Thomas L. Sanderson, an individual v. Catherine L. Hanaway

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-3120
___________________________
Thomas L. Sanderson, an individual
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Catherine L. Hanaway, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the State of
Missouri
Defendant - Appellant
James Hudanick, in his official capacity as Chief of Police of the City of
Hazelwood, Missouri
Defendant
___________________________
No. 24-3204
___________________________
Thomas L. Sanderson, an individual
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Catherine L. Hanaway, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the State of
Missouri
Defendant

-- 1 of 11 --

-2-
James Hudanick, in his official capacity as Chief of Police of the City of
Hazelwood, Missouri
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeals from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
____________
Submitted: September 16, 2025
Filed: January 2, 2026
____________
Before LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
____________
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Thomas Sanderson challenged a Missouri statutory provision that required all
registered sex offenders, such as himself, to post a sign at their residence on
Halloween stating, “No candy or treats at this residence.” Concluding that this
mandate violated the First Amendment, the district court permanently enjoined its
enforcement statewide. Defendants appeal.
I.
Since 2000, Thomas Sanderson and his family have consistently set up large,
elaborate Halloween displays involving decorations, sound effects, and fog
machines. But when Sanderson was convicted of a sex offense in 2006 and ordered
to serve a term of imprisonment, those displays ceased. While he was incarcerated,
Missouri passed a law restricting registered sex offenders from participating in
Halloween:

-- 2 of 11 --

-3-
1. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections
589.400 to 589.425 shall be required on October thirty-first of each year
to:
(1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children;
(2) Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5
p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just
cause, including but not limited to employment or medical
emergencies;
(3) Post a sign at his or her residence stating, “No candy or treats
at this residence”;
(4) Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening
hours after 5 p.m.
2. Any person required to register as a sexual offender under sections
589.400 to 589.425 who violates the provisions of subsection 1 of this
section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 589.426 (2008) (Halloween statute). Upon his release from custody,
Sanderson asked the St. Louis County Police Department and, later, the Hazelwood
Police Department if he was required to abide by the Halloween statute, given it was
enacted after the date of his conviction. Both assured him that he had been
“grandfathered in” and thus could continue participating in Halloween festivities.
For the next fourteen years, Sanderson’s Halloween displays continued, and
they grew more extravagant with each year. But in 2022, Hazelwood police received
a call that a sex offender was participating in Halloween, and Sanderson was
consequently arrested, charged, and convicted for violating the Halloween statute.
The validity of that conviction is not before us. Instead, Sanderson brought a
facial challenge to the Halloween statute under the First Amendment, specifically
arguing that subsection 1(3)—the sign mandate—unconstitutionally compelled the
speech of all individuals required to register as sex offenders in the state. Just before
Halloween 2024, the district court found Sanderson was likely to succeed on the

-- 3 of 11 --

-4-
merits and entered a preliminary injunction. Then, after a bench trial, the district
court found the sign mandate unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction
preventing Defendants (the State) from enforcing it anywhere in Missouri.
The State appeals. Only subsection 1(3) of the Halloween statute is at issue in
this appeal.
II.
A.
“After a bench trial, this court reviews legal conclusions de novo and factual
findings for clear error.” Howard v. United States, 964 F.3d 712, 716 (8th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Kaplan v. Mayo Clinic, 847 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2017)). “Under the
clearly erroneous standard, we will overturn a factual finding only if it is not
supported by substantial evidence in the record, if it is based on an erroneous view
of the law, or if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that an error was
made.” Id. (quoting Roemmich v. Eagle Eye Dev., LLC, 526 F.3d 343, 353 (8th Cir.
2008)). “There is a strong presumption that the factual findings are correct.” Id.
(quoting Urb. Hotel Dev. Co. v. President Dev. Grp., L.C., 535 F.3d 874, 879 (8th
Cir. 2008)).
That said, “[a]n appellate court’s review . . . is unique in the context of a First
Amendment claim.” Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 621 (8th
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284–85
(1964)). In First Amendment cases, the court must “make an independent
examination of the whole record,” which is “not necessarily a de novo review of all
the facts relevant to the ultimate judgment entered.” Id. (first quoting Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 285; and then citing Fams. Achieving Indep. and Respect v. Neb. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 111 F.3d 1408, 1411 (8th Cir. 1997)). Accordingly, facts irrelevant to
the free speech issue are reviewed for clear error, whereas the facts “crucial to the
First Amendment inquiry” receive a “fresh examination.” Id. (quoting Fams.

