United States v. Nicole Roy

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-3062
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Nuria Maricela Argueta-Rodriguez; J.I.C.A.; Gilman Ernesto Cortez Cucufute;
Josseline Gilmary Cortez-Argueta
lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioners
v.
Todd Blanche, Attorney General of the United States1
lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent
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Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
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Submitted: August 3, 2026
Filed: August 17, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before LOKEN, L.R. SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
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1Todd Blanche is automatically substituted as respondent in place of Pamela
Bondi pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2).

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PER CURIAM.
Salvadoran citizens Gilman Ernesto Cortez Cucufute and Nuria Maricela
Argueta-Rodriguez, and their two children, Josseline Cortez-Argueta and J.I.C.A.
(collectively, “Petitioners”), petition for review of a decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA dismissed their appeal from an immigration
judge’s (IJ’s) decision denying them asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT); and declined to reinstate a period of
voluntary departure. After careful consideration of the record and the parties’
arguments on appeal, we deny the petition.
The BIA adopted and affirmed the decision of the IJ, concluding that
Petitioners’ proposed particular social groups, “community leader who was exploited
and coerced by the gang for benefits associated with his construction business,” and
“partner of community leader coerced and exploited by the gang,” were not
cognizable; even assuming the proposed social groups were cognizable, Petitioners
failed to establish a nexus between them and any past or feared future persecution;
and Petitioners did not establish they were eligible for CAT protection. The BIA also
declined to reinstate the voluntary departure bond because Petitioners failed to
provide timely proof that the bond had been posted, and ordered Petitioners removed
to El Salvador. On appeal, Petitioners assert that the 1-year time bar for filing asylum
applications should be excused, argue that their proposed particular social groups are
cognizable, challenge the IJ’s findings regarding past and future persecution,
challenge the denial of CAT protection, and request that this court reinstate the
voluntary departure bond.
We review questions of immigration law de novo, and findings of fact for
substantial evidence. See Aguilar-Hernandez v. Bondi, 163 F.4th 537, 539 (8th Cir.
2026). Only the BIA’s decision is subject to this court’s review; however, this court
also considers the IJ’s findings and reasoning to the extent they were adopted by the
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BIA. See Silvestre-Giron v. Barr, 949 F.3d 1114, 1117 (8th Cir. 2020). Initially,
because the agency considered the asylum applications on the merits, we decline to
address Petitioners’ challenge to the asylum time bar. Regarding asylum and
withholding of removal, we agree with the IJ and the BIA that Petitioners’ proposed
particular social groups were not cognizable, see Rosales-Reyes v. Garland, 7 F.4th
755, 759 (8th Cir. 2021) (requirements for establishing particular social group;
whether group constitutes a particular social group is a question of law, reviewed de
novo), and were impermissibly defined by their persecutory conduct, see Fuentes v.
Barr, 969 F.3d 865, 872 (8th Cir. 2020). The failure to establish cognizable particular
social groups is itself an independent basis to deny relief from removal. See
Uriostegui-Teran v. Garland, 72 F.4th 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2023) (concluding
petitioner’s failure to establish cognizable PSG disposed of asylum and
withholding-of-removal claims). We thus decline to consider Petitioners’ challenge
to the IJ’s persecution findings. Cf. Silvestre-Giron, 949 F.3d at1117.
Substantial evidence also supports the denial of CAT protection. See Escobar
v. Garland, 55 F.4th 662, 670 (8th Cir. 2022) (government does not acquiesce in
torture merely because it is aware of torture but powerless to stop it); Rosales-Reyes,
7 F.4th at 761 (CAT relief is not appropriate where it is possible for petitioner to
relocate upon removal to avoid torture); see also Guled v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 872,
881-82 (8th Cir. 2008) (separate analysis for CAT claim is required only when there
is evidence noncitizen may be tortured for reasons unrelated to asylum and
withholding of removal claims).
We lack jurisdiction to consider Petitioners’ request to reinstate voluntary
departure. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229c (voluntary departure), 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (no court
shall have jurisdiction to review any judgment regarding the granting of relief under
§ 1229c); Camick v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 1101, 1107 (8th Cir. 2018) (courts of appeal
lack jurisdiction “to entertain a request to reinstate voluntary departure,” citing
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§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)); see also Arenivas-Flores v. Barr, 794 Fed. Appx, 561 (8th Cir.
2020) (unpublished per curiam) (BIA’s decision denying request to reinstate
voluntary departure because noncitizen failed to post required voluntary departure
bond was consistent with relevant regulations, and in any event, this court lacked
jurisdiction to review that decision).
The petition for review is denied. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
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