Data Axle, Inc., Delaware corporation v. Andrew Nolting

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-2068
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Data Axle, Inc., Delaware corporation
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Andrew Nolting
Defendant - Appellant
CFM Data Network, LLC, a Minnesota limited liability company, doing business
as DataSourceOne.com; Douglas Ferrara; John Does, real names unknown and
representing the individual Owners, Officers, Directors, and Members of CFM
Data Network, LLC d/b/a DataSourceOne.com; Jane Does, real names unknown
and representing the individual Owners, Officers, Directors, and Members of CFM
Data Network, LLC d/b/a DataSourceOne.com
Defendants
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
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Submitted: March 19, 2026
Filed: June 1, 2026
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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KOBES, Circuit Judge.
The issue before us is whether Andrew Nolting may immediately appeal from
an order holding him in civil contempt and imposing sanctions. We conclude that
he cannot and dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Data Axle, Inc. sued CFM Data Network, LLC d/b/a DataSourceOne.com
(DSO) and its owner Andrew Nolting for violations of the Copyright Act and the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and for related state-law claims. Data Axle alleged
that DSO and Nolting unlawfully accessed, copied, and licensed Data Axle’s
proprietary business databases. When DSO did not answer, the district court1
entered default judgment against it, awarded Data Axle monetary damages, and
enjoined DSO and its officers from wrongfully using the copyrighted databases. The
court also ordered DSO to produce an accounting of records and destroy any copies
of Data Axle’s data. Nolting filed a timely answer to the complaint, so the case is
proceeding against him, though it has been stayed pending this appeal.
Data Axle learned after default judgment that DSO no longer existed when
the judgment was entered2 and that Nolting was selling databases on a new website.
It suspected Nolting was still selling its copyrighted data and moved for an order to
show cause why Nolting and DSO should not be held in contempt. After an
evidentiary hearing, the district court3 found that Data Axle had not shown that
Nolting was selling Data Axle’s copyrighted information on the new website by
clear and convincing evidence, but DSO had undisputedly failed to pay the money
judgment, provide the accounting of records, or make any attempt to destroy the
1 The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District
of Minnesota.
2 The Minnesota Secretary of State administratively terminated DSO for
failure to file its annual renewal.
3 The Honorable Laura M. Provinzino, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota.

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copyrighted material it possessed. Although Nolting was not subject to the default
judgment and had not been personally ordered to pay that judgment or comply with
those orders, the court held that he nonetheless could—and would—be held in civil
contempt alongside DSO as the company’s sole owner and shareholder. The
contempt order required the parties to provide a joint status report explaining
whether DSO and Nolting satisfied the judgment and complied with the previous
orders or, if they could not, provide briefing explaining why. Absent any further
order, Nolting was ordered to pay $1,000 per day to the Clerk of Court, starting in
30 days, until compliance. Nolting then filed this appeal, asserting jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, or alternatively, under the collateral order doctrine.
Nolting argues that the district court’s contempt order is a “final decision”
under § 1291 because it decisively “establishe[d] [his] personal liability for the
judgment entered against DSO,” leaving “nothing more to litigate about at this
point.” But an order is only a final decision if it “ends the litigation on the merits
and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Cunningham v.
Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 204 (1999) (citation omitted); see Dean v. County
of Gage, 807 F.3d 931, 937 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[O]nly orders that dispose of all claims
are final and appealable.”). The district court has more to do; in fact, it hasn’t had
the opportunity to adjudicate Nolting’s liability on any claim made directly against
him. Nolting “is a party to a still pending action,” and so “must await a final
judgment” to appeal the court’s order. Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 792
(8th Cir. 2004).
The collateral order doctrine, which permits immediate appeal of a “small
category” of interlocutory orders, is not an alternative basis for our jurisdiction. See
Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 204. “To be reviewable under this doctrine, an order must
meet three requirements: (1) it must conclusively determine the disputed question;
(2) it must resolve an important question completely separate from the merits of the
action; and (3) it must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”
In re M & S Grading, Inc., 526 F.3d 363, 370 (8th Cir. 2008).

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The contempt order did not “conclusively determine” anything. Id. It “may
be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and
all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The district court has
even indicated, in its order denying Nolting’s motion to stay imposition of sanctions
pending appeal, that it would have amended the order to remove contempt sanctions
for failure to pay the money judgment if it were not for this premature appeal. See
State ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102, 1106 (8th Cir. 1999)
(after a notice of appeal has been filed, a district court “may not reexamine or
supplement the order being appealed”).4
Nor is the order effectively unreviewable. Mere economic loss does not
usually “implicate rights which could be lost or irreparably harmed if immediate
review were denied.” Coleman v. Sherwood Med. Indus., 746 F.2d 445, 446 (8th
Cir. 1984); see Beber v. NavSav Holdings, LLC, 140 F.4th 453, 461 (8th Cir. 2025)
(“Economic loss, on its own, is not an irreparable harm so long as the losses can be
recovered.” (cleaned up)). And Nolting has not shown that the $1,000-per-day fine
will be irretrievable should he ultimately prevail in a timely appeal. See Nat’l Insts.
of Health v. Am. Pub. Health Ass’n, 145 S. Ct. 2658 (2025) (per curiam) (loss of
money can become an irreparable harm “if the funds ‘cannot be recouped’ and are
thus ‘irrevocably expended’” (quoting Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott, 561 U.S.
1301, 1304 (2010) (Scalia, J., in chambers))).
We dismiss the appeal.
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4 We take judicial notice of the district court’s order. See Stutzka v.
McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005).

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