United States of America v. Ian Christopherson

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
IAN CHRISTOPHERSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-10012
D.C. No. 2:09-cr-00056-MMD-
RJJ-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Miranda Du, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 12, 2014
San Francisco, California
Before: FARRIS and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges, and HUCK, Senior District
Judge.**
The Defendant, Ian Christopherson, was convicted of income tax evasion
and employment tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. § 7201, after a jury trial. The conviction
was based on his usage of a bank account in Montana to operate his law firm, the
FILED
MAY 20 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Paul C. Huck, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for Southern Florida, sitting by designation.

-- 1 of 3 --

existence of which he failed to disclose to the IRS even after the Agency began to
levy his other assets. Before the verdict, the defense proposed a jury instruction on
the crime’s mens rea element of “willfulness”:
In determining…intent or lack of criminal intent you may consider
whether his actions of using the First Citizen’s Industrial Consultant’s
bank account was for the purpose of remaining in business to be able to
pay his taxes, rather than to evade the payment of tax.
Although imprecise, this proposed instruction was discussed by both the defense
counsel and the prosecutor with the court, and all parties recognized it to be a claim
of a good faith misunderstanding of the law that would negate the mens rea for the
crime. Essentially, the defense had argued—and hoped to instruct the jury—that
Christopherson was unaware that his usage of the second bank account would be
considered unlawful tax evasion. The district court rejected the instruction, not as a
matter of law but because of an insufficient evidentiary foundation.
The appeal argues only that Christopherson was entitled to this jury
instruction on his good faith misunderstanding of the law. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
A defendant is normally “entitled” to a jury instruction that presents an
aspect of his theory of the case, so long as (1) an evidentiary foundation supports
it, (2) the law supports it, and (3) it is not adequately covered by the rest of the
2

-- 2 of 3 --

instructions when viewed in their entirety. United States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107,
1120 (9th Cir. 2010).
The question has been decided in this Circuit in United States v. Hardy, 941
F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1991). Hardy contained sparse reasoning, but it squarely
addressed the issue. While courts may not instruct that ignorance and good faith
misunderstanding claims cannot be considered by the jury, they need not
affirmatively instruct that such claims must be considered. This rule accords with
other circuits that have addressed the question. See United States v. Kokenis, 662
F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Damra, 621 F.3d 474, 502 (6th Cir.
2010); United States v. Simkanin, 420 F.3d 397, 411 (5th Cir. 2005).
Even if Christopherson’s proposed good faith misunderstanding of law
instruction had a sufficient evidentiary and legal foundation, it was within the
district court’s discretion to refuse it. This theory was adequately covered by the
instruction on willfulness.
AFFIRMED.
3

-- 3 of 3 --