Jorge Mario Moscoso- Castellanos v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JORGE MARIO MOSCOSO-
CASTELLANOS,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 12-72693
Agency No. A095-663-275
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted September 3, 2015**
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM,*** Chief
District Judge.
Jorge Mario Moscoso-Castellanos, a native and citizen of Guatemala,
petitions for review of an adverse decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
FILED
OCT 13 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief United District Judge for the
District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

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("BIA"). We review de novo the BIA’s legal determinations and for substantial
evidence the BIA’s factual determinations. Khudaverdyan v. Holder, 778 F.3d
1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2015). We dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part.
1. As explained in the published opinion filed this date, the BIA properly
ruled that Petitioner failed to demonstrate 10 years of continuous physical
presence. Thus, he is statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal.
2. The BIA properly found Petitioner statutorily ineligible to adjust his
status to that of lawful permanent resident on the basis of his wife’s purported
eligibility to adjust her status through an approved labor certification. Petitioner’s
lawyer conceded to the immigration judge ("IJ") that the labor certification
application on which Petitioner relies originally was filed to benefit another
employee, and the only document in the record connecting Petitioner’s wife to the
application was filed in 2005. Petitioner’s wife (and, through her, Petitioner) thus
cannot benefit from the priority date of that application because a federal
regulation limits the benefit of a "grandfathered" priority date under 8 C.F.R.
§ 245.10(a)(3) to the person "who was the beneficiary of the application for the
labor certification on or before April 30, 2001," id. § 1245.10(j).
3. The BIA properly ruled that the IJ did not have to explain to Petitioner
that he might be eligible for asylum relief or protection under the Convention
2

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Against Torture. In 11 immigration hearings over a period of several years,
Petitioner—who was represented by counsel at each of the hearings—never
expressed any fear whatsoever of returning to Guatemala. Petitioner therefore
showed no "apparent eligibility" for these forms of relief. Valencia v. Mukasey,
548 F.3d 1261, 1262 (9th Cir. 2008).
4. Issues pertaining to Petitioner’s request for prosecutorial discretion are
unexhausted, so we lack jurisdiction to consider them. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); see
also Vilchiz-Soto v. Holder, 688 F.3d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2012) (order) (holding
that we lack discretion to review discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial decisions to
adjudicate cases).
Petition DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.
3

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