Texte intégral
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HAROLD D. HARDEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DWIGHT NEVEN, Warden; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-15755
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02008-JAD-VCF
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2017**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Harold D. Harden appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional
claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) (summary judgment for
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County
of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011) (cross-motions for summary
judgment). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Johnson v.
Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on
Harden’s retaliation and excessive force claims because Harden failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted his available
administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, or
whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable. See Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (“[P]roper exhaustion of administrative remedies . . .
means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the
agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191 (a prisoner who does not exhaust
administrative remedies must show that “there is something particular in his case
that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively
unavailable to him”); Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“[A] grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which
redress is sought.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Summary judgment for defendants on Harden’s access-to-courts claim was
proper because Harden failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
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whether defendants caused an actual injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
348-49, 354-55 (1996) (setting forth elements of an access-to-courts claim and
actual injury requirement).
We do not consider issues not specifically and distinctly raised in the
opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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