United States of America v. Robbie Dean Fetters, also known as Robert Dean Fetters

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 25-1323
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Robbie Dean Fetters, also known as Robert Dean Fetters
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
____________
Submitted: November 21, 2025
Filed: January 5, 2026
____________
Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
____________
BENTON, Circuit Judge.
Robbie Dean Fetters appeals the district court’s1 denial of his motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Having jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
1 The Honorable Stephen H. Locher, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Iowa.

-- 1 of 6 --

-2-
In 2011, a jury convicted Fetters of being a felon in possession of a firearm,
using or carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime, conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine, and possession with intent to
distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) and
924(c)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 841(b)(1)(C) and 846. The
district court2 varied downward, sentencing him to 320 months in prison and five
years of supervised release.
In 2020, the district court denied Fetters’ motion for compassionate release
because he did not establish that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors warranted it.
In 2024, Fetters again moved for a compassionate release. He emphasized his
medical conditions—cirrhosis, esophageal varices, thrombocytopenia, diabetes, his
feeding tube with accompanying infections and stomach acid leakage, inadequate
nutrition that caused abrupt weight loss, a paralyzed tongue, chronic diarrhea, high
cholesterol, high blood pressure, hypertension, hepatitis-C, and Vitamin D
deficiency. He is in the Bureau of Prisons’ “chronic care clinic,” classified as a
Level Three inmate, between good-health (One) and most-serious-medical-needs
(Four). The district court denied the motion.
This court reviews the denial of compassionate release for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Sims, 87 F.4th 917, 919 (8th Cir. 2023). “The district court has
broad discretion in determining whether proffered circumstances warrant a reduction
in sentence.” United States v. Loggins, 966 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir. 2020); see 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (“the court . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment”)
(emphasis added). “A district court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of
law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” United States v. Robinson,
9 F.4th 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2021).
2 The Honorable John A. Jarvey, United States District Judge for the Southern
District of Iowa, now retired.

-- 2 of 6 --

-3-
The general rule against modifying an imposed term of imprisonment is
“subject to a few narrow exceptions.” Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526
(2011). By the First Step Act of 2018, prisoners may seek a reduction in sentencing
after exhausting administrative remedies within the BOP. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A); Loggins, 966 F.3d at 892. The defendant must establish three
conditions: “(1) ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ justify the reduction; (2) the
reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission; and (3) the sentencing factors under § 3553(a) support relief.” United
States v. Johnson, 2025 WL 1949738, at *1 (8th Cir. July 16, 2025). See also
United States v. Avalos Banderas, 39 F.4th 1059, 1062 (8th Cir. 2022) (stating
defendant “bears the burden to establish that compassionate release is warranted”).
Having a “terminal illness” is an “extraordinary and compelling reason.” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(A).
I.
Fetters argues the district court erred in using the BOP definition of “terminal
illness,” instead of the sentencing guideline’s definition. See BOP Program
Statement 5050.50 (2019) (defining “terminal, incurable disease” as having a life
expectancy of 18 months or less); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A) (defining “terminal
illness” as a “serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory,” but noting
that it does not require a “specific prognosis of life expectancy”).
The Sentencing Commission may promulgate general policy statements about
sentencing modifications under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C).
While this court has not decided the validity and applicability of the 2023
amendment expanding U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, it is proper for a district court to “deny
defendant’s requested relief anyway” when “the factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
[do] not warrant any reduced sentence.” United States v. Williams, 2025 WL
1672255, at *1 (8th Cir. June 13, 2025) (unpublished). See United States v. Rodd,
966 F.3d 740, 747 (8th Cir. 2020) (affirming a denial of compassionate release even
if the unamended guideline were not applicable because the § 3553(a) factors did

