Filed: December 12, 2025
[Unpublished]
____________
Before SMITH, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
____________
PER CURIAM.
Zachary Flaherty pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1343, and separately to one count of criminal contempt, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 401(3). The district court1 sentenced Flaherty to a total of 228 months’
1 The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of Iowa.

-- 1 of 6 --

-2-
imprisonment followed by a supervised release term of three years. Flaherty now
challenges the substantive reasonableness of his wire fraud sentence. We affirm.
Flaherty worked as an insurance producer for 17 years and throughout all 17
years, Flaherty stole money from over 30 victims. Through his fraudulent scheme,
Flaherty stole at least $3.1 million from his victims. Flaherty received checks from
the victims, representing that he would invest the funds. Instead, he would deposit
the checks into his personal account and use the money for his own bills, taxes,
travel, clothing, and other personal uses.
Even after Flaherty was caught and pleaded guilty to wire fraud, he continued
his fraudulent scheme and violated court orders. He submitted false sworn
statements to the court. He violated the district court’s no-contact order by
continuing indirect contact with two victims. He also violated the district court’s
protective order prohibiting him from attempting to sell certain assets that would be
used to repay victims. Due to these post-plea actions, Flaherty began his sentencing
hearing by pleading guilty to criminal contempt.
Following his plea at sentencing, the district court found that the appropriate
Guidelines range was between 168 to 210 months’ imprisonment, plus 6 months’
imprisonment for criminal contempt. This sentencing range included his base wire
fraud offense, which was increased based on the loss amount and the number of
victims. There were also increases because Flaherty received more than $1 million
in gross receipts from financial institutions, knew or should have known that these
were vulnerable victims, abused a position of power, and obstructed justice. Flaherty
objected to these increases, but the court overruled his objections to those
calculations. The court also considered over a dozen victim impact statements from
Flaherty’s victims.
In addition to these Guidelines increases, the court also found that the
Guidelines did not adequately address some aspects of Flaherty’s conduct. For
instance, the Guidelines did not account for the length of time that Flaherty’s fraud

-- 2 of 6 --

-3-
occurred, the excessive fees and charges that Flaherty took from the victims, and
that Flaherty’s entire livelihood centered around this fraud. The court also
considered Flaherty’s “incorrigibility” and noted that this conduct continued despite
interventions from the insurance companies and family members. To account for
these factors, the district court varied upward by 12 months on the wire fraud charge
and imposed a total sentence of 228 months’ imprisonment—222 months for the
wire fraud charge and 6 months for the criminal contempt charge.
First, Flaherty contends that “the district court committed procedural error
when sentencing him and that his total 228-month sentence was substantively
unreasonable as premised upon 222 months for Count 15.” Appellant’s Br. 3. He
does not further elaborate.
Procedural error includes failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory,
failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any
deviation from the Guidelines range.
United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citation
modified). We conclude that the district court correctly calculated the Guidelines
range. Flaherty does not dispute any of the facts on which the court relied. He also
does not argue that the court failed to adequately explain the sentence. On this
record, we discern no procedural error.
Next, Flaherty argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. We
review “the substantive reasonableness of [an] above-Guidelines sentence . . . under
a ‘deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” United States v. Cutler, 87 F.4th 893,
896 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461). A district court abuses its
discretion when it “fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received
significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or
considers only appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a clear error of

