Guetatchew Fikrou v. Montgomery County Office of Child Support Enforcement Division;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GUETATCHEW FIKROU,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY OFFICE OF
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
DIVISION; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-15669
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01297-GMN-
NJK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Guetatchew Fikrou appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims stemming from
defendants’ enforcement of a child support order. We have jurisdiction under 28
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 15 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We may affirm on
any basis supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534
F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
Dismissal of Fikrou’s action was proper because Fikrou failed to allege facts
sufficient to establish that the district court had personal jurisdiction over any
defendant. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121-23 (2014) (discussing the
requirements for specific personal jurisdiction and explaining that “the plaintiff
cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum”); Schwarzenegger v.
Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004) (requirements for
general personal jurisdiction). To the extent the district court erred by denying
Fikrou’s motion for reconsideration contending that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
was inapplicable to his claims of extrinsic fraud, any error was harmless because
dismissal was proper for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend the
complaint because amendment would have been futile. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp.
of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would
be futile).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

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in the opening brief or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v.
Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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