-- 4 of 11 --

-5-
Achieving Indep. and Respect, 111 F.3d at 1411). The court is not bound by the
district court’s determinations of the credibility of witnesses, but “we remain
cognizant that the district court is in the best seat to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses.” Id.
A facial challenge is successful only if “a law’s unconstitutional applications
are substantial compared to its constitutional ones.” GLBT Youth in Iowa Schs. Task
Force v. Reynolds, 114 F.4th 660, 669 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Moody v. NetChoice,
LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 718 (2024)). That analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we
“assess the [law’s] scope, which includes consideration of what activities by what
actors [does] the law[] prohibit or regulate.” Id. (citing Moody, 603 U.S. at 724).
Second, we “determine which of the [law’s] applications violate the First
Amendment.” Id. at 669–70. Third, we “must measure the unconstitutional
applications against the remaining provisions.” Id. at 670.
B.
The sign mandate has, in effect, one application: those required to register as
sex offenders, regardless of their underlying offense, must post a sign bearing the
phrase “no candy or treats at this residence.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 589.426.1(3). Because
the statute does not apply differently to anyone within the category of those required
to register, we need only consider whether that sole application violates the First
Amendment. See NetChoice, LLC v. Bonta, 113 F.4th 1101, 1116 (9th Cir. 2024).
C.
The First Amendment’s protection “includes both the right to speak freely and
the right to refrain from speaking at all.” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714
(1977) (citations omitted). In other words, compelling an individual to “personally
speak the government’s message” or “host or accommodate another speaker’s
message” contravenes the First Amendment. Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. &
Institutional Rts., Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 63 (2006); see also Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n

-- 5 of 11 --

-6-
of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 790–91 (1988) (“The First Amendment
mandates that we presume that speakers, not the government, know best both what
they want to say and how to say it.”). And “[c]ompelled statements of fact . . . like
compelled statements of opinion, are subject to First Amendment scrutiny.” Ark.
Times LP v. Waldrip as Tr. of Univ. of Ark. Bd. of Trs., 37 F.4th 1386, 1394 (8th
Cir. 2022) (en banc) (quoting FAIR, 547 U.S. at 62)); Riley, 487 U.S. at 797–98
(“These cases cannot be distinguished simply because they involved compelled
statements of opinion while here we deal with compelled statements of ‘fact’: either
form of compulsion burdens protected speech.”).
However, the First Amendment is not implicated when the speech “is plainly
incidental to the [law’s] regulation of conduct, and ‘it has never been deemed an
abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely
because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed.” FAIR, 547 U.S. at 62 (quoting Giboney
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)). For example, laws banning
the conduct of discrimination in the workplace would incidentally prevent the speech
of posting a sign that says, “Whites Only.” See id. (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 389 (1992)). Likewise, the Solomon Amendment, which explicitly
required law schools to allow the military to recruit on its campus, only incidentally
required the school to circulate messages about the presence of recruiters on campus.
Id. at 61–62 (“[R]ecruiting assistance provided by the schools often includes
elements of speech.”)
The sign mandate—the sole provision challenged here—is not merely
incidental to conduct: it explicitly requires registrants to post a sign bearing a specific
message. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 589.426.1(3). True, the other three provisions of the
Halloween statute regulate a registrant’s conduct. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 589.426.1.
But the sign mandate requires only speech (the posting of a sign with the
government’s message), not any other related conduct. Id. § 589.426.1(3). In fact, it
requires verbatim speech. See FAIR, 547 U.S at 62 (noting that unlike the laws at
issue in compelled speech cases, the Solomon Amendment “does not dictate the

