Kadea Esso Solitoki v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KADEA ESSO SOLITOKI,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 14-73430
Agency No. A078-438-284
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 6, 2017**
Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH, MURGUIA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Kadea Esso Solitoki, a citizen of Togo, petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal of the Immigration
Judge’s (“IJ”) decision finding him (1) removable under
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as an alien not in possession of a valid, unexpired
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 11 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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visa; and (2) ineligible for special-rule cancellation of removal under the Violence
Against Women Act (“VAWA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2), as an alien who has been
“battered or subjected to extreme cruelty” by his spouse. We have jurisdiction to
review the BIA’s final order of removal and denial of § 1229b(b)(2) relief under
8 U.S.C. § 1252. See Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 835 (9th Cir. 2003).
We review de novo the BIA’s legal determinations. Kyon Ho Shin v. Holder, 607
F.3d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010). Questions of fact, including the BIA’s decision
that Solitoki was not subjected to extreme cruelty, are reviewed for substantial
evidence. See Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 832, 837.
1. The IJ did not err in permitting DHS to amend the charge of removability
during the final merits hearing of Solitoki’s removal proceedings. Under DHS
regulations, DHS may lodge additional or substituted charges of removability at
any time during removal proceedings, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.30, and Solitoki cites no
authority to support his claim that the IJ’s questioning was otherwise improper.
See Pangilinan v. Holder, 568 F.3d 708, 709 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is critical that
the IJ scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all
the relevant facts.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As Solitoki
does not otherwise challenge the merits of the IJ’s finding that he is removable
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), we will deny the petition on this ground.
2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Solitoki failed to

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show that he had been subjected to extreme cruelty for the purposes of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(2). Solitoki’s ex-wife left her daughter alone with Solitoki for long
periods of time, used drugs, mocked Solitoki in public and private, threatened to
withdraw her support for his lawful permanent resident application, spent his
money, and destroyed his credit. Taken together, these actions do not constitute
the type of extreme emotional abuse or manipulative control tactics that would
compel a finding of “extreme cruelty.” See Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 840
(distinguishing the “extreme concept of domestic violence” from “mere
unkindness”). Accordingly, the BIA did not err in concluding that Solitoki did not
qualify for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2).
PETITION DENIED.

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