-- 3 of 6 --

-4-
judgment by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice
dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Fiorito, 640 F.3d 338, 352 (8th
Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005)). “It
is ‘the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within,
above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable.’”
Cutler, 87 F.4th at 896 (quoting Feemster, 572 F.3d at 464).
Flaherty argues that the district court took a “global approach to weighing
aggravating factors and fail[ed] to or insufficiently weigh[ed] mitigating factors.”
Appellant’s Br. 14. He contends that the district court ignored that Flaherty learned
these fraudulent ways from his father and “fail[ed] to understand the impact
excessive use of alcohol had on his global decision-making.” Id. He also challenges
the district court’s “victim impact-centric approach,” though he provides no
argument to show that this approach was improper. Id. at 12.
The district court varied upward by 12 months from the top of the Guidelines
range. It did so because the Guidelines range did not adequately account for certain
facts. These included Flaherty’s scheme targeting vulnerable victims. See Fiorito,
640 F.3d at 352 (“[A] district court may impose an upward variance based on facts
already included in the advisory sentencing guidelines where the advisory guidelines
do not fully account for those facts.” (quoting United States v. Jones, 509 F.3d 911,
914 (8th Cir. 2007))). Flaherty “challenge[s] [the court’s] victim impact-centric
approach,” Appellant’s Br. 12, but he acknowledges that courts can consider
“financial and emotional harm to the victims, and nature of the victim[s]
themselves,” id. at 11. The government says that “the court heard from over one
dozen victims or relatives of victims as it was required to do pursuant to the Crime
Victims’ Rights Act” but contends “that is not a ground for reversal.” Appellee’s Br.
13 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3771). The government is correct. As Flaherty acknowledges,
the court is allowed to consider the harm to victims in imposing a sentence. See
United States v. Scanlan, 65 F.4th 406, 409 (8th Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (noting that
“the harm to the victims,” among other factors, warranted a high upward variance).

-- 4 of 6 --

-5-
Flaherty acknowledges that courts have wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a)
factors, but he attacks the court’s weighing of those factors. Specifically, Flaherty
alleges that the court failed to consider certain mitigating factors. However, “[t]he
fact that he wished the court would have emphasized the mitigating circumstances
he presented over other considerations is not a reason to reverse.” United States v.
Ritesman, 817 F. App’x 299, 300 (8th Cir. 2020) (unpublished per curiam); see also
United States v. Farmer, 647 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Simply because the
district court weighed relevant factors . . . more heavily than Farmer would prefer
does not mean the district court abused its discretion.”).
Flaherty also contends that the district court ignored his “lack of prior criminal
history.” Appellant’s Br. 12. This is incorrect. The court noted that he was in
criminal history category I. R. Doc. 132, at 40. Further, in explaining the sentence,
the court emphasized that the Guidelines range did not account for the scheme’s
“length of time.” Id. at 93–94. It also discussed that Flaherty did not stop the scheme
when given the chance and was in criminal contempt of court. The court believed
that these factors justified an upward variance and countered his low criminal history
score. The court did not err.
Flaherty next argues that the district court failed to consider that his father,
like him, struggled with alcohol addiction, and that his alcoholic father collaborated
in this scheme. Thus, Flaherty says that the district court ignored that he “may have
learned” this behavior from his father. Appellant’s Br. 13. Similarly, he contends
that the court ignored that he has struggled with the “excessive use of alcohol” since
he was a child. Id. at 14. The district court considered Flaherty’s relationship with
his father but still found “nothing in the record about the defendant’s childhood that
suggest[s] any harm or experiences that could contribute to such conduct.” R. Doc.
132, at 95–96. The court also required that Flaherty abstain from alcohol
consumption, implying knowledge of Flaherty’s alcohol issues.
Flaherty argued in his sentencing memorandum that these mitigating factors
favored a downward variance. See United States v. Davis, 932 F.3d 1150, 1154 (8th

-- 5 of 6 --

-6-
Cir. 2019) (holding that a 63-month sentence, a 17-month upward variance from the
Guidelines range, was not substantively unreasonable because Davis presented his
mitigating factors to the district court, which found that aggravating factors “far
outweighed” the mitigating factors). “[T]he district court explicitly acknowledged
almost all of the mitigating factors that [Flaherty] raises on appeal . . . .” United
States v. Merrett, 8 F.4th 743, 752 (8th Cir. 2021) (finding that the sentence was not
substantively unreasonable because the defendant “simply disagree[d] with how the
district court weighed” his mitigating factors). Flaherty’s argument asserts no more
than that the district court gave less weight to mitigating factors than he would wish,
but he has not shown the weight given was unreasonable. See Ritesman, 817 F.
App’x at 300; see also Farmer, 647 F.3d at 1179 (“[R]egardless of some mitigating
circumstances, a sentencing court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in
each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an
appropriate sentence.”).
On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s 12-
month upward variance from the top of the range in its imposition of a 222-month
sentence for predatory wire fraud. The district court thoroughly explained the
sentence and discussed several reasons why a variance was appropriate.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s sentencing.
______________________________

-- 6 of 6 --