John Steven Hallman v. MATTHEW CATE, Secretary of the California Department of Corrections;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Hallman’s
request for oral argument is denied.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN STEVEN HALLMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MATTHEW CATE, Secretary of the
California Department of Corrections; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-17098
D.C. No. 5:10-cv-03548-LHK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Lucy H. Koh, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 10, 2012**
Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner John Steven Hallman appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due
FILED
OCT 04 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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11-17098 2
process and First Amendment violations in connection with his 2008 re-validation
as an associate of the Mexican Mafia prison gang. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d
734, 737 (9th Cir. 2001) (failure to state a claim); Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321,
323 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (issue preclusion). We may affirm on any ground
supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.
2008), and we affirm.
Dismissal was proper because the state court’s denial of Hallman’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his retention in the Security Housing Unit
precluded Hallman from relitigating the same issues in a § 1983 action. See
Silverton v. Dep’t of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[B]ecause of
the nature of a state habeas proceeding, a decision actually rendered should
preclude an identical issue from being relitigated in a subsequent § 1983 action if
the state habeas court afforded a full and fair opportunity for the issue to be heard
and determined under federal standards.”). Hallman’s contention that he was not
provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues in the prior proceeding
is unpersuasive. See Clark v. Yosemite Cmty. Coll. Dist., 785 F.2d 781, 786 (9th
Cir. 1986) (“[A]n opportunity to reach the merits is sufficient to invoke a
preclusive effect.”).

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11-17098 3
Absent an underlying constitutional violation, Hallman’s supervisory
liability claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Taylor v.
List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating standard).
To the extent that Hallman alleges that his continued retention in the
Security Housing Unit following his 2008 re-validation is an “atypical and
significant hardship” in violation of his federal due process rights, this claim is not
viable because, even if there was a protected liberty interest at stake, the documents
submitted in support of his complaint show that he received all of the process that
was due. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 229 (2005).
Hallman’s motion for appointment of counsel, filed on August 10, 2012, is
denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.

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