Robert Joseph Pilgrim v. Attorney General of the State of Arizona; Charles Ryan

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT JOSEPH PILGRIM,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF ARIZONA; CHARLES RYAN,
Respondents-Appellees.
No. 16-15963
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-00856-DGC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 15, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and EZRA,***
District Judge.
FILED
MAR 08 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the
District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.

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Petitioner Robert Joseph Pilgrim (Pilgrim) appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his federal habeas petition as untimely. Pilgrim asserts that he was
entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations because his mental
impairments precluded him from timely filing his petition. Pilgrim also maintains
that the district court abused its discretion in failing to conduct an evidentiary
hearing and in failing to order production of his medical and psychiatric records in
order to properly assess his equitable tolling claim.
Pilgrim was not entitled to equitable tolling because he did not demonstrate
“a mental impairment so severe that [he] was unable personally either to
understand the need to timely file or prepare a habeas petition, and that impairment
made it impossible under the totality of the circumstances to meet the filing
deadline despite [his] diligence.” Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1093 (9th Cir.
2010). In the district court, Pilgrim vaguely asserted that he suffered from
delusions, manic depression, schizophrenia, and paranoia that “hindered and
delayed” timely filing of his federal habeas petition. However, he did not
sufficiently demonstrate that his impairments were the “but-for cause of any
delay.” Id. at 1100. The record also reflects that Pilgrim’s mental condition was
not an impediment to seeking post-conviction relief in state court or in pursuing
various forms of relief in federal court. In light of his court filings, Pilgrim failed
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to establish that he was incapable of timely filing his federal habeas petition due to
any mental impairment. See Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th
Cir. 2014) (explaining that the petitioner’s ability to file state habeas petitions and
seek various forms of relief “refute[s] a claim of impairment so debilitating that
[the petitioner] could not rationally or factually understand the meaning of a
deadline”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pilgrim’s motions
for an evidentiary hearing and for production of documents.1 “A habeas petitioner
. . . should receive an evidentiary hearing when he makes a good-faith allegation
that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling. . . .” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d
964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006), as amended (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis in the original). Pilgrim’s bare allegations of a mental
impairment did not warrant an evidentiary hearing under this standard. Pilgrim
also never demonstrated that an order from the district court was necessary to
compel production of his own mental health records, particularly as it was
1 The magistrate judge recommended denial of Pilgrim’s pleading “entitled
motion for an evidentiary hearing,” and referred to Pilgrim’s motion filed at
Docket # 29. The pro se motion referenced by the magistrate judge included a
request for medical records.
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Pilgrim’s burden to support his equitable tolling claim and to explain the nature of
his mental impairment. See Rudin v. Myles, 781 F.3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir. 2015).
AFFIRMED.
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