-- 3 of 6 --

-4-
not favor it); United States v. Vega-Figueroa, 139 F.4th 77, 80 (1st Cir. 2025)
(finding the amended guideline binding but concluding no abuse of discretion
because defendant was still a danger to the community under § 3553(a) factors).
This court need not determine whether the amended guideline is applicable,
because the district court did not ignore it. It found Fetters was not “per se ineligible
even though his life expectancy exceeds eighteen months.” The court thus
recognized that a “specific prognosis of life expectancy (i.e., a probability of death
within a specific time period) is not required.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A); see
United States v. Marcussen, 15 F.4th 855, 859 (8th Cir. 2021) (“the district court
properly looked to [the unamended guideline] as relevant but not binding in
determining that [defendant’s] health conditions . . . were not ‘extraordinary and
compelling reasons’ warranting a reduction”); Loggins, 966 F.3d at 892 (finding
district court’s consideration of factors outside the unamended guideline’s
enumeration proper). The district court had broad discretion under either the BOP or
guideline’s definition of “terminal illness.” See Rodd, 966 F.3d at 747 (affirming
because “[t]he district court knew its discretion” rather than focusing on “whether
the district court erred in adhering to the [unamended guidelines]”). See also
Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 501 (2022) (district court not “required
to articulate anything more than a brief statement of reasons”).
It went on to properly exercise its discretion in concluding that Fetters’s
medical conditions fell short of the extraordinary and compelling requirement. The
district court acknowledged that “Fetters unquestionably has serious medical needs”
that “have worsened in recent years,” discussing in detail his medical conditions and
treatments. See United States v. Vangh, 990 F.3d 1138, 1141 (8th Cir. 2021)
(affirming because “the district court discussed [defendant’s] reasons in great detail,
including each of his medical conditions and the treatments he was receiving for
them”); Loggins, 966 F.3d at 892 (affirming a denial of compassionate release
because the court considered the defendant’s circumstances before finding them
insufficient). But it found his conditions “are not as serious as he claims, nor are
they so serious that the BOP cannot adequately provide care.” See Marcussen, 15

-- 4 of 6 --

-5-
F.4th at 858 (“Section 3582(c)(1)(A) requires a judicial determination of
‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ based on an inmate’s unique
circumstances.”); Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 501 (holding a district court “may, in its
discretion, dismiss arguments that it does not find compelling without a detailed
explanation”).
II.
Fetters believes the district court abused its discretion in determining that the
§ 3553(a) factors did not support compassionate release. This court reviews a district
court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors for an abuse of discretion. See Rodd, 966
F.3d at 747. “A sentencing court abuses its discretion under § 3553(a) if it fails to
consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives
significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the
appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.”
United States v. Kowal, 527 F.3d 741, 749 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Compassionate release can be denied after balancing the § 3553(a) factors
because it is “discretionary, not mandatory.” United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d
691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020); see Marcussen, 15 F.4th at 857 (affirming denial of
compassionate release even when the district court found extraordinary and
compelling reasons because “multiple § 3553(a) aggravating factors strongly
weigh[ed] against release”). District courts do not have to make specific findings or
“mechanically recite the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Rodd,
966 F.3d at 748. If the defendant advances “mitigating factors,” it is presumed the
district court considered them, which is all that is required to satisfy this court. Id.
Here, the district court found (citations omitted):
To the extent the Court is obligated to consider the § 3553(a)
factors, they reinforce the conclusion that a sentencing reduction is not

-- 5 of 6 --

-6-
appropriate. Fetters committed numerous violent and non-violent
felony offenses in the years after he was shot in 2001, including
convictions for: assault causing injury to peace officers (2002);
carrying weapons and third-degree theft (2002); third-degree arson
(2005); assault (2005); carrying concealed weapons (2005); assault
(2005); carrying weapons and going armed with a knife blade (2006);
first-degree theft (2006); and assault (2008). These offenses involved,
among other things, Fetters punching a police officer twice in the head
and spitting in the officer’s face, lighting a victims clothes on fire and
threatening to set fire to a vehicle, striking his brother in the head with
a baseball bat, running from the police, and hitting a victim with a stick
and his fist and throwing a brick at the victim. Clearly Fetters is capable
of endangering the community despite his medical issues. Indeed, he
has also been disciplined twice for assault while serving his federal
sentence, once in 2012 and again in 2017.
The instant offense conduct reinforces why Fetters received such
a long sentence. . . . When this offense conduct is combined with his
criminal history, Fetters deserves—and continues to deserve—a
lengthy sentence, notwithstanding his medical issues. Accordingly, the
Court cannot conclude that his 320-month long sentence is excessive.
The district court properly conducted the required “individualized inquiry.” Cf.
Sims, 87 F.4th at 919 (remanding because nothing indicated the district court
considered defendant’s proffered reasoning or that it reviewed the defendant’s
medical records). Because the district court thoroughly considered the § 3553(a)
factors, it did not abuse its discretion in finding they “reinforce the conclusion that
a sentencing reduction is not appropriate.” See Rodd, 966 F.3d at 748.
* * * * * * * *
The judgment is affirmed.
______________________________

-- 6 of 6 --