-- 6 of 11 --

-7-
content of the speech at all”). Because the sign mandate (1) explicitly requires
registrants to speak the government’s message in the form of a sign at their residence,
and (2) dictates specifically what that sign must say, it compels speech.
In short, we agree with the district court that the sign mandate compels speech
and, thus, is unconstitutional unless it can survive strict scrutiny.
D.
The sign mandate will survive strict scrutiny only if it “furthers a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Miller v. Ziegler, 109 F.4th
1045, 1050 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340
(2010)). The district court found that “Defendants have established a compelling
interest in restricting certain conduct of sexual offenders on Halloween that satisfies
the strict scrutiny standard.” Neither party challenges that determination on appeal,
and understandably so. We therefore move directly to the question of whether the
statutory provision is narrowly tailored. In other words, is the sign mandate the least
restrictive means of achieving the government’s compelling interest? See United
States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
At trial, the State’s witnesses offered several justifications for the sign
mandate. Law enforcement officers testified that the signs were beneficial for
enforcement purposes because the signs (1) allow them to “be able to ensure that
there is compliancy,” (2) make enforcement of the Halloween statute more efficient,
and (3) provide an extra layer of protection for children.
The evidence presented, however, failed to show how the sign mandate
achieved these goals. The statute does not set any requirements for the size or the
location of the mandated signs. According to one law enforcement officer, a
registrant could put “a little itty-bitty [] Post-it [note]” on the door and still be in
compliance, so long as the note had “the correct verbiage.” Another law enforcement
witness confirmed that a compliant sign “could be as small as a postage stamp.” Both

-- 7 of 11 --

-8-
officers further testified that, under the statute, a registrant would still be in
compliance even if the sign was on the back door or inside the house. Even if a sign
could result in greater efficiency for law enforcement and heightened protection for
children, a sign that is not visible to law enforcement or trick-or-treating children
fails to serve either purpose.
The efficiency rationale was also premised on the idea that, with the signs,
officers do not have to exit their vehicles to ensure compliance with the Halloween
statute. But one officer testified that even if he does not see a sign from the driveway,
“that doesn’t necessarily mean they are in violation of [the sign mandate].” And
another agreed that officers “can drive by and see if the lights are on the house
without getting out of the car. . . . [T]he fact that a sign isn’t posted isn’t going to
make it more necessary for an officer to get out of their car[.]” Rather, “[t]he sign
simply allows [officers] to have that extra provision that [they] are checking the right
home.” Indeed, the Chief of Police testified that his officers still enforced the
remaining provisions of the Halloween statute when the preliminary injunction was
in place, and there was no evidence that the statute was more difficult to enforce
without the signs than with them.
Even when the signs are visible and legible from the driveway or the porch,
there was no convincing evidence presented that they add anything to advance the
goal of protecting children. One officer, based on her personal, rather than
professional, experience trick-or-treating, said that having the exterior lights off on
Halloween “means absolutely nothing” and that children will still approach the
house. A second officer testified that the sign mandate was necessary because, unlike
leaving lights off, the sign was “not ambiguous.” Yet this officer did not demonstrate
how any such ambiguity would put children at risk. Rather, she wanted parents “to
have a clear understanding that there is a potential danger at that location.” Given
the publicly accessible sex offender database, coupled with the remaining provisions
of the Halloween statute, this testimony likewise does not establish a specific need
for the sign mandate. In any event, the State’s sole expert, who testified to the
compelling interest by demonstrating that Halloween presented unique risks for

