Sabra Albritton v. Tiffany & Bosco Pa;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SABRA ALBRITTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TIFFANY & BOSCO PA; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 13-16464
D.C. No. 4:12-cv-00924-HCE
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Hector C. Estrada, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted February 13, 2018***
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
This matter has been stayed since August 11, 2017, pending issuance of the
mandate in Ho v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., No. 10-56884, or further order of the
court. We hereby lift the stay.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge.
*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 26 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 13-16464
Sabra Albritton appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her
action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Kwan v. SanMedica
Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Albritton’s FDCPA claims against the
Bank of New York Mellon Corp. (“BNYM”) because Albritton failed to allege
facts sufficient to show that BNYM was a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. See
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) (excluding from the definition of “debt collector” a
creditor collecting debts on its own behalf).
The district court properly dismissed Albritton’s FDCPA claims against the
remaining defendants because Albritton failed to allege facts sufficient to state
plausible claims for relief under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d-1692g. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider the district court’s denial of Albritton’s request for a
temporary restraining order because the denial is not appealable. See Hunt v. Nat’l
Broadcasting Co., 872 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he denial of a temporary
restraining order is not generally appealable unless it effectively decides the merits

-- 2 of 3 --

3 13-16464
of the case . . . .” (citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to take judicial
notice of the endorsements of the note because Albritton failed to show that this
information was relevant and “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid.
201(b); United States v. Woods, 335 F.3d 993, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting
forth standard of review).
We reject as without merit Albritton’s contentions regarding judicial bias.
Albritton’s request for a permanent injunction, set forth in the opening brief,
is denied.
Albritton’s request for sanctions, set forth in Albritton’s objection to the
notice of bankruptcy (Docket Entry No. 30), is denied.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --