Juanita Celia Garcia v. Deborah K. Johnson

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUANITA CELIA GARCIA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
DEBORAH K. JOHNSON,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 17-55618
D.C. No.
2:13-cv-06864-JFW-FFM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 9, 2018
Pasadena, California
Before: CALLAHAN and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and EZRA, District Judge**
Juanita Garcia was convicted of murdering her longtime boyfriend, David
Zweig. Because the jury found that Garcia killed Zweig for financial gain, she was
sentenced to life without parole. Garcia appeals from the district court’s denial of
her habeas petition, in which she alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. We
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the
District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
FILED
AUG 21 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we affirm.1
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a habeas petition. Murray v.
Schriro, 882 F.3d 778, 801 (9th Cir. 2018). Our review is governed by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Under AEDPA, habeas relief cannot be granted “unless the state court
decision: ‘(1) was contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court, (2) involved an unreasonable application of such law, or (3) . . .
was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record
before the state court.’” Murray, 882 F.3d at 801 (quoting Fairbank v. Ayers, 650
F.3d 1243, 1251 (9th Cir. 2011), as amended).
To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must
show (1) constitutionally deficient performance by counsel (2) that prejudiced the
defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Garcia argues her
trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient representation because, she alleges,
he contacted the administrator of Zweig’s trust to make payments to Garcia. At
trial, the prosecution offered evidence of the attorney’s contact with the trust
administrator in support of its theory of Garcia’s financial motive. Garcia argues
that her trial counsel thus had an impermissible conflict of interest that prejudiced
1 Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural
history of the case, we need not recount it here.

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her defense.2
Garcia fails to meet her burden under Strickland’s prejudice prong and
AEDPA. Although the California Court of Appeal’s decision indisputably recites
Strickland’s prejudice standard correctly, Garcia argues the Court of Appeal
misapplied the standard because in two instances in its decision it did not use the
precise “reasonable probability” terminology. Despite any such imprecision, we
are satisfied that the state court applied the correct standard, especially in light of
AEDPA’s requirement that we give state courts the benefit of the doubt. See
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 23–24 (2002) (reversing court of appeals’ grant
of habeas petition where state court used imprecise language in applying Strickland
prejudice prong); Mann v. Ryan, 828 F.3d 1143, 1158 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(“Under AEDPA, because we can read the decision to comport with clearly
established federal law, we must do so.”).
Garcia’s primary argument that she meets Strickland’s prejudice prong is
that the evidence of her attorney contacting the trust administrator was the
“linchpin” of the prosecution’s financial motive theory. Garcia’s argument ignores
the state court’s conclusion that “[e]ven if the jury did not hear evidence of
2 Garcia concedes that the alleged conflict of interest does not excuse
her from satisfying Strickland’s prejudice requirement. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535
U.S. 162, 166 (2002) (holding that prejudice is presumed “where assistance of
counsel has been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding”).

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[counsel’s] contact with the trust attorney, there was ample evidence to support a
finding of financial motive.” The Court of Appeal stated:
[Garcia] knew that Zweig had created a trust. In fact, she told the
trust attorney that he had misspelled Zweig’s name in the trust
documents. She admitted she knew he was leaving most of his assets
to her. Audio recordings from the surveillance system also show that
in early October, [Garcia] demanded Zweig pay her $15,000 to move
out and when he only offered her $5,000 to leave immediately, she
threatened to “take [him] down.” [Garcia] also contacted the trust
attorney both before and after Zweig died regarding paying his
medical and funeral expenses.
A fairminded jurist could have concluded that, in light of the other evidence of
Garcia’s financial motive, Garcia failed to show a reasonable probability that, but
for the asserted conflict, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
The California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that Garcia failed to show prejudice
under Strickland was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did not
involve an unreasonable application of such law, and was not based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts.
AFFIRMED.

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