United States of America v. Al Shlomo Klaus

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for**
decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
AL SHLOMO KLAUS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-56444
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00579-WDK-E
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
William D. Keller, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 10, 2013**
Pasadena, California
Before: NOONAN, WARDLAW, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Al Shlomo Klaus appeals the award of $1,710,000 in damages following a
jury trial in a civil action brought by the United States to recover fire suppression
costs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
FILED
MAY 20 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The government’s expert damages witness, a financial analyst with the
United States Forest Service, testified concerning the costs the federal government
incurred to fight the Crown Fire and the Forest Service’s methods of ensuring that
only costs incurred in fighting the Crown Fire, as opposed to those relating to the
contemporaneous Foothill Fire, were attributed to that fire. This testimony,
coupled with the government’s extensive documentary evidence of its expenses,
was sufficient to support the jury’s damages award. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum
Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 791 F.2d 1356, 1365-66 (9th Cir. 1986).
Klaus argues that the jury’s damages award was necessarily speculative
because the jury (1) rejected the full amount of damages claimed by the
government and (2) deliberated for only one day, a purportedly insufficient amount
of time to examine “each piece of paper” produced by the government “to ascertain
if charges were properly allocable to the Crown Fire.” These arguments are
unavailing. First, “the jury is not bound to accept the bottom line provided by any
particular damages expert,” and the jury had ample evidence before it from which
to arrive at its own proper calculation. In re First Alliance Mortg. Co., 471 F.3d
977, 1002 (9th Cir. 2006); accord Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident
Comm’n, 199 P.2d 302, 306 (Cal. 1948) (“The trier of fact may accept the evidence
of any one expert or choose a figure between them based on all the evidence.”).

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Second, the jury was not required to conduct its own audit of the government’s
source documentation to avoid arriving at a “speculative” award. Instead, it was
entitled to rely on the evidence that was presented to it, including the testimony of
two damages experts and numerous exhibits, at least three of which were
summary-type documents that could be carefully reviewed in less than a day. See
L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 791 F.2d at 1366.
Because the jury’s finding of the amount of damages is supported by
substantial evidence and was not speculative, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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