Scott Teutscher, an individual v. Riverside Sheriffs Association

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SCOTT TEUTSCHER, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RIVERSIDE SHERIFFS ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM NATHANIEL WOODSON, III,
Intervenor-Appellant.
No. 16-56830
D.C. No.
5:06-cv-01208-RHW-OP
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Robert H. Whaley, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 17, 2018**
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
William Woodson appeals the denial of his motion to permissively intervene
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 23 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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against his former client, Scott Teutscher, in Teutscher’s action against Riverside
Sheriffs Association (RSA). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
and affirm.
The district court did not abuse its “broad discretion” to deny permissive
intervention. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam). As a threshold matter, Woodson was required to show that his motion
was timely. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B); S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d
794, 803 (9th Cir. 2002). When Teutscher prevailed on his ERISA claim,
Woodson knew or should have known that his interest in possible attorney’s fees
would not be adequately protected by the parties because Teutscher did not seek
fees for Woodson’s work on the case. By the time Woodson moved to intervene
against Teutscher more than three years later, post-trial motions had already been
decided and appealed, and final judgment, including as to attorney’s fees, had been
entered. Thus, the district court did not err by finding that the stage during which
Woodson’s motion to intervene would have been appropriate had long passed.1 Cf.
Blum v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc., 712 F.3d 1349, 1354 (9th Cir.
1 Nothing in our disposition of Woodson’s first appeal suggests otherwise.
See Teutscher v. Woodson, 659 F. App’x 930 (9th Cir. 2013). Specifically, our
observation that our holding “[did] not prevent Woodson from [] attempting to
collect his fees directly from Teutscher” did not guarantee Woodson a right to
intervention nor suggest that he could not have sought intervention against
Teutscher from the outset. See id. at 933.

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2013) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding a
motion to intervene timely where the motion was filed one day after the party’s
interest in the litigation arose).
Nor did the district court err in finding that permitting intervention “would
certainly and severely prejudice the parties.” Teutscher would likely face
duplicative litigation expenses revisiting records with which he and his counsel
were previously familiar and may have approached his settlement with RSA
differently had he known Woodson intended to intervene against him. Cf. United
States v. Oregon, 745 F.2d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 1984) (focusing on whether the
existing parties’ concerns about intervention were caused by the delay). Nor has
Woodson offered a persuasive reason for his delay, since nothing prevented him
from filing the motion to intervene against Teutscher before the first appeal. See
United States v. Washington, 86 F.3d 1499, 1504–05 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding
asserted reasons for delay, including that previous motion to intervene had been
denied, unsatisfactory).
“A finding of untimeliness defeats a motion for permissive intervention.”
Id. at 1507. Since the district court’s untimeliness finding is supported by the
record, it was within its discretion to deny Woodson’s motion for permission
intervention.2
2 Woodson’s unopposed motion for judicial notice [Dkt. 11] is granted.

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AFFIRMED.

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