Rubio Izaguirre v. GREENWOOD MOTOR LINES, INC., an Ohio corporation, DBA R & L Carriers

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RUBIO IZAGUIRRE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
GREENWOOD MOTOR LINES, INC., an
Ohio corporation, DBA R & L Carriers
and JOHN & JANE DOES I-X, whose true
identitites are presently unknown,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-35972
D.C. No. 1:10-cv-00581-WBS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
William B. Shubb, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 12, 2013**
Seattle, Washington
FILED
APR 18 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The Honorable J. Michael Seabright, District Judge for the U.S.***
District Court for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
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Before: TASHIMA and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and SEABRIGHT, District
Judge.***
Plaintiff-Appellant Rubio Izaguirre appeals the district court’s decision
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Greenwood Motor
Lines, Inc. (“Greenwood”) on his employment discrimination claims. The district
court found that Izaguirre had sued the wrong entity because he was actually
employed by R&L Carriers Shared Services, LLC (“Shared Services”). It denied
his requests to modify the scheduling order and for leave to amend his complaint.
It then granted Greenwood’s motion for summary judgment because Izaguirre
could not establish that Greenwood and Shared Services should be treated as the
same entity.
We review the district court’s denial of requests for leave to amend and to
modify the scheduling order for abuse of discretion and review the court’s decision
to grant summary judgment de novo. C.F. ex rel. Farnan v. Capistrano Unified
Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. C.F. v.

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As the parties are familiar with the facts of the case, we repeat only those1
facts necessary to explain our decision.
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Corbett, 132 S. Ct. 1566 (2012). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291 and we affirm.1
I
Izaguirre argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motions to amend his complaint and modify the scheduling order. Because he did
not move to amend his complaint until after the deadline established in the
scheduling order for amending pleadings expired, he was required to demonstrate
“good cause” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16. Johnson v.
Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1992). The good
cause inquiry turns primarily on the moving party’s diligence. Id. at 609.
The district court concluded that Izaguirre “should have known the identity
of his employer without conducting discovery” because he was paid by Shared
Services, filed administrative charges against Shared Services, and filed a workers
compensation claim against Shared Services. Indeed, in the administrative
proceeding, Shared Services admitted that it employed Izaguirre. In contrast, in its
answer, amended answer, and discovery responses, Greenwood repeatedly denied

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that it was Izaguirre’s employer. On the present record, we cannot conclude that
the district court abused its discretion.
II
Izaguirre also contends that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment because Greenwood and Shared Services should be treated as a single
entity-employer under the test articulated in Morgan v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 884
F.2d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 1989). Even if the Morgan test applies in this context,
but see Anderson v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 336 F.3d 924, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2003), we
conclude that Izaguirre cannot satisfy it. Although there was some evidence of
common management and ownership, any such dispute is not material because
there was little evidence of interrelated operations and no evidence of centralized
control of labor relations. See Kang v. U. Lim Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 815 (9th
Cir. 2002) (indicating that centralized control of labor relations is the “most
critical” factor). Significantly, there was no evidence that Greenwood played any
role in employment decisions at issue. See Johnson v. Crown Enters., Inc., 398
F.3d 339, 343 (5th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Izaguirre, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting
Greenwood’s motion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.

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