Priscilla Croxdale; Ralph Croxdale v. Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-2454
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Priscilla Croxdale; Ralph Croxdale
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company
Defendant - Appellee
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
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Submitted: March 17, 2026
Filed: June 24, 2026
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.
The district court1 granted summary judgment to Travelers Home and Marine
Insurance Company (“Travelers”) because water damage to Priscilla and Ralph
1 The Honorable Rebecca G. Ebinger, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Iowa.

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Croxdale’s home was unambiguously outside the coverage of their policy. We
affirm.
I. Background
The Croxdales purchased an insurance policy (“the policy”) from Travelers to
cover their Iowa home. A generic version of the policy insured against direct
physical loss but excluded coverage “for loss . . . [c]aused by . . . [c]onstant or
repeated seepage or leakage of water or steam, or the presence or condensation of
humidity, moisture or vapor, that occurs over a period of 14 days or more.”2 The
Croxdales’ policy contained an Iowa-specific endorsement that amended the generic
version by replacing “14 days or more” with “weeks, months, or years.”
In late November 2021, the Croxdales left their home to live with their
daughter in another state. On February 12, 2022, a neighbor contacted them to report
signs of a leak at their Iowa home. The Croxdales promptly shut off the water to
their home and reported the leak to Travelers. Inspection of the home showed that
a pipe had burst, resulting in a significant leak that rendered the home uninhabitable.
Travelers determined that this leak had lasted for about one month—a finding that
the Croxdales concede on appeal—and denied coverage. The Croxdales sued,
alleging a breach of contract and a bad-faith denial of coverage.
The Croxdales and Travelers both moved for summary judgment, disputing
the correct interpretation of the policy. The district court determined that the policy
does not cover any loss caused by a leak that lasted more than fourteen days—that
is, for “weeks”—even if the loss occurred in fewer than fourteen days or if it could
2 The parties dispute whether this clause is a coverage “exclusion” or a
“limitation.” But the Croxdales have not identified any significance this distinction
would have under Iowa law. The plain language of the clause describes a loss that
Travelers does not insure against. We do not see why it matters whether the clause
is described as a limitation or an exclusion. For simplicity, we refer to the clause as
an exclusion.

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be divided into losses that occurred before fourteen days had passed and those that
had not. Because the leak lasted longer than fourteen days, the district court granted
Travelers’ motion for summary judgment on the Croxdales’ breach of contract
claim. Having concluded that the policy did not provide coverage, the district court
also granted Travelers summary judgment on the claim for bad-faith denial. The
Croxdales appeal, arguing (1) that the policy covers the entire damage from the leak,
(2) that, in the alternative, the policy at least provides coverage for damage that
occurred within the first thirteen days of the leak, and, (3) that, either way, Travelers’
denial of coverage was in bad faith.
II. Discussion
“We review a grant of summary judgment on an insurance policy
interpretation de novo, applying the same summary judgment standard as the district
court and using state law to determine coverage issues.” First Baptist Church v.
Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 129 F.4th 488, 491 (8th Cir. 2025). “Summary judgment is
appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant,
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Id. The parties agree that Iowa law governs. Iowa courts
generally interpret and construe insurance policies according to the plain meaning
of their language. Boelman v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 826 N.W.2d 494, 501
(Iowa 2013). Further, they “interpret a policy from the viewpoint of an ordinary
person, not a specialist or expert,” and “interpret ambiguous policy provisions in
favor of the insured.” Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Jungling, 654 N.W.2d 530,
536 (Iowa 2002). “[A] policy is ambiguous if the language is susceptible to
two reasonable interpretations.” Boelman, 826 N.W.2d at 501. However, they “will
not strain the words or phrases of the policy in order to find liability that the policy
did not intend and the insured did not purchase.” Id. The parties do not identify any
Iowa court decision addressing a policy with the language at issue here.
We begin with the Croxdales’ claim for breach of contract. We agree with
the district court that the policy’s plain language excludes all losses caused by a leak