-- 8 of 11 --

-9-
grooming that could lead to future abuse, could not provide any evidence for the
claim that signs provide any additional protection beyond the other restrictions
imposed on registrants in the Halloween statute. There was no evidence to support
the idea that children would be at risk if there was no sign, so long as the registrant
complied with the remaining provisions of the statute (i.e., remaining inside the
residence, not giving candy to or otherwise engaging with children, and leaving
lights off). In other words, nothing in the record indicates that a child knocking on a
door that no one opens presents a risk to that child.
We agree with the State that narrow tailoring does not require “perfect”
tailoring. Here, however, there is insufficient evidence to support the State’s
assertion that the sign mandate is the least restrictive means of achieving its goals.
The record does not support the claim that, despite the remaining provisions of the
Halloween statute, the sign mandate is necessary to further the government’s
compelling interest in protecting children on Halloween. Accordingly, the sign
mandate burdens more speech than necessary and fails strict scrutiny.1 See
McClendon v. Long, 22 F.4th 1330 (11th Cir. 2022) (concluding that when a local
Sheriff’s office made signs carrying the message “NO TRICK-OR-TREAT AT
THIS ADDRESS” and placed them in registrants’ yards, the signs were compelled
speech and they were not narrowly tailored to the compelling interest of protecting
children from sexual abuse).
1 The State argues on appeal that the sign mandate was at least properly applied
to sexually violent predators. But the only evidence presented on the subcategory of
sexually violent predators was that, after release from civil commitment, they would
be required to abide by the sign mandate. No evidence was presented at trial that
sexually violent predators, once released, pose a different level of risk than any other
person required to register, despite the district court allowing the State to elicit such
testimony. Without any evidence in the record to suggest the sign mandate is
narrowly tailored to this subcategory, there is no basis upon which to conclude that
any “other application” of the law, presuming it existed, would be constitutional.

-- 9 of 11 --

-10-
E.
In the alternative, the State argues that a new trial is warranted because it was
improperly prevented from introducing evidence about Sanderson. We review a
district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Spotted
Horse, 914 F.3d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Chism v. CNH Am. LLC, 638 F.3d
637, 640 (8th Cir. 2011)). Even then, we will reverse only “when an improper
evidentiary ruling affected the defendant’s substantial rights or had more than a
slight influence on the verdict.” Id.
The State sought to introduce evidence of Sanderson’s “dangerousness and
sex-offense history,” but the district court excluded it on relevancy grounds. We
discern no abuse of discretion in that decision. Regardless, this evidentiary ruling
neither affected the State’s substantial rights nor had any influence on the verdict.
As an initial matter, Sanderson stipulated to the fact of his criminal history
and the admission of exhibits about his underlying conduct. Although the State also
wanted to introduce testimony from B.C., the victim in Sanderson’s underlying sex
conviction, her testimony would have been cumulative. As the district court
explained:
The Court: The actual facts are not at issue in this case. He was
convicted of the offense. That’s a part of the record. Move on to another
question.
[State’s counsel]: Yes, your Honor.
[State’s counsel to B.C.:] Understanding the Judge knows – or will
know, based on the evidence that’s been provided and agreed upon in
the record regarding the case that you testified in, I want to zoom out a
little bit now[.]

-- 10 of 11 --

-11-
The district court had at its disposal Sanderson’s entire criminal record, including
police reports and other records related to his case involving B.C. This evidence was
sufficient to support the State’s theory of Sanderson’s “dangerousness,” even
without B.C.’s testimony.
More importantly, even if the evidence had been admitted, it would not have
affected the verdict. That is because any evidence of Sanderson’s dangerousness—
either from B.C. or from the State’s expert, who never met or conducted an
evaluation of Sanderson—would have supported only the compelling interest prong
of the legal analysis. But, as discussed, the sign mandate failed strict scrutiny on the
second prong: whether it was narrowly tailored. Nothing about the unique risks
posed by Sanderson—or any other registrant for that matter—would have overcome
the sign mandate’s tailoring deficiency.2
F.
The permanent injunction in this case was entered prior to the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Trump v. CASA, 606 U.S 831 (2025). As a result, we vacate the
injunction and remand for the district court to consider the appropriate scope of
injunctive relief in accordance with that opinion.
III.
The district court’s ruling that the sign mandate in Missouri’s Halloween
statute facially violates the First Amendment is affirmed. We vacate the injunction,
however, and remand for further proceedings on the scope of relief.
______________________________
2 The State also argues that it was entitled to introduce this evidence to rebut
Sanderson’s testimony. But Sanderson testified about how the law applied to him
only for the limited purpose of establishing standing, which the State contested.

-- 11 of 11 --