United States of America v. Keonne D. Chaplin

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2604
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Keonne D. Chaplin
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau
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Submitted: November 17, 2025
Filed: March 2, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, SHEPHERD and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Defendant Keonne Chaplin pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, Chaplin acknowledged
he had shot his firearm at another person but argued that an upward departure or

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variance was not justified because he had acted in self-defense. The district court1
rejected this argument and granted an upward departure under United States
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) § 5K2.62 and an upward variance under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), sentencing him to 108 months’ imprisonment. Chaplin now appeals his
sentence, arguing that the district court committed procedural error by rejecting his
self-defense argument. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the
sentence.
I.
On November 30, 2023, Chaplin engaged in a shootout with Jamison Taylor
outside a convenience store in Kennett, Missouri. Chaplin had been released from
state prison less than a month prior, and he had a rocky history with Taylor since
they had been in a physical altercation a few months earlier while they were both
incarcerated. On the day of the incident, Chaplin entered the convenience store and
saw Taylor there; he then ran back outside to his car to retrieve his firearm—a
Glock 22 pistol with a 30-round magazine. Chaplin then reentered the store while
holding the pistol underneath his waistband, and he and his associate, Herman
Pounds, stood behind Taylor as he purchased items at the counter. While Taylor
exchanged words with Chaplin and Pounds, Chaplin made gestures suggesting he
had a gun. Taylor appeared tense and nervous, and he quickly exited the store.
After Taylor left the store, he walked to his car in the parking lot. He then
walked back to the front of the store and looked inside the window before returning
to his vehicle. Taylor and a passenger from his car then stood near the car, looking
towards the store entrance. Meanwhile, Chaplin and Pounds looked out towards the
parking lot from inside the store. Pounds then walked outside, while Chaplin stayed
1 The Honorable Stephen R. Clark, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri.
2 While § 5K2.6 has been deleted from the Guidelines as of November 2025,
Chaplin was sentenced under the November 2023 version of the Guidelines.

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near the entrance. Shortly after, Chaplin gripped his gun, walked up to the door,
opened it, and fired at Taylor and his passenger. Taylor and his passenger ducked,
then returned fire. Chaplin then ran to his car in the parking lot, all the while
exchanging gunfire with Taylor. Chaplin jumped into his car and Pounds drove them
away. A female passenger in Chaplin’s vehicle was injured when a bullet fragment
struck the back of her head.
A federal grand jury charged Chaplin with one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Chaplin pled guilty
to this count pursuant to a written plea agreement. The parties did not reach any
agreement with respect to the Guidelines other than an understanding that Chaplin
should receive a reduction in offense level for acceptance of responsibility under
USSG § 3E1.1.
Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence
Investigation Report (PSR) that calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 41 to 51
months’ imprisonment. The PSR also noted that an upward departure may be
justified under USSG § 5K2.6, which provides that “[t]he discharge of a firearm
might warrant a substantial sentence increase.” The Government filed a sentencing
memorandum advocating for an upward departure or variance, recommending a
sentence of 120 months. Chaplin filed his own sentencing memorandum, arguing
that because he was acting in self-defense when he fired his weapon, an upward
departure or variance was not warranted.
At sentencing, the district court rejected Chaplin’s self-defense argument.
The district court noted that Chaplin shot at Taylor first while Taylor had not drawn
a weapon. It also noted that while Taylor and his passenger assumed an “aggressive
posture” as they stood outside the store, they only did so after Chaplin ran to his car
to retrieve his gun and held it in a threatening manner while standing behind Taylor.
Accordingly, the district court granted the Government’s requests for an upward
departure under USSG § 5K2.6 for the discharge of the firearm and an upward
variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), imposing a sentence of 108 months.

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II.
Chaplin’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court committed a
significant procedural error by not crediting his self-defense argument when
determining his sentence. “A significant procedural error can occur if the district
court . . . selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts[.]” United States v.
Hairy Chin, 850 F.3d 398, 402 (8th Cir. 2017). “We review factual findings at
sentencing for clear error under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.”
United States v. Fleming, 103 F.4th 509, 514 (8th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct.
1211 (2025). “We reverse for clear error ‘only when the entire record definitely and
firmly illustrates that the lower court made a mistake.’” United States v. Clark, 999
F.3d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “Where there are two permissible
views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous.” FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 1239 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted).
Under Missouri self-defense law, a person may use physical force “to defend
himself or herself . . . from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or
imminent use of unlawful force by [another] person.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.031.1
(2016). However, this force is not excused if the person was the “initial aggressor,”
unless they previously withdrew from the encounter or had some other justification.
See id. § 563.031.1(1).
Here, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Chaplin did not act in
self-defense. The undisputed facts establish that Chaplin entered the convenience
store moments after Taylor did; that Chaplin, after seeing Taylor, immediately ran
to his car and retrieved his gun; that Chaplin then walked back into the store and
gripped his gun while standing right behind Taylor; and that Taylor appeared tense
and nervous. In his written objection to the PSR, Chaplin conceded that he displayed
his gun in an objectively threatening manner in violation of Missouri law. See Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4) (2023) (making it illegal to “[e]xhibit[], in the presence of
one or more persons, any weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry or

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threatening manner”). Based on these facts, it was not clear error for the district
court to find that Chaplin was not merely “defend[ing] himself . . . [from] unlawful
force” under Missouri law. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.031.1.
Chaplin argues that he could not have initiated the violence because even
though he held a gun while standing behind Taylor, Taylor himself was not aware
of this. But Chaplin conceded in his objection to the PSR that he displayed his
weapon in an objectively threatening manner, that he had a violent history with
Taylor, and that Taylor seemed nervous while Chaplin was standing behind him.
Furthermore, the video footage shows Chaplin conspicuously gripping an object in
his waistband while in the store and Taylor facing Chaplin and talking to him when
he walks out. Cf. United States v. Cotton, 782 F.3d 392, 396 (8th Cir. 2015) (noting
that a person who reaches for his waistband can create the reasonable suspicion that
he is armed). Given these facts, it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to
find that Taylor knew that Chaplin was armed in a threatening manner and that it
was therefore Chaplin who was the initial aggressor under Missouri law. See Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 563.031.1(1).
In any case, even if Taylor did not initially know that Chaplin was armed,
Chaplin still concedes that he shot at Taylor while Taylor was standing outside the
store without a weapon drawn. Thus, since the record does not “definitely and firmly
illustrate” that Chaplin was acting in self-defense, see Clark, 999 F.3d at 1097
(citation omitted), the district court did not clearly err by rejecting this argument
when determining his sentence.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We
grant the Government’s motion to supplement the record.
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