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that lasts more than fourteen days, even losses caused before fourteen days have
passed. The policy excludes coverage for losses that were caused by a leak “that
occurs over a period of weeks, months, or years.” If a leak occurs over more than
fourteen days, it has necessarily occurred “over a period of weeks,” and is therefore
not covered. The leak here lasted for about one month, so the losses it caused are
entirely outside the policy’s coverage.
The Croxdales’ primary argument is that the policy covers the entirety of the
water damage. In support, they offer three key points, which we address in turn.
First, the Croxdales argue that the policy only excludes losses “that occur[red] over
a period of weeks,” and thus, even if the leak itself lasted several weeks, the loss
caused by the sudden burst of a pipe would be covered. However, the word “that”
introduces a descriptive phrase that modifies the sources of water damage, not the
term “loss.” Specifically, the word “that” immediately follows the words “seepage
or leakage of water or steam, or the presence or condensation of humidity, moisture
or vapor,” not the word “loss.” See McKain v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 623
F.Supp.3d 1117, 1122 (D. Mont. 2022) (“[T]he long-term leak exclusion identifies
a peril—the continuous or repeated seepage or leakage of water or steam which
occurs over a period of weeks, months, or years—that excludes any resultant loss
from coverage.”). This language is clear and unambiguous. Thus, we reject the
Croxdales’ argument that the policy is ambiguous and should therefore be
interpreted in their favor. See Jungling, 654 N.W.2d at 536.
Next, the Croxdales argue that the exclusion does not apply after fourteen days
but after some longer unspecified period. They argue that if the phrase “weeks,
months, or years” means any period greater than two weeks, then the words
“months” and “years” would have no importance; any leak that lasts “months” or
“years” will necessarily last for “weeks.” The Croxdales argue that we should avoid
a construction that makes any part of a contract superfluous or without meaning. See
U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n. v. Bittner, 986 N.W.2d 840, 848 (Iowa 2023). But “the rule
against superfluous language is not the be-all and end-all.” Id. at 850 (citation
modified). In Bittner, the Iowa Supreme Court positively cited our decision in Brazil

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v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 3 F.4th 1040 (8th Cir. 2021), where we held that when we
cannot reasonably interpret an insurance policy to eliminate surplusage, we should
give this canon less weight. Id. at 1043-44; Bittner, 986 N.W.2d at 850. Here, there
is no way to construe the exclusion without rendering some term surplusage, and
only the “weeks” construction avoids contradicting a term. For example, if we read
the exclusion to apply to leaks occurring over a period of at least two months, then
the term “years” would be superfluous, and we would contradict the term “weeks.”
We thus believe Iowa courts would apply the exclusion to any leak lasting at least
“weeks,” which may render “months” and “years” surplusage but avoids
contradicting an express term in the policy.
Third, the Croxdales argue that the Iowa endorsement must offer more
coverage than the generic provision it replaced. Because the generic provision
originally excluded coverage for leaks lasting longer than fourteen days, the
Croxdales conclude that “weeks, months, or years” must refer to a period that is
longer than fourteen days. The only authority that the Croxdales cite for their
purported rule is the canon against surplusage, reasoning that if the endorsement did
not expand coverage, it would be surplusage. We disagree. First, the Croxdales do
not cite any authority applying the canon against surplusage in this way. Second,
even if we concluded the Iowa-specific language has a different meaning than the
generic language, there is no reason to think that an amendment must always expand
coverage rather than reduce coverage. Here, the language is neither broader nor
narrower, merely different. Because we see no reason to ignore the plain language
of the policy, we reject the Croxdales’ contention that their entire loss was covered.
We next address the Croxdales’ alternative argument that, at minimum, the
policy provides partial coverage for the loss. They argue that the policy covers any
losses that occur within the first thirteen days of a leak, either because this is the best
reading of the policy language or because the policy is at least ambiguous. But the
Croxdales fail to reconcile this argument with the plain language of the policy,
specifically the phrase “that occurs over a period of weeks, months, or years.” They
ignore that the words “that occurs” modify the sources of damage and not loss. The

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Croxdales also rely on two cases from outside our circuit applying the law of other
states: Wheeler v. Allstate Ins. Co., 687 F. App’x 757 (10th Cir. 2017)
(unpublished), and Hicks v. Am. Integrity Ins. Co. of Fla., 241 So.3d 925 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2018). In Wheeler, the Tenth Circuit found that a substantially similar
policy did not exclude damage caused by less than fourteen days of leaking water.
87 F. App’x at 769. However, we find the Wheeler dissent’s interpretation of the
policy more persuasive for the reasons we set forth above. Id. at 777 (Moritz, J.,
dissenting) (“[B]ecause Wheeler seeks coverage for property loss caused by a leak
that unquestionably occurred ‘over a period’ of two weeks or more, I would hold
that Exclusion 3 unambiguously applies to all of the damage the leak caused.”).
Hicks involved different policy language and does not have persuasive value. 241
So.3d at 926 (describing policy language without the phrase “that occurs”).
Therefore, we conclude that the policy does not provide partial coverage for the loss.
Finally, we address the Croxdales’ claim for bad-faith denial of coverage. In
Iowa, an insured may establish a claim for bad-faith denial of coverage if the insurer
(1) lacked a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy and (2) knew of or
recklessly disregarded that absence of a reasonable basis for denial. Dolan v. Aid
Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1988). “The first element is an objective one;
the second element is subjective.” Bellville v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 702
N.W.2d 468, 473 (Iowa 2005). As the Croxdales conceded at oral argument, they
cannot prevail on their claim for bad-faith denial if the policy does not provide
coverage. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment to
Travelers on the claim.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Travelers.
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