Roderick L. Mitchell v. XAVIER BECERRA, Attorney General; JAMES C. SANCHEZ

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RODERICK L. MITCHELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
XAVIER BECERRA*, Attorney General;
JAMES C. SANCHEZ,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-15168
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02993-MCE-AC
MEMORANDUM**
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 13, 2018***
Before: LEAVY, M. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Roderick L. Mitchell appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging a violation of the ex post facto clause of the United
* Xavier Becerra has been substituted for his predecessor, Kamala D.
Harris, as Attorney General under Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 23 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 17-15168
States Constitution. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler,
627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Mitchell’s action because Mitchell
failed to allege facts sufficient to show that California Penal Code § 290.46 has a
punitive purpose or effect. See U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 9, cl. 3; Smith v. Doe, 538
U.S. 84, 104-05 (2003) (setting forth factors for determining whether a statute is
punitive for purposes of the ex post facto clause).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Becerra’s request for judicial notice, set forth in his answering brief, is
granted.
AFFIRMED.

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